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From the Editor
Welcome to the fourth special issue of the Combating Terrorism Exchange, 
“Countering Hybrid Warfare: The Best Uses of SOF in a Pre–Article V Scenario,” 
guest edited by Frank Steder of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment 
and Leo Blanken of the US Naval Postgraduate School.
The subject of this issue is counterterrorism viewed from the angle of what is 
being called hybrid warfare or sometimes hybrid operations. These are the activities 
that an actor undertakes short of open warfare to undermine a target’s formal and 
informal political, economic, and social institutions. The goal may be to break 
the target apart by hammering at existing ethnic, political, and social fissures; to 
infiltrate and suborn institutions; or falling short of these larger goals, to under-
mine and cripple the target. Overt or covert armed aggression may be used at any 
point to complete the destruction, but it is not always required.  
History is rife with examples of hybrid warfare, dating back to, well, the begin-
ning of warfare. Economic, military, and social ties are common avenues that 
aggressors have used to infiltrate targets, create funnels for information, develop 
dependencies, and weaken prey. The British East India Company, a pioneer of 
this process, slowly assumed political as well as economic control of the Indian 
subcontinent over a period of 200 years, through trade and the placement of 
“advisors” in the palaces of regional rulers. By the time Britain formally took over 
India as a Crown colony in the mid-nineteenth century, it was largely a matter of 
receiving the keys; sovereignty had long been lost. In the late nineteenth century, 
a group of American-Hawai’ian plantation owners applied intense economic pres-
sure on Hawai’i’s Queen Lili’uokalani to cede them control over trade and foreign 
relations before overthrowing her, with the inside help of cronies serving in the 
queen’s government and a contingent of US Marines.
Similar kinds of agricultural colonization in Latin America brought us the term 
“banana republic,” meaning a small ostensibly sovereign country under the de 
facto—sometimes de jure—control of multinational corporations. During the 
Cold War (1947–1991), the Soviet Union and the United States vied for influ-
ence across the globe, using every political and economic avenue available to 
them to cajole and/or force governments in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and 
Eastern Europe to accept the superpowers’ “friendship” and “protection.” And of 
course, during the Cold War, both superpowers spent enormous resources trying 
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to undermine the other through espionage, economic sabotage, and proxy warfare, while avoiding any direct conflict that 
might escalate to a nuclear exchange.
The twenty-first century is witnessing a form of hybrid warfare that is highly refined and difficult to counter because it 
disdains our comfortable Western assumptions about inter-state relations. The Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin’s 
rule, according to several of the contributors in this issue, has mastered the art of hybrid warfare in Russia’s near abroad to 
the point that it can pursue multiple strategies simultaneously and be ready to capitalize on any outcome, from a weakened 
target to a splintered one. This is what the contributors say happened in Ukraine over the dozen years leading up to the 
2014 annexation of Crimea. Before Ukraine came Georgia and Abkhazia, where Putin tested and honed his methods for 
bringing recalcitrant former Soviet satellites back under Moscow’s control. Russia’s SOF, the Spetsnaz, which has gained a 
reputation for its skill at infiltrating and manipulating neighboring countries’ ethnic Russian populations, has been one of 
his principal tools. 
Frank Steder’s introduction to this special issue lays out the structure and topics in detail, so I won’t say more about them 
here. I will close, however, by saying that my early skepticism that this “Russian style” of hybrid warfare is something new 
and deserving of our attention evaporated as I studied the articles. There is something happening, and we all need to pay 
attention, including the new administration in Washington. The great Russian bear has learned to move like a snake, but 
NATO still scans the horizon for its familiar ursine bulk instead of looking nearby for twitching blades of grass and panicked 
prey. What might happen if Estonia, a NATO member and an obvious irritant to the Kremlin, is the next victim to be 
bitten? Does NATO wait until Estonia is prostrate before determining whether there’s anything it should do to help? Or 
does it react at the first cry of alarm? As articles in this issue suggest, the future of the Alliance, and of many small countries 
in Russia’s near abroad, may depend on the answer.
ELIZABETH SKINNER
Managing Editor, CTX 
CTXEditor@globalecco.org
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS
Major Jesper J.D. Andreassen serves in the Royal Danish Air Force 
where he is a qualified rotary wing pilot. He has also served as the Air 
Liaison Officer to the Danish land special operations forces. Maj Andre-
assen’s previous position was on the Air Staff at the Defence Command 
Denmark, where he served as a subject matter expert on special air opera-
tions. His operational experience includes two tours to Afghanistan. 
Maj Andreassen earned his commission at the Royal Danish Air Force 
Academy and is currently pursuing a master’s degree in Defense Analysis 
at the US Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).
Major Abdullah Atay is currently working toward a master’s degree in 
the Special Operations and Irregular Warfare program in the Defense 
Analysis department at NPS. He will graduate in December 2016. His 
work focuses primarily on the strategic utility of the Russian Spetsnaz 
(special forces) following World War II. Mr. Atay also researches hybrid 
warfare, national power, and counterterrorism, with the intent of finding 
ways to win wars before the actual battles begin.
Major Kenneth Boesgaard has served in the Danish Land Special 
Operations Forces, also known as Jægerkorpset (or the Hunter Corps) 
since 2006 as an operator, a platoon leader, and an operations officer. 
He has deployed three times to Afghanistan. MAJ Boesgaard received 
his officer’s education at the Royal Danish Military Academy and is 
currently pursuing a master’s degree in Special Operations and Irregular 
Warfare in the Defense Analysis department at NPS. Upon his return to 
Denmark, MAJ Boesgaard will serve in the newly created Danish Special 
Operations Command.
Espen Berg-Knutsen is currently the director of the Special Opera-
tions Research and Development Program (SORD) at the Norwegian 
Defence Research Establishment (FFI). As a visiting research scientist in 
the Defense Analysis department at NPS from 2014 to 2015, he initiated 
and directed the NORSOF 2025 study, together with Professor Nancy 
Roberts.
Dr. Leo Blanken is an associate professor in the Defense Analysis 
department at NPS and a guest editor of this special issue of CTX. He 
published a book on geopolitics entitled Rational Empires: Institutional 
Incentives and Imperial Expansion (University of Chicago Press, 2012) 
and co-edited the recent volume Assessing War: The Challenge of 
Measuring Success and Failure (Georgetown University Press, 2015). He 
has also written articles on a variety of international security topics. His 
current research focuses on the problems of military planning in the 
context of changing international norms and political constraints.
continued page 4
Inside This Issue
Letter from the Editor ELIZABETH SKINNER
5 Foreword
LT GEN MARSHALL B. “BRAD” WEBB, NATO SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
HEADQUARTERS
7 Introduction: The Theory, History, and Current State of Hybrid Warfare
FRANK BRUNDTLAND STEDER, NORWEGIAN DEFENCE RESEARCH 
ESTABLISHMENT
Section One: Russian Hybrid Strategies and Tactics in Ukraine
20 Countering Russian Hybrid Warfare: Acknowledging the Character of Modern Conflict
CW4 STEPHEN M. DAYSPRING, US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES
31 Russian Aggression toward Ukraine: A Long-Term Example Of Hybrid Warfare
OLEKSANDR DANYLYUK, UKRAINE CENTER FOR DEFENSE REFORMS
45 The Strategic Utility of the Russian Spetsnaz in Crimea
MAJ ABDULLAH ATAY, US NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Section Two: NATO Responses to Hybrid Strategies
54 Is It All Just a Bad Habit? Explaining NATO’s Difficulty in Deterring Russian Aggression
LEO BLANKEN, US NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
61 From Tactical Champions to Grand Strategy Enablers: The Future of Small-Nation SOF in 
Counter–Hybrid Warfare 
ESPEN BERG-KNUTSEN, NORWEGIAN DEFENCE RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT
69 To Change or Not to Change? 
LTC SÁNDOR FÁBIÁN, NATO SPECIAL OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS
75 Sharpening the Spear of NATO SOF: Deterring Russian Hybrid Aggression through 
Network Targeting
MAJ BRIAN W. JAMES, US NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
83 NATO Needs to Better Integrate Conventional and Special Operations Forces
MAJ JESPER ANDREASSEN, MAJ KENNETH BOESGAARD, AND  
MAJ ANDERS SVENDSEN, US NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
90 NATO SOF Military Assistance to Support Deterrence and Reassure Russia
CAPT MARIUS KRISTIANSEN AND LTC ANDREAS HEDENSTRØM,  
US NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
100 Afterword
COL MICHAEL RICHARDSON, US NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
4CTX | Vol. 6, No. 4
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS (CONT.)
COVER PHOTO
A US Marine watches a demonstration of an amphibious assault from the 
bridge of HMS Ocean (UK), as part of Exercise Baltops 16. Photographer 
unknown, NATO, via Flickr.
DISCLAIMER
This journal is not an official DoD publication. The views expressed 
or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of any governmental or nongovernmental organization 
or agency of the United States of America or any other country.
TERMS OF COPYRIGHT
Copyright © 2016 by the author(s), except where otherwise noted. The Combating Terrorism Exchange journal (CTX) is a peer-reviewed, quarterly journal available free 
of charge to individuals and institutions. Copies of this journal and the articles contained herein may be printed or downloaded and redistributed for personal, research, 
or educational purposes free of charge and without permission, except if otherwise noted. Any commercial use of CTX or the articles published herein is expressly pro-
hibited without the written consent of the copyright holder. The copyright of all articles published herein rests with the author(s) of the article, unless otherwise noted.
Oleksandr Danylyuk is the chairman of the Centre for Defense Re-
forms in Ukraine. Since the beginning of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian 
war, he has served as chief adviser to the Ukrainian minister of defense. 
From 2010 to 2014, during the Viktor Yanukovych presidency, Mr. 
Danylyuk developed an underground resistance movement (about 
25,000 members), which became the initiator and main driving force 
behind the Revolution of Dignity (2013–2014). He has been a member 
of the Ukrainian National Bar Association since 2003 and has been 
involved in conflict management and resolution in various types of 
political, corporate, and religious conflicts.
Chief Warrant Officer 4 Stephen Dayspring has nearly 20 years of 
special operations experience with the US Army Special Forces. He 
has served as an operator and staff officer at the detachment, company, 
battalion, and group levels and has extensive operational experience in 
the Balkans, Iraq, Africa, and Eastern Europe. CW4 Dayspring holds an 
MS in Defense Analysis from NPS, where he focused his thesis research 
on analyzing Russian hybrid warfare. He is currently serving as a special 
operations integration officer at the US Army’s Training and Doctrine 
Command.
Lieutenant Colonel Sándor Fábián is a Special Forces officer in the 
Hungarian Army, currently serving as head of the Assessment and 
Evaluation Branch, NATO Special Operations Headquarters, in Mons, 
Belgium. In 2006, CPT Fábián helped create the Hungarian Special 
Forces Battalion as a Special Forces company commander. In early 
2009, he was promoted to major and deployed to Afghanistan as the 
commander of the Hungarian Special Forces element. In June 2012, 
MAJ Fábián became the senior Special Forces adviser at the Operational 
Directorate of the Hungarian General Staff. He was promoted to 
lieutenant colonel in 2014.
Major Andreas Hedenstrøm has served in the Norwegian Army for 18 
years and currently serves in the Norwegian Special Operations Com-
mand. He has served as squad leader, platoon commander, and company 
commander, in addition to different staff positions. His operational 
experience is mainly from deployments to the Balkans, Africa, and 
Afghanistan. MAJ Hedenstrøm is a graduate of the Defense Analysis 
program at NPS.
Major Brian W. James is currently enrolled in the Special Operations 
and Irregular Warfare curriculum at NPS. He is a US Army Infantry 
officer with 11 years of experience in various infantry units, including 
the 1st Infantry Division, 82nd Airborne Division, and the 75th Ranger 
Regiment. While serving most recently in the 75th Ranger Regiment, 
MAJ James worked as an operations officer and company commander 
within a Special Operations Joint Task Force, where he gained extensive 
experience with US targeting doctrine to degrade enemy networks in 
Afghanistan. 
Captain Marius Kristiansen has served in the Norwegian Army for 13 
years and is currently enrolled in the Defense Analysis program at NPS. 
CPT Kristiansen was a patrol commander and platoon commander, 
in addition to one staff position within the Norwegian Army. His 
operational experience is mainly from deployments to Afghanistan.
Colonel Michael Richardson is the chair for Special Operations at NPS. 
Previous to this post, COL Richardson served as the chief of staff, NATO 
Special Operations Headquarters. He was commissioned into the Army 
Corps of Engineers in May 1990, and transferred to the Special Forces 
Regiment in 1996, where he served as an ODA and AOB commander 
and battalion operations officer in the 10th Special Forces Group. COL 
Richardson subsequently commanded Baker and Dog squadrons of the 
Asymmetric Warfare Group. He holds a BA in Political Science from 
Gettysburg College, an MS in Defense Analysis from NPS, and is a PhD 
candidate in US History at the University of California, Los Angeles. 
Frank Brundtland Steder, guest editor for this special edition of 
CTX, is a principal scientist with FFI. He recently completed a year as 
a visiting researcher and director of the Norwegian Special Operations 
Research and Development program at NPS. Mr. Steder has been a 
project and program manager in the Analysis Division at FFI, overseeing 
several interdisciplinary subjects: operational research, human resource 
management, outsourcing and sourcing questions, system analysis, 
benchmarking studies (study director in NATO/RTO), long-term 
defense planning, efficiency studies, policy studies, and performance 
management, as well as a wide range of personnel and gender studies.
Major Anders Svendsen serves in the Danish Special Operations Com-
mand. He has served as both enlisted and an officer in Army reconnais-
sance and infantry in various functions including squad leader, platoon 
leader, company commander, and battalion staff. He has extensive 
operational experience from the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan. MAJ 
Svendsen earned his commission at the Royal Danish Military Academy 
in 2003 and completed the Danish Command and General Staff Course 
in 2015. He is currently pursuing a master’s degree in Special Operations 
and Irregular Warfare at NPS.
Lieutenant General Marshall B. “Brad” Webb is the commander, 
Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Florida. Lt 
Gen Webb graduated from the US Air Force Academy in 1984. He is a 
command pilot with more than 3,700 flying hours, including 117 combat 
hours in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Bosnia. He has commanded the 20th 
Special Operations Squadron, the 352nd Special Operations Group, the 
1st Special Operations Wing, the 23rd Air Force, Special Operations 
Command Europe, and NATO Special Operations Headquarters. His 
staff assignments include duty at Headquarters Air Force Special Opera-
tions Command, at the Joint Special Operations Command, and in the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
November 2016
5
Foreword Lt Gen Marshall B. Webb,  NATO Special Operations 
Headquarters 
The NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) is proud to 
sponsor a US Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Special Operations Forces– 
focused research project, “Countering Hybrid Warfare: The Best Uses of SOF 
in a Pre-Article V Scenario.” The NSHQ has a long-standing association with 
both academic and government research institutions inside and across NATO 
nations. The NSHQ values a “whole of government” approach to the difficult 
problems its members may face, and this research project is another step forward 
in the enduring tradition of mutual support between the military and academic 
communities. This special edition of the Combating Terrorism Exchange is a 
result of collaboration with Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) 
researchers, NPS faculty, and SOF students in the NPS Defense Analysis depart-
ment. NPS is a well-known NATO SOF supporter, and the vast majority of its 
alumni serve in NATO nations. The NSHQ has benefited from the service of 
both current and former NPS students.
A one-of-a-kind organization, the NSHQ is the primary point of development, 
coordination, and direction for all NATO SOF-related activities. The goals of 
NSHQ are to optimize the use of SOF’s unique capabilities and provide an opera-
tional command capability when directed by the Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe. The NSHQ was established in 2006 as the NATO Special Operations 
Coordination Center, with a mandate to develop policy, doctrine, and concepts 
for the use of SOF in support of the Alliance and its member states. Today, NSHQ 
personnel, who represent 29 Allied and partner nations, continue to provide 
cutting-edge concepts for how SOF can fulfill their unique and complementary 
roles in a range of pre-conflict and active conflict situations. This collection of 
essays, which explore the best ways to use SOF in conflicts short of full-scale war 
(the invocation of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty), is another step toward 
fulfilling that mandate.1
To initiate this study, I asked the research team to explore a single question: 
what courses of action can NATO, as an Alliance of 28 nations, take to counter 
or mitigate threats below the threshold of war, without requiring additional 
authorities beyond those currently approved by the North Atlantic Council, 
NATO’s governing body? The articles in this special issue of CTX are the results 
of the team’s studies. The first three articles frame the challenges facing the 
Alliance by analyzing the current operational environment leading up to, but 
not crossing, the Article V threshold—the point at which the Alliance invokes 
collective military-led self-defense. The rest of the articles describe some of the 
obstacles NATO faces as it adapts to this environment, and explore the unique 
capabilities that SOF can contribute, both to mitigating the threats before a 
crisis reaches the level of an Article V declaration and in defense of the Alliance 
following a declaration of war.  
I believe readers will find value in this broad selection of writings on the ways 
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limitations and restrictions of the NATO framework. Operations in the pre–
Article V environment are a difficult problem with a complicated overlap of 
authorizations, planning processes, and legal rules. The supporting questions 
the authors ask and answer were chosen to explore these and related issues in 
detail. These authors are a unique group because they are not passive observers 
of the international security environment, but rather are experienced special 
operations officers who have been given the time, resources, and expert 
guidance of  professional NPS and FFI researchers to thoroughly analyze the 
topic question.  
This research project is highly pertinent for our times. The Alliance’s enemies 
and competitor nations continuously study our procedures, and systematically 
analyze how NATO escalates to war. By hovering under the threshold of activi-
ties that might trigger an Article V declaration, they seek advantage within the 
gray areas of our system. Conversely, we pursue the same knowledge, but from 
a different angle: what activities can NATO SOF perform that do not require 
an Article V announcement? Our enemies may conduct hybrid operations 
in an overt manner, but NATO does so as well, whether purposefully or not. 
The articles in this anthology offer new options, ideas, and courses of action 
to consider that are valuable to NATO and NATO SOF. New perspectives from 
outside entities such as research institutions and think tanks offer vital insight 
that might not be obvious to those of us closer to the fight. NSHQ benefits from 
the zeal and academic discipline that NPS students and faculty, along with their 
FFI colleagues, bring to bear on grand ideas and problem sets.
The collegial and cooperative relationship that exists between our institutions 
fosters long-term support for the solution of difficult problems that deserve a 
thoughtful and in-depth approach. The collective expertise of the “whole of 
governments” is one of the Alliance’s chief advantages for solving problems, 
because it enables us to reveal hidden perspectives, investigate new ideas, and 
discover intriguing solutions that might remain hidden from a purely military 
vantage point. We truly benefit from each other’s strengths. The NSHQ looks 
forward to future projects between NSHQ, NPS, and FFI. ²
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Lt Gen Marshall B. “Brad” Webb commanded NATO Special Operations 
Headquarters from August 2014 to July 2016.
This is a work of the US federal government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 
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NOTES
1  Article V, known as the “collective defense clause,” reads: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise 
of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties 
so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed 
force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. 
 
“Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be 
terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.” 
 
North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243: http://www.NATO.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm
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Introduction: The Theory, History, and 
Current State of Hybrid Warfare
Frank Brundtland Steder, 
Norwegian Defence  
Research Establishment
The greatest victory is that which requires no battle. 
 — Sun Tzu, The Art of War1
The articles in this special edition of the Combating Terrorism 
Exchange (CTX) discuss current and future uses of Special Operations Forces, 
particularly the best use of SOF in a pre–Article V scenario—that is, before invok-
ing the “collective defense” clause that permits resort to armed force according 
to the stipulations of the original North Atlantic Treaty. The main impetus for 
suggesting greater use of SOF—in both traditional and non-traditional roles—is 
the escalation in the Russian Federation’s aggressive behavior towards Eastern 
European NATO and non-NATO countries in recent years.
The main purpose of this special issue is to enlighten international CTX readers 
about the similarities and differences between SOF counterterrorism methods 
and other SOF missions and tasks, and these methods’ relative utility in the 
emerging threat environment. It has become increasingly apparent, not only to 
academics but also to SOF professionals, that CT and other direct SOF approaches 
address only observable and immediate threats, not necessarily the long-term 
causes of those threats. As long as this is the case, terrorist organizations, criminal 
elements, and hostile state actors will most likely continue to grow and adapt for 
the future battlefield. Indirect SOF methods, like those described in more detail 
later in this issue, may provide a wider range of near-term options for NATO.
The project behind this special issue builds on the 
examination of hybrid warfare presented in the 
NORSOF 2025 study (see the article by Berg-Knutsen 
in this issue).2 That study, supported by the work 
of international SOF students at the US Naval Post-
graduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California, set 
out to answer the question “How should we design a 
SOF structure that will best serve the security interests 
of Norway in 2025?” The students carried out a 
“strategic design” process that included interviews 
with SOF leaders and subject matter experts from 
around the world. One finding is that “future warfare 
will move beyond the military domain into the civil 
domain, challenging traditional organizations and 
doctrines.” Furthermore, the students claim that 
“as a result of Russia’s strategic and political show 
of force in the last few years, the need to counter 
unconventional/hybrid warfare will likely increase in 
the future.” Hence, as a continuation of the NORSOF 
2025 study, this special issue of CTX seeks to propose 
“FUTURE 
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the best uses of national and international SOF when countering unconventional 
tactics and hybrid opponents in a typical pre–Article V scenario. 
The authors of the nine articles included here are a mixture of academics and 
both active and retired military officers from six different countries, all of whom 
have a background in international SOF operations and SOF-related research. 
Most of the authors are current NPS students or graduates of the Department 
of Defense Analysis at NPS. They all share an interest in the potential value of 
indirect approaches in future conflicts. 
Each of the articles addresses a different but complementary topic. Some of the 
articles explore the motivations for Russia’s renewed near-abroad strategy, others 
discuss how this strategy has been carried out and what to learn from it (in 
Ukraine, for example), and some suggest new concepts and ideas for the future 
use of national and international SOF to counter hybrid strategies. I outline each 
of the articles later in this introductory essay, but first I would like to clarify 
some important themes and topics that these articles have in common.
Hybrid Warfare: Something Old, Something New, 
Something Borrowed, Something … Red?
The term hybrid warfare has been widely debated within the international 
security community in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and 
remains a source of concern for observers of current Russian policy.3 It is useful 
to trace the evolution of the term over the last two decades, because a common 
understanding of the concept is crucial for our task of exploring possible NATO 
SOF countermeasures to hybrid warfare.    
According to our research, the first time the term appeared in a publicly available 
text was in an NPS master’s thesis titled “SPEC FI: USMC and Special Operations,” 
written by US Marine Corps (USMC) Lieutenant Robert Walker in 1998.4 Walker 
discussed the expeditionary capability of the Marine Corps as being “a hybrid 
force for a hybrid war.” He continued, “Hybrid warfare is that which lies in the 
interstices between special and conventional warfare.”5 This early definition of 
hybrid warfare addresses an internal point of efficiency: the best use of scarce 
military resources is achieved through a combination of conventional and non-
conventional forces.
In 2002, another NPS student, Major William Nemeth, USMC, used the term in 
his thesis to discuss means to counter hostile actions from what he calls “mixed 
and hybrid societies,” through a case study of the Chechen separatist movement.6 
Nemeth explored not only linkages between military and civilian entities, but 
also how a mix of traditional and modern approaches, and of civil actions and 
warfare, creates an effective hybrid force. He postulated that hybrid warfare 
would become increasingly prevalent, and claimed that “the strengths of hybrid 
warfare lend themselves to the use of guerrilla tactics, which technologically 
advanced and highly bureaucratic forces have a difficult time countering.”7 In 
other words, when a modern army confronts a smaller hybrid force, the conven-
tional force will be compelled to rethink its established doctrines and adapt its 
operational procedures so that it can identify and exploit the critical vulner-
abilities of the hybrid enemy. This adaptation will enable modern conventional 
HYBRID WARFARE 







forces to strike the center of gravity of the opponent and thus reduce its freedom 
of movement, capacity, and will to fight.
The popularity of the concept of hybrid warfare took off in a 2005 article by 
James Mattis and Frank Hoffman, published in the US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings.8 The two authors drew attention to the fact that US conventional and 
technological military superiority could be challenged not only by other states, 
but also by non-state actors and adversaries, through the combined use of less 
advanced technologies. Countries with advanced conventional forces are likely 
to face more irregular procedures and tactics that represent an advantage: 
adversaries compensate for inferior capacity, techniques, and capabilities through 
the use of terrorism, insurgency, and guerrilla tactics. These threats will most 
likely be carried out by paramilitary formations organized according to ethnic 
background, by organized crime syndicates, and through cyber attacks against 
essential military and civilian infrastructure such as political, financial, and 
communications networks. 
In his 2007 essay, “Conflicts in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” 
Hoffman used historical examples to explore the concept of hybrid warfare.9 
In this popularized treatment, Hoffman defined hybrid warfare as a “range of 
different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics 
and formations, terrorist acts including discriminate violence and coercion, and 
criminal disorder.” He then tested this definition against several historical cases, 
including the Irish insurgents of 1919–1920, the Afghan mujahedeen in the 
1980s, Chechen rebels in the 1990s, and Hezbollah in its 2006 
war with Israel. Hezbollah, Hoffman claimed, is the clearest 
example of a modern hybrid force because it relied on a combi-
nation of military and civilian means, and achieved its objective 
through organized strategic movements and with decentralized 
cells that used various adaptive tactics.
In the years following the publication of Hoffman’s essay, the 
US Department of Defense (DoD) and Government Account-
ability Office (GAO) evaluated the term hybrid warfare to better 
describe the methods used by adversaries against US and allied 
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.10 In their opinion, published 
in a 2010 report, there was no need to officially define hybrid 
warfare as a unique subset of warfare terminology (as had been 
done with biological warfare, irregular warfare, or landmine 
warfare, for example), and the DoD and GAO urged officials 
and academics not to introduce this new sub-terminology for 
warfare.11 This reluctance came to a quick end in 2014 with the 
Russian annexation of Crimea.
After Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Crimea emerged from 
their clandestine phase in early 2014, the term hybrid warfare 
became the latest buzzword among officials, academics, and 
practitioners to describe the West’s perception of Russian 
actions as something new.12 It was later applied to the revitalized 
eastern flank of NATO as well, reflecting the perception that the 
security picture in Europe—and the West—was returning to a 
Cold War–like scenario.13 Russia, by contrast, did not use the 
GERASIMOV 
CHARACTERIZED 
HYBRID WARFARE AS 
MODERN WARFARE.
Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov
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term hybrid warfare until 2016, when it was presented in a speech by Chief of the 
General Staff General Valery Gerasimov before the Russian Academy of Military 
Sciences.14 Based on the Russian threat assessment and especially in light of the 
extensive reformation of the Russian armed forces in 2008, Gerasimov character-
ized hybrid warfare as modern warfare and included the so-called “color revolu-
tions,” which he claimed were used by the United States and its allies to “[blur] 
the lines between war and peace.”15 He went on to state that “non-military means 
of achieving military and strategic goals have grown and in many cases exceeded 
the power of weapons in their effectiveness.”16
Over the years, there have been many suggestions for how to counter non-state 
and state actors that appear to be hybrid forces. The principal question in future 
battle is whether to use the same strategy or tactics as one’s opponents, or to do 
something different and unexpected. There are researchers and officials who 
urge adaptation, new tactics, and upgraded procedures, but few offer specifics 
on how to actually counter future hybrid threats.17 According to General Petr 
Pavel, head of the NATO Military Committee, “The primary purpose is to create 
an influence that is strong enough, but below the threshold of [collective defense 
provision] Article 5, so they achieve the goals without provoking the enemy 
or opponent to initiate a defense response.”18 The articles you will read in this 
special edition of CTX intend to illuminate the best use of national and interna-
tional SOF, aligned with the overall strategy of NATO, on the hybrid battlefield.
At the end of the day, it does not really matter whether hybrid warfare is a new 
or old concept. It is nevertheless tempting to remind readers of what Prussian 
strategist Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) and Chinese strategist Sun Tzu (5th 
century BCE) had to say in this regard: a hybrid approach is simply warfare that 
uses all means necessary to achieve victory.19 The term hybrid operations might be 
more precise for characterizing tactics that are short of war, that is, a pre–Article V 
scenario, given that the topic of this special issue is how NATO can improve its 
counteractions in a low-level conflict situation or, where possible, avoid war 
altogether. For simplicity and consistency, the authors use the term hybrid 
warfare throughout this special edition of CTX, well aware of its use, misuse, and 
controversial definition.20 The overall question the authors are trying to answer, 
regardless of the definition, is how best to counter a hybrid force, or an opponent 
that is using all means necessary—conventional and non-conventional, legal and 
illegal, regular and irregular—to weaken a target across time, level, and place, 
before war is declared.
The Gerasimov Doctrine: Using All Means Necessary
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the successor Russian Federation indi-
cated that it might be moving slowly toward internal liberal democratic and 
market economic reforms. Externally, the USSR’s Cold War policy of exporting 
influence turned toward protecting Russians in the near abroad, that is, in the 
newly independent states that once made up the USSR.21 This policy positioned 
Russia and gave it a platform from which to continue to project power and influ-
ence outside of its borders, and inevitably brought it into conflict with Western 
democratic principles. Once the Baltic states declared their independence in 1991, 
protecting the Russian diaspora located within their borders proved to be the 
winning rationale for intervention. In Lithuania, Russia exerted control over the 
Lithuanian Communist party and the Yedinstvo movement, which were fighting 





and organized workers’ protests.22 The Russian military was eventually able to 
deploy into Lithuania under the pretense of keeping law and order for the new 
country’s ethnic Russian citizens, who comprised a quarter of the population. 
Around the same time, Russia sent “volunteers” to assist Russian separatists 
in Moldova, and the Russian military provided support to those “volunteers.” 
In the early 2000s, Latvia and Lithuania were caught up in scandals that in-
volved Russian-funded political organizations, disinformation campaigns, and 
bribery—glimpses into Russia’s determined projection of influence in its near 
abroad. The “color revolutions” in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan influenced 
and served as justification for Russia’s assertiveness and determination to project 
its anti-Western narrative in the information realm of political warfare.23  
In recent history, Russia’s use of military and non-military tactics has played 
out successfully in Georgia and Ukraine. After its UN-sanctioned insertion into 
Georgian politics through peacekeeping operations in both Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia (1992–2008), Russia was positioned militarily and diplomatically to 
sow dissent and solidify its influence over Georgia. It overtly began to assert its 
diplomatic leverage by placing ethnic Russians in key ministry positions in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia.24 
Russia’s cyber war tactics at the outbreak of military escalation “included various 
distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks to deny/disrupt communications 
and information exfiltration activities conducted to accumulate military and 
political intelligence from Georgian networks.”25 After just five days of combat 
operations, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev ordered Russian troops to end 
all military operations in Georgia and accepted a peace plan that essentially 
allowed Russia to continue to assert its dominance over Georgia.26  
Influence over Ukraine, which has large valuable energy and industrial sectors, 
has been vital to Soviet and Russian national objectives since the 1917 revolu-
tion. The two countries share not just a long border but also interdependent 
economies, a military-industrial partnership, and large ethnic diasporas. Moscow 
has perpetuated Russia-friendly narratives and information campaigns within 
Ukraine’s largely Russian-speaking south and east, and has used its extensive 
network of pro-Russian resources and personnel within Ukraine to exploit 
opportunities and sow dissent whenever it was useful.27 These activities have 
disrupted internal Ukrainian politics in favor of Russian objectives and delegiti-
mized the Ukrainian government as it pursues further ties with the West.28 The 
variety and complexity of the actors Moscow employs reflect the intensity of its 
actions and tactics. These coordinated efforts include using NGOs to promote 
anti-Western, anti-NATO, and anti-democratic sentiment; raising doubts about 
Crimea’s territorial status; using language and education as political instruments, 
including book and school burnings; publishing and distributing free anti-state 
newspapers; renaming streets, towns, and cultural centers; hanging Russian flags 
and plaques and scrawling Nazi graffiti on Ukrainian buildings; supporting 
separatist calls from Russian politicians; using religion as a political instrument 
and promoting the Russian Orthodox Church; and modifying shared common 
memory.29 Russia’s physical positioning in Crimea and its continued cultivation 
of economic relationships, pro-Russian movements, and interdependence with 
the Ukrainian government allowed Moscow to swiftly exploit the “Euromaidan” 
movement to protect Russian nationals, take over Crimea, and foment discord 
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In 2013, General Gerasimov published an article presenting a model that clearly 
describes Russian intent and phased actions to meet national interests, a model 
now known as the “Gerasimov Strategy.” Gerasimov described a world where 
“the role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has 
grown, and in many cases, they have exceeded the power of weapons in their ef-
fectiveness.”30 Non-military means include the political, economic, information, 
humanitarian, and other sectors, in coordination with the “protest potential of 
the population.” Gerasimov clearly stated that the use of special operations and 
other military forces may be necessary, but they are often carried out under the 
guise of other missions to conceal the real purposes of subversion, coercion, and 
classic unconventional warfare tactics.31 The model in figure 1, from a translated 
version of his original article, clearly shows that the initial phases of hybrid 
mobilization focus on non-military methods, and highlights the phase that 
emphasizes civil society and the human domain.32
As figure 1 illustrates, the formation of coalitions, unions, and political opposi-
tion groups and the application of political, economic, and diplomatic pressure 
are tools that can be leveraged by using all instruments of national power to 
influence the human domain (civil society). The official Russian military doc-
trine approved by the Russian Security Council and President Vladimir Putin 
in December 2014 further highlights how Russia sees conflict. According to this 
doctrine, modern conflicts require “the use of indirect and asymmetric modes of 
actions,” including “non-military measures implemented with the extensive use 
of the protest potential of the population” and externally funded “political forces 
and social movements.”33
Figure 1: The Gerasimov Strategy: Role of Non-Military Methods in Resolving Inter-Governmental Conflicts
November 2016
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Special Operations Forces Are Necessary in Hybrid 
Warfare
There are many popular myths and misconceptions about special operations 
forces.34 A commonly agreed-upon definition of SOF is given in NATO doctrine 
AJP-3.5.35
Special operations are military activities conducted by specially 
designated, organized, trained, and equipped forces, manned with 
selected personnel, using unconventional tactics, techniques, and 
modes of employment. These activities may be conducted across 
the full range of military operations, independently or with conven-
tional forces, to help achieve the desired end-state. Politico-military 
considerations may require clandestine or covert techniques and the 
acceptance of a degree of political or military risk not associated 
with operations by conventional forces. Special Operations deliver 
strategic or operational-level results or are executed where significant 
political risk exists.36
Perhaps one of the most insightful statements regarding this NATO definition 
is that “special operations are a military instrument, which is highly suited 
for contributing to the holistic security approach.”37 In the anthology Force of 
Choice: Perspectives on Special Operations, retired Admiral William McRaven 
explained the overall idea of how to utilize SOF as a national and international 
strategic instrument and made the point that SOF are best used in the tenuous 
space between diplomacy and conventional war.38
Hence, in a pre–Article V scenario, the likely best national and international 
strategy and resource to counter hybrid forces is to use SOF not by itself, but in com-
bination with diplomatic tools and conventional resources. One way to highlight 
this principle of cooperation in NORSOF 2025’s suggested counter–hybrid war-
fare strategy is through the concept of a comprehensive or whole-of-government 
approach, with members from the SOF community in a central strategic and 
operative role. All of the articles in this special issue present SOF as one piece 
in a jigsaw puzzle: it needs to fit together with other forces, elements, entities, 
concepts, and resources—both domestic and international—to complete this 
grand strategy to counter any opponent—hybrid and non-hybrid. This role, as a 
unique and leading contributor in a joint operational setting, is one of the most 
critical SOF mission sets identified by NATO.39
Despite some variations, all Western nations with SOF have a fairly similar 
mission set for their SOF forces. There are three general tasks in any given SOF 
structure: military assistance (MA), special reconnaissance (SR), and direct action 
(DA), in addition to special operations in a joint environment.40 Military as-
sistance encompasses training, educating, and supporting military allies, usually 
“on-site” or “in theater,” outside the provider’s national borders. The “classic” 
ambition in MA is to carry out specific sub-tasks in the mission until the allied 
military forces are capable of carrying them out themselves. The MA activity 
often generates added insight and new information/intelligence in and around 
the area of responsibility and leads to the formation of independent or joint SR 
and DA tasks in future operations.41 
SOF ARE BEST USED 
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The now-obsolete concept of unconventional warfare can be considered an 
earlier and more comprehensive version of MA, in which the main task was to 
support resistance movements in a country at war. This included “undermining 
the domestic and international legitimacy of the target authority,” as well as 
“neutralizing the target authority’s power and shifting that power to the resis-
tance.”42 In addition to today’s common SOF mission sets (MA, SR, and DA), 
the concept of irregular warfare (which has replaced unconventional warfare), 
particularly stands out with regard to MA. Irregular warfare includes support for 
an insurgency operation and the “facilitation of political processes where SOF 
may support diplomacy, information operations, and economic measures.”43 
SR, by contrast, is all about actively collecting information through different 
means, across space and time, and is especially designed for areas or mission 
sets that are extremely dangerous, hostile, or politically sensitive. DA includes 
precise (strike) missions, limited in space and time, and clearly directed towards 
a defined strategic ambition that could result in a new paradigm in ongoing 
operations.44 
Given the different natures of these three unique mission sets, they are sometimes 
categorized as direct (SR and DA) and indirect (MA). These direct and indirect 
methods can be considered “the yin and yang of special operations.”45 In the 
United States, slightly different terms are used to differentiate between the direct 
and indirect SOF approaches: surgical strike for SR and DA (also referred to as hard 
power), and special warfare for MA (also referred to as soft power). “As yin and yang 
imply, SOF is most effective when there is the proper balance between its capabili-
ties, but that balance constantly shifts as conditions change.”46 These properties, as 
well as the variance and balance in tasks and mission sets, make SOF a particularly 
good resource for countering hybrid warfare tactics.
Another popular term related to hybrid warfare—the gray zone—is often 
described as the conceptual space between war and peace.47 Other terms, such 
as small wars, low-intensity conflict, and military operations other than war have 
also been used to describe conflicts within the gray zone. But if the gray zone is 
truly going to add to our understanding of conflict before a declaration of war, 
it should be viewed as an environmental condition for the best use of SOF, not as 
a strategy, just as Bill McRaven presented it when he postulated that irregular 
warfare is the military’s strategy to achieve the best results in the conceptual 
phase between diplomacy and war.48
DIRECT AND INDIRECT 
METHODS CAN BE 
CONSIDERED “THE 




Content Summary: Background, Current Threats, and 
Suggestions for Best Use of SOF
In 2014, the world watched as Russia annexed Crimea with seeming ease, ex-
ploiting more refined techniques than those that Moscow used in Georgia a few 
years earlier. It did this in part by placing Russian agents in key positions within 
institutions such as Ukraine’s SBU (the equivalent of the US Federal Bureau of 
Investigation).49 When Russia determined that the time was right to initiate 
its takeover of Crimea, it launched a cyber attack against Ukraine similar to its 
operation against Georgia. This time, however, Russia supported the attack with 
electronic warfare, which prevented Crimean authorities from communicating 
with Kiev, thus undermining Kiev’s ability to effectively provide command and 
control during the crisis.50 When Russian forces entered Crimea, they wore no 
insignia and had a greater understanding of what was taking place than would 
be expected of ordinary Russian soldiers. The confusion this created among 
Crimea’s residents was then exacerbated by Russian media and official channels, 
all of which called the invasion a local uprising. It must be noted that because of 
Russia’s integration of conventional and irregular techniques, its ability to create 
confusion, and its swift action, it was able to seize Crimea with virtually no 
bloodshed.51 This fait accompli was then followed by the initiation of an almost 
completely unconventional warfare campaign in support of a separatist move-
ment in eastern Ukraine. 
Following the recommendations from the NORSOF 2025 report, the first section 
of this special issue presents the case study of Russian hybrid warfare in Ukraine 
in detail from three perspectives. First, Stephen Dayspring discusses the range 
of power available to an authoritarian regime like Russia, and the motivation 
behind Moscow’s aggression towards its neighbors. Oleksandr Danylyuk then 
delves into the chronology of events in Ukraine between 2010 and 2014, and 
the Russian covert operations that guided them. Abdullah Atay follows with a 
description of the particular use of Russian SOF—the Spetsnaz—in the annexa-
tion of Crimea in March 2014.
The six articles in the second section discuss some critical principles of hybrid 
warfare for NATO to consider as it contemplates means to counter both state and 
non-state actors. Leo Blanken begins by asking a basic question: why have NATO 
allies found it so difficult to mount an effective response to the new forms of 
Russian aggression described by Dayspring, Danylyuk, and Atay in the first 
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section? The answer, he suggests, may lie in inherited assumptions and ingrained 
habits of thinking left over from the Cold War. Moving from the “why” to the 
“how,” Espen Berg-Knutsen postulates that SOF could take a key role in small 
nations’ defense against hybrid aggression by forming the core of a multidisci-
plinary unit that coordinates national counter-hybrid efforts. Taking this line 
of thinking a step further, Sándor Fábián suggests that in order to be effective 
against hybrid strategies and tactics, the Allied nations must consider reforming 
their militaries away from conventional warfare towards unconventional and ir-
regular warfare. The best way to fight a hybrid force, Fábián argues, is to become 
a hybrid force: a comprehensive whole-of-government effort that combines the 
police, military, and other parts of a society’s national security sector. Following 
this, Brian James argues, somewhat controversially, for a more proactive NATO, 
which can be achieved by establishing an adapted collective-defense version of 
the US Army’s targeting practices. 
SOF as an effective deterrent mechanism is not necessarily what first comes to 
mind when most strategists are trying to counter state actors engaged in hybrid 
warfare. Norwegians Marius Kristiansen and Andreas Hedenstrøm, however, 
suggest using US Army SOF (ASOF) in this unusual role. They offer the example 
of a MA-style training and education mission with the Norwegian Home Guard 
on the Norwegian-Russian border. While the potential for multiple effects and 
signaling from ASOF support in a future mission is intriguing, the main objective 
would actually be deterrence, not education of the Home Guard. 
Another exciting concept is suggested by the three Danish contributors, Ken-
neth Boesgaard, Anders Svendsen, and Jesper Andreassen, who take the defini-
tion of hybrid warfare “back home” to NPS. Building on Walker’s ideas, but 
“with a twist,” the authors depart from the original definition of hybrid force to 
suggest a better, more consistent combination of SOF and conventional forces 
over time to achieve sustainability in stabilization and reconstruction operations. 
This concept/strategy has the potential to work well in a national context in 
which all necessary scarce resources are utilized over time. 
The nine articles in this special issue discuss emerging and future threats and 
suggest specific actions to meet them on the hybrid battlefield. All the authors 
have tried to ensure that their contributions are complementary and cover a 
broad range of issues within the overarching topic of how best to use SOF in a 
pre–Article V environment. For a summary of the contributors’ findings and 
suggestions about the way forward for NATO and NSHQ, we offer an afterword 
by Mike Richardson, formerly with NSHQ and now SOF chair in the Defense 
Analysis department at NPS. Happy reading! ²
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Countering Russian Hybrid Warfare: 
Acknowledging the Character of Modern 
Conflict
CW4 Stephen M. Dayspring,  
US Army Special Forces
The Russian Federation is at war with the West. Pretending 
this is not the case or obfuscating the character of the conflict with delicate 
semantic constructions does not make it any less so. Russia has established 
strategic objectives that violate the sovereignty of its neighbors and threaten the 
stability of the international system. It has selectively deployed tools from the 
full range of state power, including the overt and covert use of force, to achieve 
those objectives. Yet this simple realization eludes many in the West, particularly 
those who are far from the geographic points of physical contact. If they did 
acknowledge Russia’s aggression, many Westerners would demand an immediate 
response. Instead, these observers question the existence of any war instigated 
by Moscow because they do not see a game played by Western rules or at a level 
of force commensurate with the worst expectations of Cold War–era thinking. 
Skeptics will point at the skylines of Washington, London, and Paris and insist 
that a state of conflict can be disproven by the unbroken vistas of the Western 
centers of power. Russia, the only state that poses an existential threat to the 
United States, could obliterate these capitals in a matter of minutes, and the fact 
that it has not done so means there is no war.1 If there is no state of war between 
Russia and the West, these thinkers conclude, then there must be peace.  
Some Westerners have envisioned a third possibility, a “gray zone” in which 
conflict can seethe below the threshold of open conventional warfare.2 The 
war-or-peace polarity, nevertheless, is a Western idiosyncrasy that is not shared 
by Russia. Russian strategists have long held that the natural condition between 
states is a continuous struggle for relative advantage, albeit to varying degrees of 
intensity.3 Western efforts to admonish Russia for an action or policy are made 
with the preferred Western instruments of peace, diplomacy, and economic 
pressure, which are used in the same way they would be to enforce the rules 
of behavior among members of the generally cooperative liberal world order. 
Western leaders sometimes excuse negative Russian behavior as the result of 
misunderstandings or the insensitive actions of other Western states, and seem 
to assume that relations with the Kremlin can be reset with an apology and an 
affirmation of Russia’s status in the world.4
These efforts have failed. Even worse, they have legitimized Russian leader 
Vladimir Putin’s gains by failing to reverse them and have diverted attention 
from the rebirth of authoritarianism in Russia. Under the “sovereign democracy” 
and authoritarian “power vertical” principles that are the core of Putinism, the 
Putin regime is strengthening its grasp on domestic power, is increasingly willing 
to use force to maintain its dominance in the near abroad, and is applying pres-
sure to the rifts between EU and NATO members to undermine and ultimately 
fracture its main geopolitical rivals.5 The uniqueness of the Russian approach—
the weaponization of soft power, the masked sponsorship of violence, the use of 
propaganda to promote uncertainty among Westerners and excuse their inac-
tion, and the calculated use of military force to preserve the initiative—is a result 
of its determined efforts to realize strategic objectives while avoiding a direct 













Recent Russian actions against Georgia and 
Ukraine have confounded the West precisely 
because they embody this approach: the of-
fensive pursuit of strategic objectives through 
the slow erosion of the target’s national power, 
while deliberately avoiding direct engagement 
with NATO’s military power. Russia could 
easily overpower small neighbors like Georgia 
and Ukraine if it committed to an all-out 
invasion. The lesson that offensive-realists 
like Putin took away from the 1991 Gulf 
War, however, was that when Iraqi President 
Saddam Hussein committed the state’s mili-
tary power to the annexation of Kuwait, his 
isolated force became vulnerable to a much 
stronger Western coalition. Once the military 
element of state power was outmatched and annihilated, Hussein was quickly 
challenged on multiple fronts, and his hold on power was threatened. Putin’s 
quandary, in light of this example, was how to pursue Russia’s offensive-realist 
goal of dominating its neighbors without jeopardizing one of the principal 
pillars of Russian national strength, its armed forces.
The strategy of focusing the non-military elements of national power on de-
grading an adversary’s ability or will to resist while preserving the military for the 
culminating blow is not a product of post-Soviet thinking. In 1920, Alexander 
Svechin specifically articulated such a theory of Soviet warfare in his appropri-
ately titled thesis, Strategy of Attrition.6 Through a purely pragmatic application 
of mathematics, Svechin realized that the industrial capacity for destruction 
demonstrated in the First World War had far outpaced any nation’s ability to 
generate and field forces. Calculations of national strength based on numbers of 
men-under-arms or the military-age population were unreliable once the means 
to kill off these troops by the thousands became readily available. To commit a 
state’s armed force to an offensive action, he concluded, was to make that force 
(and therefore the state) vulnerable to annihilation. Attrition should, therefore, 
be executed primarily in the political space, through economics, diplomacy, and 
information, but its effects should remain focused on an enemy’s ability and 
will to wage war. Svechin theorized that the military should be used to posture 
and threaten, and to support diplomacy or information activities, but it must 
be used offensively only to quickly consolidate an objective before reassuming a 
defensive position and deescalating any of its activities that might invite external 
intervention.  
As products of Soviet political-military education, Vladimir Putin and his siloviki 
(literally, “persons of force” or inner circle) were certainly familiar with Svechin’s 
concept of conducting war in the absence of open hostilities.7 They have simply 
adapted the concept to fit the post-Communist realities of twenty-first-century 
Russia. Whether it is the result of centuries of invasion from all directions or 
some other reason, Russians see international relations through the prism of 
realism.8 They don’t place their faith in the international order to ensure the 
defense of the Russian state; rather they assume that the only true guarantor of 
The Kremlin, Moscow, 1860, by John Cooke Bourne
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Russian sovereignty is Russia itself, which they believe 
is constantly under threat.9 Because all non-Russians are 
potential enemies, furthermore, the security of the Russian 
state is promoted by advancing Russian leverage over the 
“buffer” states of the near abroad. Distrust of the interna-
tional order does not, however, mean that Russian leaders 
are unaware of its importance to the idea of liberalism and 
that Russia is no match for the Western nations’ collective 
defense. Putin’s new strategy of attrition—the hybrid 
combination of po-
litical means and the 
application of violence 
short of acknowledged 
state-on-state war-
fare—seeks to exploit 
the vulnerabilities of 
this order. Putin will 
continue to pursue 
strategic objectives 
that violate neighbors’ 
sovereignty without 
risking the military 
pillar of Russian state 




The West’s diplomatic 
and economic efforts 
have failed to change 
Russia’s increasingly 
belligerent trajectory 
because they are based 
on the flawed assump-
tion that Russia shares 
the belief that it is at peace with the West. Like the West, 
Russia uses diplomatic, informational, and economic 
instruments, but to far different ends. They are a means 
to promote Russian national strength by preserving the 
current regime’s hold on power and undermining the 
state’s geopolitical rivals, the EU and NATO. Rather than a 
case of overreach in the arena of acceptable interstate com-
petition, this is a calculated strategy aimed at fracturing 
and dissolving the bonds within these organizations to 
undermine any coherent response to Russian aggression.  
By regularly promising a diplomatic resolution to the naïve 
West, liberally applying economic coercion against the 
target state(s), and sowing confusion among all parties 
by manipulating information, the Putin regime combines 
political warfare with various non-attributable instruments 
of violence, such as troops out of uniform. The result is a 
synthesis of available means to achieve deliberate political 
ends while minimizing most of the risks associated with 
traditional war.10 The Russian Federation’s hybrid warfare 
extends far beyond the Soviet Union’s Cold War subver-
sion, principally because it has not been countered in kind. 
The mechanisms and inclination to do so were shuttered 
or redirected in the West following the collapse of the 
ideological firewall that separated East and West before 
the demise of the 
Communist empire. 
The Russian Federa-
tion has resurrected 
the subversion and 
deception that the 
Soviets practiced as 
“active measures” 
within the trappings 
of Russian nationalism 
and a philosophy of 
rising pan-Eurasian 
power that is destined 
to rival and defeat 
a morally bankrupt 
West.11 Russia is at war 
with the West because 
Russian leaders 
believe it to be so, and 
they will maintain 
the initiative in this 
war until the West 
acknowledges the 
nature of the conflict 
and widens both the 
range and intensity of 
its response.
Divergent Perspectives on National 
Power: DIME
Whatever the momentary advantages either side may have 
achieved during the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the 
West ultimately reached a certain level of equilibrium 
across the DIME (diplomacy, information, military, and 
economics) spectrum of national power. Eventually, the 
massive economic advantages of the West bankrupted the 
Soviet Union’s ability to sustain itself, and almost over-
night, the generations-old Western view of Communist 
Russia as the “evil empire” gave way to wishful thinking 
that the new Russian Federation would quickly internalize 
and adopt the shared values of a cooperative international 
order and begin to realize its full potential. Unfortunately, 
Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin, 2008
November 2016
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Russians met the Western preference for mirror-imaging (assuming one’s 
subject thinks the same way as oneself ), and the belief that Russian actions and 
diplomatic engagements were meant in the same context and spirit as any other 
Western state, with mistrust and suspicion. Into this vacuum of ideological 
opposition, Russian maskirovka (literally, “masked,” or calculated deception) 
was reborn and began to flourish.12 As Russia slowly rebuilt its national power 
under Boris Yeltsin and his chosen successor, Vladimir Putin, its leaders learned 
to exploit the information networks and economic interdependencies emerging 
with globalization to pursue their offensive-realist objectives of dominating the 
near abroad and undermining cohesive resistance among those they perceived to 
be their principal threats.13   
Diplomacy
Where mutual suspicion called for the rigorous verification and enforcement 
of any agreement during the Cold War, Western assumptions of good faith 
currently have given the Russians carte blanche to make and break compacts 
with few repercussions, granting Moscow the initiative in changing the political 
dynamic between itself and an adversary.14 Russia has used its veto in the UN 
Security Council to end any serious discussion of international penalties for 
its coercive actions against Georgia and Ukraine. The Kremlin offers to be the 
diplomatic broker for other conflicts (e.g., Iraq and Syria) and expects to be 
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consulted concerning crises that it caused (e.g., Ukraine and Azerbaijan) but 
claims no part in. The West worries about provoking Russia and accepts terms 
that are unenforceable and that afford Russia the time and space to improve its 
position for further aggression. Russia never negotiates in “good faith” and will 
abide by an agreement only to the extent that it serves Russian interests. Russia 
wraps all of its actions in claims of legitimacy; for example, Moscow frequently 
touts its status in Syria as an invited guest of President Bashar al-Assad as a 
means to shape discussions of the conflict around the legalisms of international 
intervention, while avoiding the topic of Russia’s complicity in intentional at-
tacks on civilians. In a similar way, Moscow’s claim that it had a moral obligation 
to defend the human rights of ethnic Russians in Ukraine from (nonexistent) 
state persecution became the justification for the annexation of Crimea.15
Information 
Using the widely connected and uncensored network of television and digital 
media at its disposal, Russia has vastly outstripped its rivals’ minor efforts to spin 
and influence small stories. It has flooded the information space with a deluge 
of propaganda, disinformation, and falsehoods that serve to both obscure the 
truth regarding its actions and bolster the positions of those who argue against 
resolute action on the part of the West. Where Soviet-era disinformation sought 
to build narratives around some grain of truth to promote credibility, Putin’s in-
formation operations are more inclined to fabricate multiple realities with little 
regard for objective fact.16 The Kremlin has demonstrated a significant level of 
control over the media (particularly internet and television) and has dominated 
the message, which is anti-US and anti-EU, but pro-anything that causes problems 
for either of those entities. The West has no coherent message to counter Putin’s 
crushing of opposition movements and his sponsorship of violence.
Military
While Western militaries have been increasingly frustrated in their efforts to 
prove theories of counterinsurgency and to wage battle against terrorist tactics, 
the Russians have invested in rebuilding conventional capabilities while simulta-
neously experimenting with a variety of surrogate options to facilitate deniability. 
Following troop reductions after the end of the Cold War, US land power in 
Europe has steadily declined to two combat brigades by 2015, while Russia still 
has hundreds of thousands of troops stationed a short train ride to the east.17 US 
and NATO military efforts are designed to “not provoke,” while Russian actions 
are calculated to coerce neighbors, test defensive measures, and provide options 
whenever Moscow senses an emerging potential to gain advantage. Russia uses 
Victory Day Parade, Moscow 2015
November 2016
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land power to threaten and bully and to test Western reactions, and it can do so 
without sending any forces out of Russian territory. 
Almost as important as the underlying military capability is the image of 
determination and confidence that power projects. Russia manages the image of 
its forces to create the impression that they have fully modernized, and that all of 
the troops are professionals fully equipped with the latest generation of rifles and 
night-vision equipment. In fact, Russia has a top-heavy officer corps and a token 
NCO corps, and it relies heavily on conscription to fill out its ranks. It advertises 
the invincibility of its new tanks while downplaying the humiliation of its latest 
generation of air-defense weapons, one of which caught fire in the middle of a 
2015 Victory Day Parade.18 The result is that Russia creates a perception of 
military ability and strength of will that is sufficient to give the United States 
pause as it considers how to meet its NATO and bilateral defense obligations.
Economics
Targeted sanctions against Russian elites have not reversed Russian policies. For 
its part, Moscow subsidizes key foreign industries (such as Ukrainian heating 
oil) to keep prices low and foster dependency. It then raises prices at critical 
moments to influence elections or demand various concessions. Russia has 
quarantined goods from Georgia, Ukraine, the Baltic states, Finland, Turkey, 
and the United States to make a point during periods of tension. Unlike Western 
sanctions, which are meant to reinforce international norms of behavior, Russia 
uses economic coercion to undermine demonstrations of sovereignty, such as 
Ukraine’s intention to join the EU. Russian embargoes are barely noticed in the 
United States, but their impact on smaller countries like Moldova and Azer-
baijan can collapse governments. 
Russia also puts very influential Westerners on the boards of important Russian 
companies.19 Paid extravagant “consulting” fees, these connected politicians and 
businessmen become advocates for Russian policies whenever their lucrative 
incomes are threatened. Western powers are reluctant to be too forceful with 
Moscow about playing by the rules because of the number of Western companies 
with strong economic interests in Russia.20 The Western preference is to view 
Russia’s elites as a collection of entrepreneurs who want to participate in the free 
market alongside their Western peers. In actuality, what has emerged in Russia in 
the last decade is anything but a free market—something more akin to a statewide 
organized crime syndicate. The central government controls the conditions for in-
ternational trade and is in turn backed by those who profit from this arrangement. 
Those who dissent suddenly find themselves afoul of the “law” and imprisoned 
or killed, after which their assets are seized by the state.21 Low-level crime and 
corruption are allowed to flourish as long as the government is not targeted and 
as long as whatever services are required (criminal, cyber, paramilitary) are at the 
government’s disposal when needed. The West maintains a significant economic 
advantage over Russia, so Putin has chosen to forego direct competition in this 
arena, opting instead for local bilateral arrangements that provide Moscow with 
economic leverage over certain neighbors. The Russian DIME no longer equals 
the Western DIME, and the Russians are using this fact to shape and consolidate 
political objectives with minimal risk to the state’s armed forces.
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Hybridizing Political Warfare with Violence
History almost always demonstrates that the objectives of war are shaped and 
prepared well before the introduction of forces. This is the essence of political 
warfare, to which Russia has added instruments of violence with which it 
continues to shape and consolidate objectives while remaining below the 
threshold of open war. The potential victim cannot determine the appropriate 
defensive measures until it correctly interprets the adversarial nature of Russia’s 
actions in the political space. In such situations, it would behoove the defender 
to see the world as it is, and not as he wishes it to be. Failing to recognize Russia’s 
low-intensity aggression as warfare is a conceptual problem for the West today. 
Russia is not the blossoming democracy that the world anticipated when the 
Iron Curtain fell—Putin’s “sovereign democracy” is something very alien to 
Western principles of freedom and representative governance. In the economic 
arena, Russia is not simply going through the growing pains of an emerging free 
market in an unsteady global marketplace—its leaders are deliberately engi-
neering market crises to control the state and exert political leverage abroad, and 
to strain relations between its former client states and the West.  
Russia’s 2008 military invasion of Georgia was not a knee-jerk response to 
Georgia’s shelling of Russian “peacekeepers.” It was a calculated insult to 
Georgia’s sovereignty, a fact that Russia had revealed was its true goal four years 
earlier, when Moscow offered to help end the “Rose Revolution” in exchange for 
the right to appoint the Georgian ministers of the interior, defense, and security. 
Russia demanded this same concession for ending the Abkhazia-Georgia War 
in 1995.22 In the same vein, Russia’s occupation of Crimea in 2014 was not to 
protect Russians in the near abroad from the imagined persecutions of fictional 
Ukrainian Nazis, nor even to exploit Ukraine’s political chaos: it was a calculated 
move to grab strategically valuable real estate. The long-anticipated Crimean 
“opportunity” was a direct result of Moscow’s gradual manipulation of crises in 
Ukraine, until the right moment presented itself and the prepared plan could be 
put in motion. Russia’s intervention in Syria was not a determined blow against 
the spread of the Islamic State. Instead, by claiming to target the IS, the Kremlin 
formulated a narrative to cover its complicity in al-Assad’s massacres of Syrian 
civilians. From its operations in Syria, Russia also learned the value of “weapon-
izing” human beings in the form of countless refugees who fled from Russian 
airstrikes into Turkey, Greece, and the rest of Europe. These “human swarms” 
have strained relations between EU members by taxing resources, testing border 
security, and calling into question open border policies.23 Through simultane-
ously forcing the mass migration into Europe and promoting nationalist fears 
of cultural invasion, Russia directly influenced Britain’s referendum to leave the 
EU.24 In all of these cases, Russia has inserted itself at the center of diplomatic 
efforts to resolve conflicts, the promise of which has undermined any Western 
appetite for direct confrontation. Somehow, each new claim of sincerity in peace 
negotiations is given serious plausibility, despite Russia’s active hand in initiating 
and exacerbating the violence.
Recommendations
The Russian Federation is at war with the West. It is a nasty, subversive campaign 
of deceit and manipulation, and Moscow uses every weakness of good faith in 
negotiation and open dialogue in a connected world to further its aims and 
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promote its position. It is time for the West to acknowledge that Russia’s current 
regime is a hostile actor that poses an existential threat to the future of free so-
cieties. That giant stockpile of nuclear weapons will always put an upper ceiling 
on the potential for decisive actions against the Russian regime, but Western 
nations must fully examine the broad area beneath that mark to develop effective 
responses.  
In Russia’s view, only land power matches land power. While ships and aircraft 
and ballistic missiles are important ingredients in the general deterrent calculus, 
Russia estimates power based primarily on the number of troops on the ground 
and tanks in the field. During the Cold War, NATO and the United States 
expected that superior technology and training would overcome superior Soviet 
numbers in a conventional confrontation, but the backbone of resistance would 
still fall on the armored and infantry divisions of the allied armies. When Russia 
looks across the European plain today, it observes the lack of any real conven-
tional strength standing between it and its expansionist objectives. The North 
Atlantic Alliance must fill this void with a capable and significant conventional 
land force if its members intend to reassert the expectation of deterrence.
Rebuilding significant land power capabilities will take time, and even if these 
forces were available tomorrow, they would not be enough to counter Russia’s 
indirect strategy of political attrition, which is specifically meant to avoid a 
risky clash with Western military power. To meet this immediate need, the West 
must adopt practices that inflict a cost on Russia where Putin’s current deterrent 
calculations anticipate none. This will require policy changes by certain Western 
governments to deny Russia access to international forums and markets and 
to undermine Russia’s leverage over its neighbors. Anti-Russian movements 
in any non-Federation territory occupied by the Putin regime, such as the 
Crimean Tatars’ resistance efforts, should be recognized as legitimate resistance 
and should be eligible for the full military and economic support of the West. 
The various Western state intelligence agencies and special operations units of 
Western forces should be directed to covertly target vulnerable nodes of Russian 
state power abroad, particularly those that support the Russian military, to levy a 
real price for Russian aggression. These targets should cover the range of Russian 
national power and should not be limited to actions that leave the initiative with 
Moscow. For example, Western operatives should seize Russian properties and 
assets; sabotage and sink naval vessels produced in foreign ports before they can 
be delivered to the Russian navy; and place bounties on Russian cyber operatives 
and thieves as a way to extend the rule of law into Russia’s territorial “sanctuary”. 
These kinds of actions could be conducted under layers of deniability commen-
surate with Russia’s denial of involvement abroad, but the message of intention 
and reciprocity should be clear.  
The final action that must be undertaken immediately is an all-out information 
blitz aimed at the Russian people themselves. It is not enough to try to counter 
individual instances of Kremlin misinformation. Instead, Western information 
resources should aim at isolating Putin from Russian popular support. It should 
be the stated goal of the West not to pursue regime change in Russia, but it is 
vital to specifically attribute Russia’s increasing isolation and economic distress 
to the actions of its chosen leader. The Russian people’s political alterna-
tives are decreasing in number, and their options for democratic resolution 
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are correspondingly few, but that is a reality they will have to contend with if 
they want to alter the current course of their nation. 
To fight this Russian style of war, the West must acknowledge that it is taking 
place and then demonstrate that it is willing to use the full range of political 
tools, including violence, to shape and consolidate similar strategic objectives. 
The more vulnerable members of Eastern Europe and Central Asia must avoid 
the cost-cutting temptations of the liberal order, where expectations of collec-
tive defense and enforced stability have led some governments to forget their 
unilateral responsibilities for ensuring their country’s sovereignty. These coun-
tries must examine any bilateral arrangement with Russia to make certain they 
do not cede a coercive advantage, and scrutinize all of Russia’s actions and stated 
motives with suspicion. A targeted nation’s intelligence agents must expend 
every effort to learn Russia’s capabilities and intentions. In the absence of sound 
intelligence to the contrary, the prospective victim must assume malevolence 
behind any Russian activity directed its way. Vulnerable nations must enact clear 
laws that keep vital defense and other markets under domestic control and all 
sectors of the economy independent of Russian patronage. Their militaries must 
be equipped and trained to a point at which Moscow cannot be certain of swift 
military success. Their governments must prepare for a coordinated resistance 
and promise a resolute campaign of unconventional warfare in any territory 
Putin attempts to occupy, so that allies will have time to mount a response. 
Finally, when Moscow’s hostile intentions are known, the defender must take 
deliberate, calculated asymmetric actions to inflict a physical cost on the ele-
ments of Russian power, particularly the military element whose preservation is 
the calculation that drives Russian hybrid warfare. ² 
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victory-day-watch-russian-missile-5671253
19 One of the most prominent of these politicians-turned-Putin-
advocates is former German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder 
(1988–2005). Schroder actively championed a Russo-German 
pipeline while he was in office, and he was given a senior position 
on GAZPROM’s board after he left office. He continued in this 
position while GAZPROM used its pipeline monopoly to coerce 
Russia’s neighbors, and publicly declared that Putin’s actions 
in Ukraine had the same moral weight as NATO operations 
during the Kosovo crisis. Craig Whitlock and Peter Finn, 
“Schroeder Accepts Russian Pipeline Job,” Washington Post, 10 
December 2005: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2005/12/09/AR2005120901755.html ; Tony 
Paterson, “Merkel Fury after Gerhard Schroeder Backs Putin 
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For a more detailed examination of Putin’s use of corruption to 
promote state interests, see Karen Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy: 
Who Owns Russia? (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015).
20 Despite endemic corruption, cronyism, and currency 
manipulation, Russia was invited into the G8 economic 
forum in 1998. This invitation represented an effort to 
induce Russia to abide by international rules by overlooking 
Russia’s actual practices. Russia was kicked out of the G8 in 
March 2014, following the occupation of Crimea, but this 
action did little to stop the Kremlin’s instigation of violence 
in Eastern Ukraine or its support for al-Assad in Syria. 
21 Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a Russian oligarch who challenged Putin 
in 2003 and spent 10 years in prison, is the most famous example 
on a constantly growing list. 
22 Thornike Gordadze, “Georgian-Russian Relations in the 1990s,” in 
The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia, eds. Svante E. 
Cornell and S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2009), 
28–35.
23 EU members do not agree on the permeability of borders between 
members or between the EU and affiliated non-members. 
For a brief overview of the Schengen Agreement and a list of 
signatories see “Schengen: Controversial EU Free Movement Deal 
Explained,” BBC News, 24 April 2016: http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-13194723 . For examples of the effects of the 
migration crisis on specific European countries, see “How Is the 
Migrant Crisis Dividing EU Countries?” BBC, 4 March 2016:  
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34278886 
24 The UK’s “Brexit” vote to leave the EU is widely attributed to the 
fear, deliberately inflamed by some politicians, that Britain was 
going to be overrun with Syrian and other refugees. “Immigration 
Fears Caused Brexit Vote, David Cameron Tells Brussels,” Daily 
Mail, 28 June 2016: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/pa/
article-3663125/David-Cameron-face-EU-leaders-time-Brexit-




Russian Aggression toward Ukraine:  
A Long-Term Example of Hybrid Warfare
Oleksandr Danylyuk, Ukraine  
Center for Defense Reforms
Many people assume that Russian aggression toward Ukraine 
began early in 2014, when largely peaceful anti-government protests in Kiev 
turned violent, and Russian forces without insignia subsequently crossed into 
eastern Ukraine to support a separatist uprising there.1
A close examination of the events that led up to that period shows, however, 
that Russia had been carrying out not only information operations, but also 
other clandestine and special operations against Ukraine for more than a decade. 
Russia was providing financial support to different subversive organizations in 
Ukraine as well, in a concerted effort to push Ukraine away from the European 
Union and toward Moscow. Thus, a range of what are now termed hybrid opera-
tions, or hybrid warfare, was in play for many years, across Ukraine’s regions and 
all sectors of Ukrainian society and institutions, long before 2014. 
Divide and Concur: A Common Approach in Russian 
Warfare
Ukraine is a multi-ethnic unitary state, in which ethnic Ukrainians constitute 
the majority in all regions except Crimea. In a 1991 referendum following the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, 90 percent of Ukraine’s citizens voted for the 
country’s independence from Russia, while only seven percent voted to remain 
part of the new Russian Federation (RF). Even in Crimea and its main city of 
Sevastopol, where the Russian Black Sea Fleet is berthed, more than half of 
voters opted for independence. In the Donbas region, which also has a large 
ethnic Russian population, only 12 to 13 percent opposed independence.
Many Westerners don’t realize that Ukraine, with its rich farmland and abun-
dant natural resources, was never a voluntary member of either the Russian 
Empire or the Soviet Union, and that Ukrainians have struggled persistently to 
retain or win back their right of self-determination throughout the territory’s 
troubled history. Because of Ukraine’s large population and the people’s willing-
ness to put up armed resistance, Russia has typically chosen methods of uncon-
ventional warfare as its main tool of influence in Ukraine.
It is difficult to say exactly when Russia developed a plan to break up Ukraine. 
Considering the Soviet national policy of controlling republics through infra-
structure integration, the layout of major logistical infrastructure and strategic 
pipelines across Ukraine make it possible to believe that plans for such a 
contingency existed even before 1991. Active preparations for the plan’s prac-
tical implementation, however, began only just before Ukraine’s presidential 
elections in 2004. Τhe population of Ukraine became the main tool of this plan. 
Two candidates, each of whom represented one ethnic constituency while being 
unacceptable to the other, became the leading candidates in the presidential race. 
Viktor Yanukovych, a native of Donetsk in the largely Russian-speaking Donbas 
region of southeastern Ukraine, stood for the pro-Russian part of society, while 
1—The Workers’ 
Paradise
In 1917, at the time of the Bol-
shevik revolution, Ukraine was an 
independent state. Following the 
revolution, the Bolshevik Party did 
not have sufficient support within 
Ukraine to come to power through 
elections, so its leaders established 
a parallel government, the so-
called “Provisional Government of 
Workers and Peasants of Ukraine,” 
in the Russian city of Kursk. This 
puppet structure served as a pre-
text for Soviet Russia’s military 
invasion of Ukraine in December 
1918. The fighting ended in 1922 
with the final occupation and 
liquidation of the Ukrainian 
Republic and the creation of the 
Ukrainian SSR as a component of 
the USSR.
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2—Heorhij Gongadze and the Troika of Oligarchs
Modern Russian hybrid operations in Ukraine began in 2000 with the murder of Ukrainian opposition journalist Heorhij Gongadze, 
while he was investigating corruption among the close network around Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma.i  Some reports claimed 
that Gongadze was killed by Russia’s secret service, the FSB,ii  to discredit Kuchma in the eyes of the international community and the 
Ukrainian people, and to undermine his cooperation with representatives of Ukraine’s pro-Western democratic parties.iii  The murder 
instigated street protests, isolated Ukraine internationally, and initiated the collapse of Ukraine’s democratic pro-Western coalition 
while strengthening the pro-Kremlin faction. It also led to the appointment of Viktor Medvedchuk, an oligarch and close friend of 
Russian leaders Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, as head of the Administration of the President of Ukraine. 
Active efforts to bring Ukraine back under de facto Russian control continued for the next 14 years. The main tools of these efforts 
were oligarchs and businessmen who were granted privileged access to the corrupt process that privatized the Ukrainian economy 
and its strategic sectors following independence in 1991.iv  Over the next 10 years, these oligarchs not only monopolized Ukraine’s 
industrial sector, media, and infrastructure, but also acquired considerable influence over the country’s political processes, reportedly 
with political, financial, and organizational support from the Russian FSB and Russian criminal organizations.v  Three of these men, 
Dmitry Firtash, Rinat Akhmetov, and Igor Kolomoisky, became the most influential billionaires in Ukraine. Firtash is a partner in 
Russia’s state-run television company, while the Russian energy firm Gazprom is a co-owner of Firtash’s RosUkrEnergo.vi  Akhmetov, 
at one point the wealthiest man in Ukraine thanks to his control of the coal and oil industries, was in partnership with Firtash and 
Russian-born billionaire Vadim Novinsky (who became a Ukrainian citizen in 2012). Kolomoisky is a partner in the enterprises of 
Russian oligarchs Roman Abramovich and Alexander Zhukov.vii  These three Ukrainian oligarchs purchased strategic Ukrainian state 
assets in part through Russian state banks such as VTB (BTБ), Sberbank (Сбербанк), and VEB (ВЕБ).viii  They also control the most 
influential Ukrainian media, which gives them almost full control over who among Ukrainian politicians and public figures will 
become popular, or even simply become known. Firtash, Akhmetov, and Kolomoisky remain the primary sources of funding for any 
political activity in Ukraine, using their wealth among both pro-Russian and pro-Western parties to control seats in the parliament 
and local councils.
i  “Outspoken Ukraine Journalist Missing,” BBC, 19 September 2000: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/932310.stm ; “Ukraine’s 
‘Censorship Killing,’” BBC, 14 February 2001.
ii  Volodymyr Ariev, “Another Version of the Murder of Georgy Gongadze: Marchuk, Medvedchuk, and FSB” [in Ukrainian], Ukrayinska Pravda, 24 May 
2005: http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2005/05/24/4388577/ ; Alexander Ilchenko, “Gongadze Was Killed by KGB Agent ‘Soldatov’” [in Russian], 
Segodnya, 23 August 2011: http://www.segodnya.ua/politics/power/honhadze-ubival-ahent-khb-coldatov.html ; “Was Pukach an Agent of the Security 
Services?” [in Russian], Ukrayinska Pravda, 23 August 2011: http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2011/08/23/6522091/
iii  Vasyl Tuhluk, “The Death of Gongadze: Ladder to Power?” [in Ukrainian], Ukraina Moloda, 19 April 2005: http://tema.in.ua/article/110.html
iv  “Kolomoisky Said That in 2004 Paid $5 Million Bribe for the Monthly Management ‘Ukrnafta’” [in Ukrainian], ZN.ua, 5 March 2015: http://dt.ua/
ECONOMICS/kolomoyskiy-rozpoviv-yak-u-2004-roci-plativ-5-mln-habara-schomisyacya-za-upravlinnya-ukrnaftoyu-167933_.html
v  Heorhiy Semenetc, “Rinat Akhmetov: The Myth” [in Russian], Argument, 5 May 2014: http://argumentua.com/stati/rinat-akhmetov-mif
vi  “Ukraine’s Fugitive Oligarch: Catch Me if You Can,” Economist, 3 May 2015: http://www.economist.com/news/europe/ 
21650382-america-wants-prosecute-dmitry-firtash-austrian-court-refuses-extradite-him-catch-me-if
vii The information about these oligarchs is from before the Orange and Maidan Revolutions. The status of many of their assets has changed, for better or for 
worse, since the upheavals of 2014.
viii Oleksandr Paskhover, “Smell of Energy: Akhmetov and Firtash Are the Main Buyers of Large Property in Ukraine” [in Ukrainian], Korrespondent, 2 
December 2011: http://kreston-gcg.com/ua/press/publications/energo.html
Viktor Yushchenko was the pro-Ukrainian candidate and a supporter of integration with the EU.2 The choice between them 
meant that the election would inevitably polarize Ukrainian society and possibly instigate civil and regional conflicts. 
Beginning some time before the elections, the population of Donbas was subjected to an information campaign apparently 
designed to inflame separatist sentiments and create a false sense of ethnic identity in Ukrainians of Russian background.3 
Local TV stations actively promoted the idea of a “Donbas identity” and a sense of regional solidarity through the popu-
larization of local history exclusively about the imperial and Soviet periods and famous figures from Donbas. Pro-Russian 
President Leonid Kuchma’s appointment of Yanukovych as prime minister of Ukraine in 2002 and the inclusion of a 
significant percentage of ministers from Donetsk in his government were presented as a great victory for the region. The 
first round of the presidential elections was scheduled for 31 October 2004.
Russian Influence during the Orange Revolution
Viktor Yushchenko, the pro-EU candidate, became seriously ill in September 2004 while campaigning for president and 
nearly died. His face was severely disfigured as a result, and several specialists believed he had been poisoned by dioxin. 
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3—Two Viktors:  
The People’s Choice
Viktor Yanukovych is a native of the largely Russian-
speaking industrial Donbas region. He was twice 
convicted of violent crimes in his youth, but later 
became an economist before turning to politics. The 
more liberal Europhile voters in Ukraine considered 
his candidacy to be offensive to their values.i 
Rival candidate Viktor Yushchenko was a centrist 
politician who, although favoring ties with the EU, 
was quite loyal to the Russian-speaking population of 
Ukraine. Russian propaganda nevertheless portrayed 
him as a right-wing extremist—even a neo-Nazi. He 
was said to be a puppet of the United States who 
threatened not only to ban the Russian language in 
Ukraine, but also to persecute its native speakers.ii 
This image of Yushchenko was disseminated in part 
through the creation of both real and fake extreme-
right organizations, which made outrageous public 
statements to misrepresent his views and held rowdy 
demonstrations in support of his candidacy.iii
i  Peter Byrne, “From Prison to President,” Kyiv Post, 11 
February 2010: http://www.kyivpost.com/article/
content/ukraine/from-prison-to-president-59338.html ; 
“Profile: Ukraine’s Ousted President Viktor Yanukovych,” 
BBC, 28 February 2014: http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-europe-25182830
ii  Malcolm Haslett, “Yushchenko’s Auschwitz Connection,” 
BBC, 28 January 2005: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/4215101.stm
iii  “Akhmetov: Whoever Won, Donbass Will Live, 
Work, and Prosper” [in Ukrainian], Korrespondent, 
25 December 2004: http://ua.korrespondent.net/
ukraine/251713-ahmetov-hto-b-ne-zdobuv-peremogu-
donbas-bude-zhiti-pracyuvati-i-procvitati ; “Provocateurs 
Failed to Walk with Torches” [in Ukrainian], Ukrayinska 
Pravda, 4 September 2004: http://www.pravda.com.ua/
news/2004/09/9/3002339/
4—Visual Aids
As the elections approached, pro-Russian media 
distributed a map of Ukraine that depicted the coun-
try’s population divided into three classes. Western 
Ukrainians were represented as being first-class, those 
in Central Ukraine as second-class, and Ukrainians in 
the Russian-speaking southeast as third-class citizens.i 
Millions of such maps were printed and distributed, 
mainly in the southeastern regions of Ukraine.
i  Mykola Tomenko, “Ideologists of Division of Ukraine into 
Three Classes Should Bear Criminal Responsibility” [in 
Ukrainian], Tomenko.ua, 2 July 2014: http://tomenko.ua/
komentari/ideolohy-podilu-ukrajiny-na-try-sorty-mayut-
ponesty-kryminalnu-vidpovidalnist/
5—The Southeast Ukrainian  
Autonomous Republic
On 26 November 2004, a session of the Luhansk Regional Council 
approved a decision to establish a “Southeast Ukrainian Autonomous 
Republic.”i  Council deputies declared the closure of external borders 
and appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin for support. On 
that same day, Viktor Yanukovych’s supporters in the Odessa region, 
headed by Odessa city mayor Ruslan Bodelan, adopted a resolution 
demanding recognition of Odessa and the whole Odessa region as a 
self-governing territory they called Novorossiyskij krai (the New Russia 
region).ii 
The next day, an extraordinary session of the Kharkiv Regional Council 
concentrated all governing authority in the hands of Governor Yevhen 
Kushnaryov, established executive committees of regional and district 
councils, and assigned the powers of state authorities to these councils. 
The session further ordered the regional offices of the Ukrainian State 
Treasury and National Bank to suspend transfers to the state budget. 
The representative of the Kharkiv Executive Committee, Yevhen 
Kushnaryov, was entrusted to coordinate the new body’s actions 
with the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council) of the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea and the corresponding councils of the Donetsk, 
Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Luhansk, Odessa, Kherson, and Myko-
laiv regions, as well as with the Sevastopol City Council. Subject to 
further “aggravation of the situation,” Kushnaryov was expected to 
coordinate his actions with these other regions to break away from 
Ukraine and create the Southeast Ukrainian Autonomous Republic. 
The Ministry of Justice declared the decision by the Luhansk Regional 
Council illegal, and Yushchenko urged the prosecutor general of 
Ukraine to jail “people who raised the flag of national separatism.”iii 
On 28 November in Severodonetsk, Yanukovych’s supporters held 
an “All-Ukrainian congress of people’s deputies and deputies of local 
councils,” which recognized the election of Viktor Yanukovych as 
president of Ukraine.iv If Yushchenko should win the second run-off, 
this body intended to demand a referendum to change the admin-
istrative and territorial division of Ukraine.  Some delegates called 
for the creation of self-defense units and to proclaim the region’s 
independence, with its capital in Kharkiv.v 
i  Luhansk Regional Council, “On the Institutional Strengthening of Local 
Authorities in the Luhansk Region (No. 16/1)” [in Russian], 26 November 
2004: http://oblrada.lg.ua/node/2159
ii   Peter Kalandyrets, “Odessa Mayor Ruslan Bodelan Threatens to Create a 
‘Novorossiysk Edge’” [in Ukrainian], Radio Svoboda, 26 November 2004: 
http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/923436.html
iii   “Kushnarev’s Lawyers Say the Security Service’s Decision to Initiate a Case 
on Separatism was Falsified” [in Ukrainian], Censor.net, 28 February 2006: 
http://censor.net.ua/news/60700/advokaty_kushnareva_zayavlyayut_chto_
postanovlenie_sbu_o_vozbujdenii_dela_pro_separatizm_sfalsifit
iv  “Yanukovych Will Not be Able to Hold Autonomous Referendum?” [in 
Ukrainian], Ukrayinska Pravda, 28 December 2004: http://www.pravda.com.
ua/news/2004/12/28/3005835/ 
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This situation significantly increased the radical sentiments 
of the pro-Western part of the electorate.4 Yushchenko’s 
death under such circumstances would inevitably have 
led to civil conflict. Fortunately for Ukraine, Yushchenko 
survived and mobilized his supporters to be non-violent 
participants in the elections and to help monitor the 
results. No candidate reached the required 50 percent vote 
threshold to win in the first round of voting on 31 Oc-
tober, so a runoff between Yushchenko and Yanukovych 
was held on 21 November. Yanukovych was declared 
the winner. Yushchenko’s supporters and international 
observers denounced the balloting as fraudulent, and the 
Orange Revolution (orange being the color of Yush- 
chenko’s faction) began.5 It was a typical example of a 
non-violent “color revolution,” using civil disobedience 
and peaceful mass demonstrations as its major tools to 
force a government response. 
As Yushchenko’s supporters organized to demand a new 
ballot, several Russian-speaking towns and regions of 
south and southeast Ukraine, including Odessa, Luhansk, 
Kharkiv, and Sevastopol, among others, began taking steps 
to secede from Ukraine if Yanukovych’s election were 
nullified. President Leonid Kuchma publicly took a stand 
against these movements—a decision that turned out to 
be crucial for the future of Ukraine. He urged separatists 
“not to take the country to pieces. ... Ideas expressed by the 
heads of local administrations do not comply with either 
the Constitution or Ukrainian law.”6 The parties reached 
a compromise. Parliament voted on several amendments 
to the Constitution, which transferred significant powers 
from the president’s office to Parliament. The Orange Revo-
lution succeeded when Ukraine’s Supreme Court annulled 
the runoff results and called for a new round of balloting, 
which Yushchenko won by a comfortable margin.
Today, it is difficult to say why Russia abandoned its efforts 
to split Ukraine in 2004. The most probable cause seems 
to have been the position of President Kuchma, who had 
strongly opposed the division of the country and didn’t 
allow the army and security forces to escalate the confronta-
tion with Yushchenko’s supporters.7 For one thing, such 
an escalation would have threatened the main transit route 
for Russian gas and oil exports to Europe through the 
territory of Ukraine. The most likely explanation is that, 
despite the attempts of Russian propaganda to portray the 
liberal-democratic Yushchenko as a neo-Nazi and a threat 
to the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine, only a 
small part of the citizenry actually believed it. After the 
Orange Revolution’s success, however, Russia’s influence in 
Ukraine’s politics did not decrease. This may have been one 
of the conditions of the compromise.8 The changes to the 
Constitution and the appointment of Viktor Yanukovych 
as prime minister of Ukraine only one year after the revolu-
tion may have been another one.
The Escalation of Russian Hybrid 
Operations after the 2004 Presidential 
Election
Following the Orange Revolution, Russia focused on 
correcting its mistakes of 2004 and largely succeeded. 
Viktor Yushchenko never convincingly filled the role his 
opponents assigned him of a neo-Nazi fascist, and his 
eventual election as president failed to motivate genuine 
support for separatism in the southeast of Ukraine. The 
Russian Federation’s security services, therefore, looked 
for another Ukrainian who could not only lead a nation-
alist parliamentary movement but also make it into the 
second round of elections against Yanukovych in 2015. 
This candidate had to be someone who both inspired 
fear in the Russian-speaking population of southern and 
eastern Ukraine and was too unethical to be supported by 
Western politicians. 
Oleh Tyahnybok and his Social-National Party of Ukraine 
were chosen for this role from among all the marginal-
ized nationalist movements and parties in Ukraine at 
the time. Tyahnybok had become widely known for his 
anti-Semitic statements in support of Yushchenko during 
the 2004 campaign, and neither he nor his party enjoyed 
great popularity.9 Despite outside support and an effort at 
rebranding with the name Svoboda (“Freedom”), the party 
remained marginal in the 2006 parliamentary elections. 
If Tyahnybok or someone like him had appeared on the 
ballot instead of Yushchenko in the second round of 
voting in 2004, Moscow would have been satisfied to 
lose the several western Ukrainian provinces that would 
have strongly supported Tyahnybok, while Russia and 
its proxies maintained control over a major part of the 
more populous central and eastern parts of Ukraine.10 The 
worst-case scenario, which had been the plan in 2004, 
would have split Ukraine from north to south along the 
Dnipro (Dnieper) River. Such a split would have allowed 
Russia to control the southern branch of the Ukrainian 
gas pipeline system, an ammonia pipeline, access to the 
Black and Azov Seas, and major strategic industries, 
especially parts of the legacy military-industrial complex.11 
Moscow envisioned transferring many major enterprises 
from Ukraine to Russia, thereby stimulating the reloca-
tion of millions of loyalist (to Moscow) Russians to the 
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so-called “priority development regions”: sparsely populated areas of the north, Siberia, and the Russian Far East, as well as 
to the national republics.  
The task of bringing Oleh Tyahnybok to the second round of voting in 2015, given his extremely low electoral support at the 
beginning of 2010, seemed impossible.12 Circumstances, however, were changing (or possibly being changed) in Moscow’s 
favor. Yanukovych’s Party of Regions won the local elections of 2010—the most brutal and dirtiest in the history of indepen-
dent Ukraine—not only in all regions of eastern Ukraine but also across the province of Western Ukraine. Unexpectedly, 
only the Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil regions supported Tyahnybok’s Svoboda party.13 The prerequisite circum-
stances for fanning Western Ukrainian separatism, with support from local authorities, were thus created. This was the 
best scenario for Russia, which would effectively control the territory and government of Ukraine—the official legal entity 
recognized worldwide—while Western Ukraine would become an unrecognized rebel state. This thinking also explains 
the decision in 2004 to postpone the splitting of Ukraine between east and west: the declaration of a Southeast Ukrainian 
Autonomous Republic would also have resulted in the creation of an unrecognized rebel state, but on the “wrong” side.
In April 2010, in response to the threat of Ukraine’s dismemberment, a group of Ukrainian conflict resolution specialists 
and social and political strategists created a center-left civil movement called Spilna Sprava (“Common Cause”).14 In 
Ukrainian, as in English, the name had positive connotations and was intended to symbolize cooperation between the 
western and eastern factions of Ukraine. Even the group’s symbols used national colors and a stylized national emblem 
with two locked hands, symbolizing the unity of Ukraine’s east and west. The organization’s main goal was to remove 
Viktor Yanukovych from power through social protest and political revolution by 2015, while preventing the Russian 
Federation from using the revolution to divide the country.15 Common Cause, therefore, adopted a strategy targeted 
7—Pipeline Diplomacy
In 2006, Russian energy producers, led by Russia’s Gaz-
prom, met with several northern European countries to 
begin developing plans for an alternative gas pipeline—
“Nord Stream”—that would bypass Ukrainian territory by 
sending Russian natural gas under the Baltic Sea directly 
to Germany and the EU. Experts have questioned the eco-
nomic viability of building this pipeline, which cost the 
organizers US$7.5 billion. i In the author’s opinion, Russia was 
not guided by economic factors, but by political ones. As 
Moscow prepares for aggression against Ukraine, Belarus, 
and the Baltic States, it is both ensuring itself an alternative 
gas export corridor and increasing Europe’s dependence on 
Russian gas supplies. A proposed Nord Stream 2 pipeline is 
now being debated in the European Parliament.ii Another 
alternative pipeline, the “South Stream,” which Russia had 
planned to launch in 2015 but suddenly shelved, would have 
run under the Black Sea to Bulgaria.iii
i  Marcin Sobczyk and Gordon Fairclough, “Nord Stream 
Waste of Money, but Irrelevant for Poland,” Wall Street 
Journal, 10 November 2011: http://blogs.wsj.com/
emergingeurope/2011/11/09/nord-stream-waste-of-money-but-
irrelevant-for-poland/?mod=google_news_blog
ii  Karel Beckman, “Can Nord Stream 2 Be Stopped?” 
Energy Post, 14 April 2016: http://www.energypost.eu/
can-nord-stream-2-stopped/
iii   Stephen Blank, “Russia Remains Set on South Stream Pipeline 




In the elections of 1998, the far-right Social-National Party of 
Ukraine (SNPU) gained 0.17 percent of the votes—next to last 
among all parties.i The party’s name and its symbol, which re-
sembled a swastika, undoubtedly helped scare away most voters, 
not only in the Russophile south and east but also those in Western 
Ukraine. The SNPU began rebranding in 2004, changing its name to 
the All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda (“Freedom”) and discarding the 
swastika-like cross for a trident-like hand.ii Svoboda’s representatives 
also gained the same access to the national media as the seated 
parliamentary parties and began to figure in major news stories 
and on most popular political shows. Despite its lack of popular 
support, Svoboda had enough campaign money for full-scale televi-
sion, radio, and print advertising for the parliamentary elections 
of 2006.iii Nevertheless, the party remained in its marginal niche 
with only 0.36 percent of the votes, and did only slightly better 
(0.76 percent) in early elections in 2007. In the 2010 presidential 
election, Oleh Tyahnybok received 1.43 percent of the votes.iv Since 
Yanukovych was elected president in 2010, however, the dynamics 
of Tyahnybok’s support dramatically changed, and he had a real 
chance to become the main rival of Yanukovych in 2015.
i  Central Election Commission, n.d.: http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vd2002/
webproc0v?kodvib=1&rejim=0
ii   “Tyahnybok Party Changed Its Name and Symbols to Avoid Being 
Compared with a Swastika” [in Ukrainian], Ukrayinska Pravda, 17 
February 2004: http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2004/02/17/2998106/
iii    “Regional Admitted That Tyahnybok Took Money from Yanukovych” 
[in Ukrainian], Texty, 10 August 2012: http://texty.org.ua/pg/video/
editorial_1/read/7596/Regional_ziznavsa_shho_Tagnybok_brav_groshi_u
iv  Central Election Commission, n.d.: http://www.cvk.gov.ua/
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to different regions which avoided controversial topics—such as linguistic, cultural, and historical issues—during the 
planned anti-regime protests. 
Fake Leaders and Misinformation
Creating fake leaders in the “grassroots” protest movement was not a problem for the Putin regime. Participants gathered 
mostly spontaneously, without knowing each other or the national or regional organizers of the movement. Anyone could 
be chosen and named a representative of the protesters. The decisive role was performed by the media, which were mostly 
controlled by the Russian Federation and the Yanukovych regime.16 These fake leaders were assigned to be the movement’s 
public commentators: they were regular participants on various political talk shows and made public statements on behalf 
of the protesters. The main task of these artificial leaders was to keep protests narrowly focused against a punitive new tax 
code, while avoiding any political demands.17 In this way, they were able to mislead people about the true nature of the 
protest. False leaders were also assigned to be the main negotiators with the government.18 During these negotiations, they 
shifted the protest demands to those that were approved by the regime.
Financial Support from Russia
In 2012, Russians in official positions in Ukraine began to create organizations aimed at supporting the future territorial 
division of Ukraine. The experience of 2004 showed that Russia could not rely on corrupt local elites, even those within 
Yanukovych’s Party of Regions, when it came to such sensitive matters. Most of the Party of Regions representatives were 
interested only in keeping power in Ukraine, albeit with Russia’s support. 
One such project was Victor Medvedchuk’s Ukrainskij Vybir (“Ukrainian Choice”), which openly campaigned against 
Ukraine’s accession to the EU and in favor of joining Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus in the Eurasian Customs Union. 
The group also actively promoted the idea of “direct democracy,” which meant that all important decisions would be made 
9—Potyomkin Protests 
The technique of inserting fake protest leaders into organiza-
tions required supplying certain resources as well, including 
people, funding, media, transportation, technology, and so 
on. One of the most popular forms of infiltration was to 
offer to provide protesters with free sound amplification 
equipment.i  This powerful and expensive equipment was 
especially important to have during major actions, where 
simple loudspeakers didn’t work. Infiltrators in the guise 
of equipment managers could keep a close watch on the 
meetings’ moderators and speakers, while others posing as 
stage security brought in disguised security forces and thugs 
hired by the regime to control the crowds.
The most successful way to disrupt a protest was to create 
various pseudo-democratic councils and committees that 
brought together both real leaders and agents provocateurs. 
Such councils usually did not have a clear structure and could 
be manipulated into endless, ineffective daily discussions of 
actions and decisions. The agents provocateurs would use 
their position on such a council to make unauthorized state-
ments on the group’s behalf, which would then be actively 
spread by the media and effectively mislead both protesters 
and the general audience. 
i   Petro Neck and Mykhailyna Skoryk, “Chronicle of Provocations: 
Euromaidan and Tax Maidan Were ‘Poured’ by the Same People” 
[in Ukrainian], Ukrayinska Pravda, 20 December 2013: http://
www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2013/12/20/7007758/
8—Russian Security
Beginning in 2010, agents of influence and even staff members in 
the Russian special services were appointed to leadership positions 
in Ukraine’s security agencies.i For example, Alexander Yakimenko, 
who was head of the Security Service, served in Crimea as a member 
of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation until 1998. Defense 
Minister Dmitry Salamatin, who moved to Ukraine and received 
Ukrainian citizenship only in early 2000, is a son-in-law of Oleg 
Soskovets, the former deputy prime minister of Russia. Even the 
personal security detail for Yanukovych was headed by Vyachyeslav 
Zanevskiy, an officer of the Federal Protective Service of the Rus-
sian Federation and former chief security officer for the secretary 
of the Russian Federation’s Security Council, General Alexander 
Lebed. Ukraine’s Ministry of Internal Affairs was headed by Vitaliy 
Zakharchenko, who served in the Soviet Ministry of Internal Af-
fairs in Riga until 1991.ii When he was serving as a Soviet officer, 
the head of Ukraine’s internal security forces, Svyatoslav Shuliak, 
was involved in the organization of the Armenian-Azerbaijani 
conflict. Another former Russian soldier, Igor Sorkin, whose father 
Vyacheslav Sorkin is a senior official with Gazprom, was appointed 
as head of the National Bank of Ukraine. Deputy Prime Minister 
Borys Kolesnikov and his family moved to Moscow after the Or-
ange Revolution, and he now flies to Kiev for work. 
i  Taras Kuzyo, “Who Betrayed Ukraine?” Gazeta.ua, 29 February 2016: 
http://gazeta.ua/articles/life/_hto-v-ukrayini-vchiniv-zradu/ 
681864?mobile=true





11—From Russia, with Love
The Russians also intensified the preparation of a clandestine power structure, using Russophile veterans’ organizations, sport and 
martial arts clubs, practical shooting and airsoft clubs, and Cossack organizations as cover.i A striking example of such an organiza-
tion was the Oplot (“Stronghold”) mixed martial arts club in Kharkiv, which was founded in 2010 by a former employee of Ukraine’s 
Ministry of Internal Affairs. In addition to promoting martial arts, this club looked after monuments to Soviet Army veterans and 
provided social aid to former ministry employees and military servicemen. During the Revolution of Dignity (2013–2014), Oplot 
members were active in the Antimaidan movement and assaulted Maidan activists. As unrest spread in Donbas in 2014, Oplot members 
helped take over the Donetsk Regional Administration.
One Russian veterans’ organization, called Boevoe Bratstvo (“Battle Brotherhood”), was headed by Boris Gromov, a former Soviet and 
Russian Army general and commander of the Kiev Military District from 1989 to 1990, and Dmitry Sablin, a member of the Federation 
Council of the Russian Federation’s Federal Assembly. Battle Brotherhood played an active role in finding and recruiting retired 
pro-Russian law enforcement veterans in Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries to take part in armed anti-Ukrainian activities. In 
January 2015, Sablin, together with movie actor Michael Porechenkov; Alexander Zaldostanov, leader of the Nochnyey Volki (“Night 
Wolves”) motorbike club; and mixed martial arts world champion Yulia Berezikova, initiated the so-called “Antimaidan” movement, 
whose goal was to counteract attempts to “create a ‘maidan’ [a popular democratic uprising] in Russia.” ii
i  “Russian Right Forces Attempt to Destabilize Ukraine” [in Russian], ORD-UA, 23 April 2016: https://ord-ua.com/2016/04/23/
rps-rossijskie-pravyie-silyi-ili-popyitka-2-rasskachat-ukrainu/
ii  “‘Combat Brotherhood’ and ‘Night Wolves’ Create ‘Antimaidan’ Movement in Russia” [in Russian], Kommersant, 15 January 2015: http://www.
kommersant.ru/doc/2646227
by means of national and local referendums.19 One of the project’s main 
public initiatives was to make Ukraine a federation, a change that would 
weaken the central government and make secession easier. In 2012, Ukrai-
nian Choice announced the launch of the “Federal Ukraine” initiative by 
holding a series of roundtables and expert meetings, where pro-Russian 
participants discussed not only how to carry out the process of federaliza-
tion, but also the terms of its implementation. Ukraine’s federalization was 
actively supported by other pro-Russian political parties besides Ukrainian 
Choice, including Rodina (“Motherland”), the Communist Party of 
Ukraine, and the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine.20
The activities of religious organizations deserve special attention with re-
gard to Russia’s influence in Ukraine. These include the Russian Orthodox 
Church (ROC), which operates in Ukraine as the Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church of Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP), in parallel with the autono-
mous Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kiev Patriarchate; the Ukrainian 
Autocephalous Orthodox Church; and the Vatican-aligned Ukrainian 
Greek Catholic Church. The ROC in Ukraine has consistently endorsed 
an anti-NATO and anti-EU—and often even Ukraine-phobic—view; 
conducted propaganda work among its followers; and organized public 
events in opposition to supporters of Ukraine’s integration with the West. 
After conflict between pro-Ukraine and pro-Russia partisans broke out in 
Crimea and Donbas in 2014, many UOC MP priests supported Russian ag-
gression, collaborated with the occupiers, and inspired militants to perform 
acts of terror against Ukrainian nationalists.21
Russian Information Campaigns Target Ukrainian Security 
Sector Personnel
As part of its campaign against Ukraine, Russia focused considerable 
attention on information and psychological operations within Ukraine’s 
armed forces, internal security forces, and personnel in the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. Russian agents of influence were appointed as heads 
10—Shattered Ukraine
Viktor Medvedchuk publicly stated 
that “the federalization of Ukraine is 
the only remedy against its potential 
division.”i He has suggested creating 
an organizing committee to draft a leg-
islative concept for a federal Ukraine. 
One Ukrainian Choice advertisement 
featured a map of a shattered Ukraine 
that reflected the concept of federaliza-
tion that was being actively promoted 
by the Russian Institute of the Com-
monwealth of Independent States. 
The topic of Ukraine’s federalization 
has been actively supported by other 
pro-Russian political parties as well, 
including Rodina (“Motherland”), the 
Communist Party of Ukraine, and the 
Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine, 
among others.ii
i  “Ukraine Is Spread Out in Installments” 
[in Russian], Kommersant, 16 July 2012: 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1981639
ii  Andriy Skumin, “Administrative Reform 
Can Result in Transmission of Sevastopol” 
[in Ukrainian], Tyzhden, 29 June 2013: 
http://tyzhden.ua/News/83266
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of psychological operations departments that worked 
actively to spread the Russian worldview along with anti-
European sentiments among soldiers and police officers.22 
For example, Colonel Evgeny Rudenko, who fled to the 
Crimean Peninsula after its annexation by Russia, was ap-
pointed as head of the Ukrainian Internal Security Forces’ 
personnel department,23 while Alexey Selivanov, the head 
of the Armed Forces’ personnel department, was the 
leader of the ROC-affiliated, strongly Russophile organiza-
tion Vernyi Kozaki (the “Faithful Cossacks”). In July 2013, 
the annual “Slavic Commonwealth” military exercises 
held by Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus centered on con-
ducting joint operations against Ukrainian insurgents.24
In the summer of 2013, the rape and attempted murder of 
a young woman by police officers in Vradiyivka (Mykolaiv 
Oblast) was used by the pro-Russian faction to stir up 
an anti-police hate campaign and became a catalyst for 
confrontations between citizens and law enforcement 
personnel.25 This led to anti-police protests across the 
country and included repeated attempts by protesters to 
seize some police stations. Meanwhile, unidentified per-
sons disseminated information through various media— 
including professional internet forums—warning the 
police that future protests posed a danger to the lives of 
law enforcement officers and their families.
These actions laid the groundwork for increasing tension 
between the public and the police, which resulted in the 
Maidan bloodshed later that year. This process of delib-
erately fanning societal antagonism is a large topic that 
deserves a separate analysis, because it can serve as a kind 
of authoritarian “antidote” against the non-violent revolu-
tions that sprang up in many countries of the Middle East 
during the “Arab Spring” and that might break out in 
Russia as well.
Russian Political Pressure Leads to 
Protests and Riots in Ukraine
The signing of the Association Agreement between 
Ukraine and the EU was scheduled for 28 November 2013. 
To disrupt the process, Russia intensified economic pres-
sure against Ukraine, which, coming from Ukraine’s main 
trade partner, had an immediate effect on the Ukrainian 
economy. 
To increase the political pressure on Yanukovych’s govern-
ment to abandon the agreement, the Communist Party 
of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Choice party attempted 
to initiate a referendum on joining the Customs Union 
with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Ukrainian politi-
cians close to the Kremlin made public allegations that 
Moscow might support a candidate other than Viktor 
Yanukovych in the upcoming presidential election. As a 
result of this intensified pressure from Russia, the govern-
ment of Ukraine rejected the Association Agreement and 
withdrew from negotiations with the EU. This outcome 
became the impetus for the Revolution of Dignity, also 
known as Euromaidan, which was at its height from 18 to 
23 February 2014.26
From the beginning of the protests that followed Ukraine’s 
rejection of the Association Agreement, it was clear to 
observers that the Ukrainian and Russian governments 
had no interest in seeing this revolutionary movement 
develop further. The main task for both governments was 
to channel the protests along safer lines and postpone 
12—“Gayropa”
A survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre in late April 2013 showed that Ukrainians were divided over accession to the EU.i Asked 
the question, “What direction should Ukraine take for economic integration?,” 41.7 percent of respondents chose “EU accession”; 
a third (32.7 percent) chose the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; 12.3 percent were against joining either the 
EU or the Customs Union; and 13.3 percent were undecided. Unlike the topic of NATO integration, however, EU accession was not 
sharply rejected by its opponents. 
Russian propaganda against the EU highlighted Europeans’ support for the human rights of sexual minorities, such as the organization 
of gay parades and the legalization of gay marriage, and insinuated equal tolerance towards such behaviors as bestiality and pedophilia.i 
Thus, Russian propaganda defined the “European values” embraced by EU supporters solely as an issue of LGBT rights and contrasted 
those with the traditional Orthodox values that Russia supposedly embodied. Pro-Russian activists and politicians even introduced 
a derogatory term, “Gayropa” instead of “Europe.” 
i  Andrey Bulgarov, “The Russian Military Dressed in Berkut’s Uniform on the Maidan in Kyiv” [in Russian], Obozrevatel, 3 September 2014: http://
obozrevatel.com/blogs/68913-rossijskie-voennyie-zimoj-pereodevalis-v-berkut-na-majdane-v-kieve.htm 
ii  “Thugs from the ‘Berkut,’ Killing People on the Maidan, Will Be Included in the Composition of the Russian Interior Ministry, Keeping Its Name” [in 




Ukraine’s split until the spring 2015 presidential elections. In the short term, the 
Yanukovych regime set up pseudo-leaders for the movement and seized control 
of the stage and audio equipment that had been set up on Maidan Nezalezhnosti 
(Independence Square) in central Kiev. Calls for revolution and early presidential 
and parliamentary elections were subsequently censored, as were any other po-
litical demands except for calls to sign the Association Agreement with the EU.27 
The government also issued a ban on ultimatums that demanded that Yanukovych 
“sign the deal or get out.” Images of these severely curtailed protests were what the 
media disseminated to their domestic and external audiences.
The number of protesters, nevertheless, increased steadily. The catalyst for revolu-
tion, however, was a brutal crackdown on a few hundred peaceful student-aged 
protesters by the notorious Berkut (“Golden Eagle”) special police force in the 
early morning of 30 November 2013. The Berkut attacked the young protesters as 
they milled on the Maidan, beating many of them with truncheons and causing 
serious injuries. 
After the crackdown, which was televised, the number of protesters grew to 
hundreds of thousands, and the revolutionary process became irreversible. This 
reversal of police strategy from pacification to confrontation and escalation re-
flects an internal conflict among the pro-Russian forces. Subsequent protests were 
fueled by provocateurs who used increasingly intense violence against participants. 
After beating the students on 30 November, these infiltrators (see sidebar 13) went 
on to burn cars and to beat, abduct, and torture Maidan activists. In the absence 
of any action plan proposed by the leaders of the parliamentary opposition, the 
protesters themselves gradually radicalized.
Instead of dividing Ukrainian society between supporters of the right-wing Tyah-
nybok and pro-Russian Yanukovych, the split between the Ukrainian nationalist 
Maidan movement and the pro-Russian Antimaidan countermovement became 
the major fault line that threatened Ukraine’s integrity.28 Maidan initially was 
more of a struggle for democracy and the independence of Ukraine, and a rejection of the corrupt incumbent regime and 
Russian colonization, than it was about EU accession. In time, however, Maidan became associated—allegedly with the 
help of Russian propaganda—with a right-wing radical element called Right Sector, which alarmed the Russophile popu-
lation of southeastern Ukraine, and most importantly, discredited the revolution in the eyes of the Russian Federation’s 
citizens.29 It would have been much more difficult for Antimaidan supporters to demonize the Svoboda party, given its 
long history of conformist policies in Parliament. The baseless rumors that Right Sector was a widespread fascist organiza-
tion with its own tanks and aircraft—rumors fostered by Russian propaganda—made the Right Sector useful as a threat to 
mobilize the populations of southern and eastern Ukraine, as well as the citizens of Russia.30 Following the annexation of 
Crimea later in 2014, myths about a militant Right Sector movement and the rise of a so-called “fascist junta” to power in 
Ukraine became prime justifications for military aggression among Russian soldiers.
On 19 January 2014, after anti-government protesters had more or less peacefully occupied Kiev’s main square for about 
two months, things came to a head when the government announced new anti-protest laws intended to disperse the 
crowds. A face-off between marchers and security forces on Hrushevskogo Street, near Maidan Nezalezhnosti, turned into 
a violent confrontation that lasted many days and left many on both sides dead.
On 22 January—ironically, Ukrainian Unity Day (Den’ Sobornosti)—the violence increased to a new level after the govern-
ment authorized the police to use deadly force against protesters. Five protesters were shot dead in clashes with security 
forces on Hrushevskogo Street, and the bodies of several protesters who had been abducted earlier were found on that 
same day.31 About 300 protesters had been wounded by the evening. Activist Dmytro Bulatov, who was kidnaped along 
with others but survived, said that the captured protesters were tortured and interrogated by individuals who, he said, 
had typical Russian accents.32 The interrogators wanted to obtain information about the revolution’s sources of financing 
as well as the revolutionaries’ presumed ties with secret services in the West. As these events took place on the streets, a 
13—The Golden Eagles
Some observers have suggested that 
undercover Russian security forces 
participated in the dispersal of Maidan 
protesters alongside their Ukrainian 
counterparts.i This conclusion comes 
in part from the fact that certain riot-
control tactics used by some special 
forces personnel were atypical for the 
internal security forces of the Ukrai-
nian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Rus-
sian security forces could have been 
disguised as members of the Crimean 
Berkut (“Golden Eagle”) unit, which 
used a different uniform from those of 
other internal security units. Almost 
all of Berkut’s members, including the 
commander, later defected to the Rus-
sian Federation.ii
i  “42% against 31%: Ukrainians Choosing 
between the EU and the Customs 
Union (Poll)” [in Ukrainian], UNIAN, 




ii  “‘Ukrainian Choice’ Picketed the EU 
Delegation to Ukraine” [in Russian], 
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group of opposition MPs within Parliament announced 
the creation of a “People’s Council of Ukraine.” Although 
this People’s Council had no formal standing and was 
intended, according to its organizers, simply to oversee 
the constitutional reform process, Russian-controlled 
media in Russia and Ukraine presented this move as if it 
were the creation of an actual alternative government in 
Ukraine.33
Over a period of several days, protesters began to occupy 
or blockade regional and local administrations, first in the 
western regions where Svoboda controlled the regional 
councils, and then in central and eastern Ukraine, as a 
wave of attempts to capture government buildings swept 
through the entire country. In Crimea and Donbas, 
anti-government protesters were met with strong—
sometimes armed—resistance from law enforcement and 
government supporters. What began to occur, essentially, 
was the implementation of Russia’s original plan to create 
a separatist Western Ukrainian People’s Republic and 
to subsequently divide Ukraine. In response to these 
uprisings, the Yanukovych regime was forced to transfer 
a significant number of the police officers who were 
currently concentrated in the capital out to suppress the 
regional protests in central and eastern Ukraine.34
Taking advantage of this significant reduction in the 
regime’s forces in Kiev, on 24 January the Spilna Sprava 
civil movement began to implement its initial strategy of 
blockading the central government buildings.35 Within 
days, anti-government forces occupied several strategic 
government institutions, including the Ministry of 
Agrarian Policy, the Ministry of Energy and Coal, and the 
Ministry of Justice. (For reasons of public safety, ministry 
workers were allowed access to their work places.) These 
actions demonstrated that the Yanukovych regime had 
finally lost control of the capital. The timing was well 
chosen: it was unlikely that Russia would be willing to en-
gage in open aggression on the eve of the Sochi Olympic 
Games (7–23 February 2014), because any disruption 
of the Olympics would have a significant impact on the 
Kremlin’s image, both domestic and foreign.
To buy some time, the Yanukovych government, in close 
concert with Russia, made a show of engaging in peace 
talks that included amnesty and the release of jailed 
protesters in exchange for the release of administrative 
buildings and the removal of strategic fortifications on 
Maidan Nezalezhnosti.36 Unfortunately for the opposi-
tion movement, the peace talks initiative was supported 
by the representatives of France, Germany, and Poland, 
as well as by members of the parliamentary opposition. 
The ensuing suspension of conflict was profitable only to 
14—Common Cause
Two months of peaceful occupation of Maidan Nezalezhnosti 
(Independence Square, the main square in central Kiev) and 
the main squares of other Ukrainian cities did not relieve 
social unrest. The political status quo and the country’s 
worsening social and economic situation, including delayed 
payment of public-sector wages, gave Common Cause an 
opening to organize protests and labor strikes at state-owned 
and municipal enterprises. These activities were aimed specifi-
cally at the transport sector in Russian-speaking southern and 
eastern Ukraine.i The organization of these actions was car-
ried out under the umbrella of an anonymous “All-Ukrainian 
Strike Committee” and was not directly associated with the 
revolution. The Yanukovych government faced the threat 
of a social explosion and possible further politicization of 
the protesters’ demands, while Russia’s ability to rely on the 
populations of the south and east as loyalists for Yanukovych 
and its own potential aggression was weakened.
i  “Mutiny on the Ship: The Drivers of Trams and Trolleybuses 
Began Preparations for a Large-Scale Strike” [in Russian], 
Vgorode, 22 December 2013: http://kiev.vgorode.ua/news/
transport_y_ynfrastruktura/204283-bunt-na-korable-vodytely-
trolleibusov-y-tramvaev-nachaly-podhotovku-k-masshtabnoi-
zabastovke; “Teachers at Metropolitan Universities to Join the 
All-Ukrainian Strike” [in Russian], Obozrevatel, 26 December 
2013: http://obozrevatel.com/politics/09183-prepodavateli-
stolichnyih-vuzov-gotovyi-prisoedinitsya-k-vseukrainskoj-
zabastovke.htm ; “New Year without Transport or Strike in 
Lutsk ‘From the Middle’” [in Russian], Volynsky Novyny, 27 
December 2013: http://www.volynnews.com/news/society/
vid-holodu-vodiyi-troleybusiv-vtrachaiut-svidomist-pratsivnyk-lpe/
15—“I Will Not Leave!”
The vast majority of protesters were outraged by the sup-
pression of revolutionary rhetoric, but previous experience 
had shown that a physical struggle for control of the stage 
could discredit the entire protest. To counter the effort to 
silence protestors, Common Cause launched a campaign to 
give everyone who supported the revolution a sticker bearing 
the inscription: “I will not leave the Maidan until Yanukovych 
resigns!” Over four million of these stickers were printed and 
distributed during the first month of the protests, and very 
soon almost every demonstrator was wearing one.i It was a 
clear marker of the protesters’ true intentions and made it 
impossible for observers or the media to misinterpret the 
protest’s demands. Protesters could not only declare their 
own point of view, but also see how many people shared it.ii
i   “‘I Will Not Leave Maidan till the Resignation of Yanukovych’: 
These Activists’ Notes Left on Parked Cars,” 032.ua, 1 December 
2013. http://www.032.ua/news/429461 
ii  “The Sticker on Ruslana: ‘I Will Not Leave Maidan till Yanukovych’s 





Russia, which utilized this time to deploy resources that were later used in violent anti-Ukrainian protests and separatist 
movements in the east and south of Ukraine. During this period, from mid-January to mid-February 2014, Russia also 
moved to establish a significant military presence in Crimea and along Ukraine’s border. 
18 February 2014 marked the beginning of the most dramatic part of the Revolution of Dignity. Protesters who took 
part in a peace march to the Parliament that day found themselves entrapped by pro-government forces and came under 
gunfire. Law enforcement officers also sustained casualties from bullets, which led some to believe that Russian agents 
were using firearms against both protesters and security forces to incite further violence.37 Evidence later indicated that 
representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs handed over more than 500 automatic firearms to Antimaidan activists.38 
The Antimaidan groups included a significant number of Russian citizens, including men who later became leaders of the 
pro-Russian militants in Donbas. One of these was Arseny Pavlov, known as “Motorola,” who commanded the Donetsk-
based terrorist group “Somalia.”
Despite the scores of protesters (along with several police officers) who were killed over the next few days,  the protests 
continued.39 The turning point came on 21 February 2014, with the formation of a new parliamentary majority consisting 
of the stalwart opposition MPs and 70 erstwhile Yanukovych supporters who defected from the ruling party. That day, 
President Yanukovych agreed to a peaceful settlement with the opposition that involved the formation of a new govern-
ment and early presidential elections. Protesters rejected this compromise and stormed the presidential palace, demanding 
that Yanukovych be thrown out of office. Yanukovych disappeared, only to turn up in Moscow some time later.
Conclusion: Russian Hybrid Operations in Post-Revolution Ukraine 
Since November 2013, the Russian Federation has carried out active psychological and organizational information opera-
tions in Ukraine aimed at creating a pro-Russian uprising, the core goal of which is to stymie Ukraine’s western develop-
ment vector and Kiev’s independence from Russian political and economic control. Moscow’s ultimate agenda may well be 
the restoration of some version of the Russian Empire or even the Soviet Union. Antimaidan organizations were formed 
for these purposes. In addition to the pro-Yanukovych rallies that took place in Kiev and in other regions, which were 
attended mostly by the employees of public institutions and enterprises, social networks provide another avenue for orga-
nizers. Groups that seek to spread Antimaidan propaganda, for instance, take advantage of social media: people who “like” 
relevant social network pages are consequently invited to participate in the meetings and activities of informal pro-Russian 
organizations.
From the perspective of this article, it is interesting to note that the Antimaidan/
pro-Russian ideology is quite eclectic. A number of different, even mutually 
16—Fanning the Flames
Since Russia was mainly interested in violent confrontation, its operatives worked 
to inflame radical sentiments.i There is evidence that the “flash-bang” light and noise 
grenades that the security forces used against protestors were taped with screws, which 
turned them essentially into fragmentation grenades. In response, protesters threw 
pavement blocks and Molotov cocktails. Evidence obtained later on indicated that some 
Russian Special Forces troops had dressed as Ukrainian law enforcement personnel and 
participated in the confrontation on Hrushevskogo Street.ii There is reason to believe 
that this same group of Russian troops operated on the other side as well, under the 
guise of protesters. Their task was to stoke the violence between protesters and police, 
inflaming it to the point of irreversibility.
i  “BBC: In 2004, Putin Advised Kuchma Force to Disperse the Maidan” [in Russian], Censor.net,  
27 January 2012: http://censor.net.ua/news/195362/v_2004_godu_putin_sovetoval_kuchme_ 
siloyi_razognat_mayidan_bibisi
ii  “GPU Gathered Evidences of FSB Involvement in the Shootings on the Maidan during Their Stay 




Anti-Yanukovych protesters occupied 
the premises of the Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, 
and Ternopil regional administrations 
(the three western regions of Ukraine 
whose regional councils were controlled 
by the Svoboda Party), without much 
resistance from the local police or in-
terior security forces. Local councils 
in these regions started to adopt deci-
sions supporting the People’s Council 
of Ukraine’s agenda, such as forbidding 
the use of the armed forces, Ministry of 
Internal Affairs police, and the internal 
security forces within those regions; ban-
ning the Communist Party of Ukraine 
and the Party of Regions; and so on.i
i  “Lviv’s People’s Council Took Power 
into Their Own Hands” [in Ukrainian], 
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hostile, concepts of Russian imperialism, such as Russian nationalism, monar-
chism, neo-Nazism, neo-Stalinism, Soviet nationalism, Orthodox fundamen-
talism, paganism, and so on are in the mix. Pro-Russian organizations operating 
in the south and east of Ukraine represent the entire range of pro-Russian 
ideologies: from the neo-Nazi “Russian National Unity,” Soviet-revanchist 
“The Essence of Time,” right-monarchist “Russian Imperial Movement,” neo-
pagan “Svarog,” and marginal National-Bolshevik party of Eduard Limonov, to 
the Kremlin-affiliated Nashi (“Our Guys”), to name only a few. The common 
platform for all these supporters of Russian intervention consists of the rejection 
of an independent Ukraine and the longing for Ukraine to unite in a single state 
with Russia.
The high level of coordination between a wide range of Russian-aligned groups 
active in Ukraine suggests they are subordinate to a single plan and concept. For 
example, in the period before the Maidan uprising, some members of these mar-
ginal organizations were selected for official military service in Russia’s Special 
Forces units. Two well-known pro-Russian militia leaders, Anton Milchakov and 
Alexei Rajewskii—both of whom are members of Russian neo-Nazi organiza-
tions—were selected for this training. In doing so, Moscow solved two problems 
at once: it neutralized these potentially dangerous internal elements by redirecting 
them to fight the external enemy (Ukrainian nationalists), and thereby also 
turned them into its own unique, unconventional, and highly self-motivated tool 
for undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty. 
The Russian operation to split up Ukraine failed because it was not able to 
organize a real pro-Moscow uprising. The annexation of Crimea in March 2014, 
which was carried out by Russian military forces without insignia, succeeded 
only to the extent that the peninsula itself came under Russian control, but it did 
not inspire any wider internal threat against Ukraine’s sovereignty. The clandes-
tine invasion of Donbas by Russian armed forces in late July and early August 
2014 was launched to prevent an offensive by the armed forces of Ukraine from 
liberating Donbas from the small number of pro-Russian militants and Russian 
Special Forces units that had seized control. Even this action failed to bring 
about the anticipated general uprising of Russian-speaking citizens in favor of 
union with Russia. 
Despite the undeclared nature of the simmering Ukraine-Russia conflict, it is 
being conducted by regular Russian military units, according to reports in the 
international press.40 Russia’s main miscalculation was its incorrect assessment 
of the citizens in southern and eastern Ukraine, in particular their willingness 
to take part in a pro-Russian separatist struggle. Pro-Russian agitators did not 
find adequate support among the local population, either during the early stage 
of peaceful pro-Russian rallies or when it came to armed confrontation. Nor 
has Ukraine had any further problems with the population in the territories of 
Donbas that were liberated from separatist control. 
What Can the EU, Eastern European Countries, and NATO Learn from 
the Ukraine-Russia Conflict?
Responding to aggression only when unconventional non-military tactics are 
beginning to be supplanted by military ones is already too late. This is the most 
important lesson that should be taken from the continuing struggle between 
Ukraine and Russia. The main indicators that unconventional aggression may 
18—Denouement
On 22 February 2014, as the MPs were 
about to vote on the restoration of the 
2004 Constitution of Ukraine, which 
limited the powers of the president, 
about 50 unidentified security officers 
bearing automatic weapons entered 
the Parliament building, but they 
were confronted and forced to leave by 
State Guard officers. It is believed that 
the gunmen were Russian servicemen 
tasked with disrupting the voting 
and shooting down the MPs. Ukraine 
would thus lose any legal path out 
of the crisis, and Yanukovych would 
remain as the only legitimate head of 
state.i Such a scenario seems plausible 
because a separatist rally in the eastern 
province of Kharkiv was scheduled for 
the next day. Pro-Russian members of 
Parliament (about 25 to 30 percent of 
the total) and the local councils, with 
President Yanukovych at their head, 
were planning to officially adopt the 
decision to divide Ukraine along the 
Dnipro (Dnieper) River, knowing this 
would lead to civil war. Yanukovych, 
however, had ultimately refused to 
participate in the rally. There are many 
possible reasons for his decision to stay 
away. Lack of support among Ukraine’s 
deputies and high-level officials is one. 
Another is the fact that the population 
of southeast Ukraine either supported 
the revolution or remained passive as 
events unfolded.ii Despite everything, 
the majority of the country’s internal 
security forces and the leaders of the 
armed forces did not support the coun-
try’s division. 
i   “Chronicle of the Revolution: 
Yanukovych Makes Concessions, but 
Does Not Give Up” [in Ukrainian], 




ii   “Defense Ministry: 90% of the Crimean 
Military Remained Loyal to Ukraine” [in 






be imminent are the psychological and organizational 
information operations that help prepare the ground for 
further aggression. In most cases, especially in democra-
cies, these kinds of preliminary operations are completely 
legal. 
In order to understand the true intentions of the Russian 
Federation and anticipate its potential next steps, NATO’s 
members should create a system of centers at the national, 
regional, and headquarters levels that are dedicated to 
monitoring and analyzing Russian information and psy-
chological operations. If we compare a number of activities 
that the Russian Federation is currently pursuing in the 
European Union against Moscow’s strategy in Ukraine, 
we can confidently assert that unconventional aggression 
by Russia against NATO member-countries is in its active 
phase. Such activities include information campaigns 
aimed at shaping public opinion, financial and other kinds 
of support for favorable political movements, and the 
creation of formal and informal organizations, including 
paramilitary groups, that will act in Russia’s interests. 
There are already clear signs of Russian informational 
and psychological operations in Europe. For example, 
Russia’s support of right-wing and far-right organizations 
within the EU is not limited to financial assistance, but 
also includes military training under the guise of airsoft, 
practical shooting, martial arts, and historical reenact-
ments. In Donbas, for example, EU citizens, mostly from 
ultra-right organizations, conducted warfare against 
Ukraine on Russia’s behalf. Among the most famous 
examples were a citizen of Norway named Jan Petrovsky 
and three former members of the French military, Sergei 
Munier, Alexandre Nabiev, and Erwan Castel.41 Even the 
surge of refugees into Europe as a result, in part, of Rus-
sian operations in Syria, has not only served to destabilize 
several EU countries, but has also increased the popularity 
of local right-wing parties, many of which do not hide 
their sympathy for Russian policy and Vladimir Putin. 
NATO is actively preparing for a conventional confronta-
tion with Russia, in which Russia has no chance. Moscow, 
however, is not planning a military invasion of Europe. 
Instead, the Kremlin has every intention of bringing its 
puppets to power, even in such countries as France and 
Germany. A look at the polling numbers for the Front 
National (“National Front”) in France and Alternative für 
Deutschland (“Alternative for Germany”) in Germany 
bears this out.
Russia is not preparing for war with the West; the war 
is already being actively conducted—on Russia’s terms, 
below the threshold of NATO’s mutual defense clause. 
And the West, which ignores the danger, unfortunately 
stands a high chance of losing this conflict. Putin’s regime 
is a threat to Western civilization and mankind in gen-
eral. The mistakes of World War II, including tolerance 
towards Hitler, must not be repeated. One cannot win a 
war while being on the defense. There is a need for a more 
offensive plan aimed at regime change in Russia and the 
subsequent stabilization of the country. ²
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The Strategic Utility of the Russian  
Spetsnaz in Crimea
MAJ Abdullah Atay,  
US Naval Postgraduate School
The Russian Federation’s near-bloodless annexation of the 
Crimean Peninsula in 2014, for the second time in Russian history, was achieved 
mostly by means of operations carried out by Russia’s special operations forces 
(Voiska Spetzialnogo Naznacheniya, or Spetsnaz). After undergoing a period 
of reforms following the transition from Communist to democratic rule, the 
Russian Spetsnaz proved to be a salient strategic asset for Russian political and 
military leaders and emerged as a credible threat for the countries of Russia’s near 
abroad. Up to now, however, few, if any, researchers have published a compre-
hensive examination of the recent annexation of Crimea that focuses specifically 
on the role of the Spetsnaz as a strategic policy tool.
A Short History of the Crimean Peninsula
Crimea, roughly 27,000 square kilometers, juts from the southern edge of 
Ukraine and is almost entirely surrounded by the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. 
In 1783, after it had been under Ottoman rule for 300 years, Russian Empress 
Catherine II annexed the Crimean Peninsula for the first time under the pretext 
of protecting its citizens from Turkish political intrigue.1 Following that victory, 
Crimea experienced a variety of political relationships with Russia, ranging from 
near autonomy to becoming a subservient oblast (province).2 An alliance made 
up of France, the United Kingdom, the Ottoman Empire, and later Sardinia 
won the Crimean War in 1856, but ultimately, the victory did not suffice to break 
the region away from Russian control.3 Crimea remained a Russian territory 
for another century after the battle that had instigated “the destruction of the 
European order.”4 In 1954, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev handed control of 
Crimea and its Black Sea ports over to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 
but in practical terms, the region was under Moscow’s control for as long as the 
Soviet Union lasted.5 Granted significant autonomy by Ukraine in the post-
Soviet era, the Crimean Peninsula remained at least partly under the Russian 
Federation’s authority until 2014.6 
The Crimean port city of Sevastopol harbors the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which 
is the primary reason why the territory is of utmost strategic importance to 
Moscow and vital to Russian national security and national interests. In the two 
decades since its emergence, the Russian Federation has revitalized its power 
and through the constant application of synchronized political warfare, created 
the circumstances essential for an operation to take back Crimea.7 Once Russian 
president Vladimir Putin had offered to “guarantee Crimea’s territory” in 2006, 
the only remaining requirement to legitimize an invasion was finding the right 
window of opportunity.8 
With the help of external weaknesses—in particular, NATO’s ponderous 
decision-making process and low probability of reacting, and the absence of a 
balancing regional power—and internal unity around its goals, Russia saw the 
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Crimea following the 2014 Winter Olympics.9 On 21 March 2014, the Russian 
Federation officially annexed Crimea following “armed intervention by forces 
of the Russian Federation, a referendum, and a declaration of independence in 
Crimea.”10 This second annexation of Crimea epitomized how to attain victory 
short of an actual military fight and demonstrated to the world Putin’s will to 
accomplish Russia’s strategic aims by all available means. The Russian Spetsnaz 
played its role in the armed intervention portion of the annexation, which 
started on 20 February 2014—according to the date on the Russian campaign 
medals.11
The Strategic Utility of Special Operations Forces
In this section, I use Colin Gray’s theory on the strategic utility of special opera-
tions forces to help illuminate why the Spetsnaz units were deployed, whether 
they were inserted at the right time and for the right place or purpose, and to 
what extent they achieved their objectives. Gray’s analysis has two parts: the 
strategic utility of special operations and the strategic utility of special opera-
tions forces. He suggests that the type of conflict and mission is the starting 
point from which to conduct such analyses and notes that “the term strategic 
utility as employed here means the contribution of a particular kind of military 
activity to the course and outcome of an entire conflict.”12 Gray proposes two 
general “master” concepts and seven subordinate concepts to frame the special 
operations portion of the theory. The two master concepts are economy of 
force and expansion of choice; the seven subordinate concepts are innovation, 
morale, showcasing of competence, reassurance, humiliation of the enemy, 
control of escalation, and shaping the future. Together, these nine concepts (or 
categories) demonstrate Gray’s multifaceted notion of strategic utility and serve 
as the framework for my examination of Spetsnaz operations in Crimea.13 
THE USE OF SOF 
AND INDIGENOUS 
OPPOSITION 
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The second part of Gray’s theory concerns the strategic utility of special opera-
tions forces. Gray argues that “the strategic value of special operations forces 
depends not just on how well or poorly they perform but also on how important 
for the war as a whole are their assigned missions.”14 As he suggests, the following 
four questions can be helpful in assessing the strategic utility of special opera-
tions forces: 
 ¡ What are the tasks that only SOF can do? 
 ¡ What are the tasks that SOF can do well? 
 ¡ What are the tasks that SOF tend to do poorly? 
 ¡ What are the tasks that SOF cannot do at all?15 
Because the Crimea campaign was unequivocally successful, this article is 
concerned only with the first two questions.
The Gerasimov Doctrine
To assess the strategic utility of special operations and special operations forces, 
we must understand the conditions that lead political and military leaders to 
choose covert operations. The portents of the special operations campaign in 
Crimea lie between the lines of what has come to be known as the Gerasimov 
Doctrine (see Steder’s Introduction to this special issue for an explanation of the 
doctrine).16 Two of Gerasimov’s points in particular reflect on special opera-
tions and the use of special operations forces in Crimea. First, SOF use covert 
actions, combined with active information and counter-information operations, 
to supplement non-military instruments of statecraft and achieve the state’s 
political and strategic goals. Second, the use of SOF and indigenous opposition 
forces creates a permanently active front throughout the territory of the target 
state and establishes the means to carry out asymmetrical actions that nullify the 
target’s advantages. In light of these ideas, all other strategic plans that refer to mass 
frontal confrontation belong to the past, and the need for new tactics for future 
operations highlights the evolving importance of special operations forces.
The Gerasimov model resuscitates Soviet-era political warfare in a modernized 
fashion—with nuances. It may signal an actual return to the Soviet era for 
Russian foreign policy and thus jeopardize small neighbors rooted in the Soviet 
soil. The model also discloses the Russian perception of the supportive tactics 
used by the West in the Georgian and Ukrainian color revolutions as an excuse 
to reinvigorate Russia’s use of similar tactics and techniques to achieve its own 
political ends. Bluntly, Russia puts blame on the West for anything Russia did 
or may yet do in Crimea and Ukraine, and may also do in Moldova, Lithuania, 
Latvia, or Estonia.
The operation that took place in Crimea put Gerasimov’s ideas into practice, 
and it was also a “test drive” of the military modernization plans he instigated.17 
The Russian Spetsnaz and naval infantry carried out the operation in an obscure 
fashion, and the truth was unveiled only after the victory. Consequently, the 
fait accompli of the occupation paralyzed any mechanisms that would have 
reacted to overt aggression. Mark Galeotti explains the logic behind Russia’s 
below-the-threshold actions as those of “a regional power able to overwhelm 
small neighbors—as it did with Georgia in 2008—but not a global one.”18 Putin 
circumvents NATO’s capabilities, which are to deter and counter a mass attack 
from Russia, and plays by a new rule book that emphasizes covert actions. NATO 
has yet to adapt. 
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The Spetsnaz in Action
The starting date of 20 February 2014 on “the Russian campaign medals ‘For 
the Return of Crimea’”19 may indicate that the ostensibly popular protests, 
which later led to violent clashes and Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych’s 
escape from Kiev to Crimea, were deliberately fabricated. According to Russian 
military analyst Anton Lavrov, “the earliest date when the Russian operation is 
reliably known to have been in progress is February 22.” That same day, according 
to Galeotti and Lavrov, the 45th Independent Spetsnaz Regiment (Otdelny 
polk spetsialnogo naznacheniya, or opSn) of the Airborne Troops (Vozdushno-
desantnye voiska, or VDV, Moscow) and the 3rd Spetsnaz Brigade (Tolyatti) were 
put on combat alert.20 Two Special Battalions of the 16th Brigade Independent 
Special Forces Detachment (Otdelny otryad spetsialnogo naznacheniya, or ooSn 
[effectively, a Spetsnaz battalion], Tambov) left their base,21 and several other 
airborne units, including the 7th Airborne Assault Division, also received similar 
orders.22 
The Anapa airfield became the key logistics base of the operation in Crimea.23 
The airfield, located 50 kilometers northwest from Novorossiysk,24 is where the 
10th and 25th Spetsnaz brigades later boarded large landing ships and deployed 
into Sevastopol harbor, along with many other reinforcements.25 As part of a 
large military “drill” that President Putin ordered on 26 February, “about 40 
Il-76 military transports left the Ulyanovsk airbase on February 26 and 27.”26 
News feeds claimed that “more than 10 of [the airplanes] landed in Anapa, and 
on February 28, some aircraft were spotted in Crimea.”27 The Ulyanovsk airbase 
is located on the Volga River, about 1,000 kilometers northeast of Anapa.
Meanwhile, self-defense militia groups started to form within Crimea, allegedly 
with Russian support or even instigation, “working through the marines of the 
810th Independent Naval Infantry Brigade already based there.”28 Unidentified 
armed groups blockaded Ukrainian bases and paralyzed any potential reac-
tion to the imminent seizure of the Crimean parliament building, which took 
place on 27 February, when approximately 50 well-equipped men claiming to 
be the local militia and wearing a variety of civilian outfits seized the Crimean 
parliament building. In the absence of any opposition, they took down the 
Ukrainian flag and hoisted the Russian flag over the building. The group 
identified themselves to the press as the “Russian-speaking Crimean population’s 
self-defense force.”29 However, as Galeotti describes them, “this well-armed and 
highly professional unit turned out to be the first deployment of operators from 
KSO [Russia’s new Special Operations Command: Komanda spetsialnogo naz-
nacheniya], supported by the elements of the VDV’s 45th opSn.”30 The operators 
turned the building into a fortress, and unarmed but well-organized pro-Russian 
protesters gathered outside to prevent local law enforcement forces from taking 
the building back. As the day went on, Russian troops continued to flow in by 
air, land, and sea. The logistics supply routines of the Black Sea Fleet made their 
infiltration from the sea easier. The Russian missile cruiser Azov carried about 
300 operators, possibly from an old unit of the 810th Brigade, 382nd Indepen-
dent Marines Battalion from Temryuk.31
After the first shock and awe, the Russians’ intentions became more vivid, even 
while their presence was still in question. The lack of identifiers, insignia, signs, 
and even license plates caused uncertainty about whether the invaders were 
ONE MONTH AFTER 
THE FIRST WAVE OF 
UNIDENTIFIED ARMED 




Medal “For the Return of Crimea”
November 2016
49
themselves Russians or local groups armed by Russians. These heavily armed 
groups in their armored personnel carriers proceeded to take over the Ukrainian 
airfields and bases in Crimea one by one. Although the Ukrainian troops had 
initial relative superiority, the government in Kiev did not issue orders to resist 
because it did not trust its own military, a factor that played a crucial role in the 
Russian takeover.32
According to Lavrov, the special units that had joined the 810th Brigade by 
5 March were the “3rd, 10th, 16th, and 22nd Independent Spetsnaz Brigades, 
the 25th Independent Spetsnaz Regiment, the 45th Independent VDV Spetsnaz 
Regiment, part of the 31st Independent VDV Airborne Assault Brigade, and 
some small but very capable SOF units.”33 All those units represented several 
thousand troops in aggregate. Even so, the high number of special operators 
can be considered an economy of force from the Russian perspective. With the 
reinforcement of conventional fire support units, the Spetsnaz paralyzed most 
Ukrainian units in their bases and prevented any resistance. A quick political 
referendum at the end of March to secede from Ukraine followed the victory. 
On 21 March 2014, one month after the first wave of unidentified armed men 
took to the streets, Crimea became Russian once again.
The Strategic Utility of Spetsnaz in Crimea
Russia’s operations in Crimea aimed to reinstate total Russian sovereignty over 
the territory after a 25-year post-Soviet hiatus. Whether the rest of the world 
is willing to acknowledge it or not, Russia succeeded in annexing Crimea for 
the second time in history. Although the contributions of various Russian 
intelligence organizations to the outcome remain unidentified, there clearly 
were sufficient human resources inside the territory, ready to act and make the 
invasion successful when Russian units infiltrated. The Spetsnaz proved adept in 
mobilizing local ethnic Russian groups to support their operations. The actual 
extent of Russia’s covert operations will unfortunately remain obscure until the 
archive of orders that were issued is revealed. Nevertheless, we can infer from this 
research that the Spetsnaz of the Main Intelligence Directorate (of the General 
Staff ) (Glavnoye razvedyvatelnoye upravleniye, or GRU) and the newly formed 
KSO played a vital role in the process.
The use of nearly all types of Russian special units in Crimea indicates that 
these units are being evaluated for a transformation from a Soviet-style Spetsnaz 
formation into a more modern SOF, organizationally closer to its Western 
counterparts. The use of “ambiguous warfare,”34 including self-defense groups, 
special units, and covert actions, may signal that Russia does not want a bigger 
actor, like NATO or the United States, to take notice and interfere.
Russian military reform, which was initiated by Defense Minister Anatoly 
Serdyukov after the conflict in Georgia in 2008, continued under his successor 
Sergei Shoigu, and later accelerated by General Gerasimov, became apparent 
in Crimea, especially in the equipment the special operators used during the 
Crimean conflict.35 The “new look” of the Russian soldiers showed the world 
that they had undergone a renewal process.36 Given that the Gerasimov Doc-
trine, which described the importance of special operations and special forces 
for achieving political ends short of open warfare, appeared a year prior to the 
operation in Crimea, the Crimean annexation can be regarded as an example of 
the doctrine and military reforms in practice. 
THE SPETSNAZ 
PROVED ADEPT IN 
MOBILIZING LOCAL 
ETHNIC RUSSIAN 
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The role the Spetsnaz played in Crimea helped to create a 
myth about the force’s stealth and effectiveness, an image 
that can serve as a useful deterrent to opponents in future 
operations. This fearsome reputation is unlikely to fade 
away unless a compromised covert action degenerates 
and is exposed, or another conflict contradicts the epic 
stories from the Crimean operation in the near future. The 
Spetsnaz’s skill at mobilizing local ethnic Russians to fur-
ther the mission and make the uprising appear spontaneous 
is also a notable aspect of the force’s Crimean activities.
Another significant strategic outcome of the Crimean 
operation is the messages it communicated to Russia’s 
“targets of influence,”37 which include all opponents of the 
Russian Federation. First, Russia showed off its splendid 
proficiency in paralyzing Western decision makers before 
they can react and prevent Moscow from accomplishing 
its strategic objectives. Second, Russia demonstrated both 
its will and the means it would use to 
back up that will should the West dare 
to poke any of its neighbors and try to 
weaken the strong political stance of 
the Russian Federation, the “rightful” 
successor of the Soviet Union. Put 
simply, the Russian Federation gets 
what it wants, before its opponents can 
acknowledge what is happening. The 
reluctance of the West to react, or the 
inadequacy of a reaction, could expand 
the threshold Putin is testing and could 
grant Russia a broader playground in the 
near future.
The lack of an actual clash of forces during the overall 
Crimean campaign obscured the real fighting capability of 
the Spetsnaz. The peaceful takeover of Crimea proves that 
there was an effective and protracted background political 
operation working to soften the ground and rally support 
in preparation for the campaign, yet it is hard to make any 
concrete observations about the special units’ inclusion. 
What Is the Takeaway from This Study?
The Russian Spetsnaz provides Russian decision makers 
with a capable means to achieve Russia’s strategic goals 
while keeping potential escalation under control, and 
with limited expenditure. Even though force numbers 
increased as the campaign accomplished its goals, the rela-
tive size of special forces to the conventional forces was 
still inconsiderable. Thus, the economy of force that Colin 
Gray specified for special operations was accomplished, 
although it was accomplished mostly due to the lack of 
resistance from Ukrainian forces. 
Given close proximity to Russian territory and a consider-
able number of Russian-speaking and Russian-looking 
people, as was the case in Crimea, Spetsnaz operators 
would not have difficulty disguising themselves as the 
“local militia” in another country contiguous to Russia. 
The inference that such a victory could be achieved 
outside the Russian near-sphere, however, will need more 
solid evidence, especially given that there was no third 
party to physically interfere with Russian logistics routes 
in Crimea. The most important strategic outcome of the 
overall Crimean campaign is the myth that the Spetsnaz 
created for themselves: it is too late to 
react when unidentified men surface 
on the streets. This worrisome myth, 
which the perceivably flawless operation 
in Crimea bolstered, will persist until a 
defeat proves it wrong.
The final point to make is that, as Ga-
leotti notes, Russia may be “punching 
above its weight” in its latest activities 
in Ukraine and Syria, due to the weak-
ness of its economy and military com-
pared to the West.38 Nevertheless, the 
outcome of the annexation of Crimea 
suggests that the modernization of the Russian army has 
paid off very well and has resulted in a modern, capable, 
and thriving SOF that Moscow can use as a strategic policy 
tool domestically and abroad. ²
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Is It All Just a Bad Habit? Explaining NATO’s 
Difficulty in Deterring Russian Aggression
Dr. Leo Blanken,  
US Naval Postgraduate School
From the splitting off of South Ossetia and provocations 
against Estonia to the annexation of Crimea, the Russian Federation is on 
the offensive (for more details on these events, see the articles by Dayspring, 
Danylyuk, and Atay in the first section of this issue). What hampers NATO from 
mounting an effective deterrent response to recent Russian aggression? I offer 
the following (partial) answer to this puzzle: the Russian threat falls outside of 
NATO’s strategic “habit.” In other words, legacy assumptions, norms, and behav-
ior patterns drive NATO’s inability to respond to the threats posed by Russian 
activity, and these legacies have been entrenched through decades of environ-
mental conditioning and discourse. Such habituation constrains the ability of an 
organization and its individual members to plan or act outside of a given space. 
The problem goes deeper than tactics, technology, or operations. It reflects both 
a self-conceptualization and a set of assumptions about the functioning of the 
global system that inhibit effective response. 
“Habit” as an Analytical Concept 
As early as the 1960s, the French philosopher Michel Foucault developed the 
concept of uncovering the “archeology” of knowledge, wherein “systems of 
thought and knowledge … are governed by rules … that operate beneath the con-
sciousness of individual subjects and define a system of conceptual possibilities 
that determines the boundaries of thought in a given domain and period.”1 Work 
such as this opened the door to critical studies of social structure that show how 
such emergent properties can constrain, if not entrap, their inhabitants.2 More 
recently, political scientist Ted Hopf has offered a new approach for analyzing 
this issue within the context of international relations, based on the fourth (and 
most neglected) of Max Weber’s logics of human action. In order, the four are: 
(1) instrumental rationality (cost-benefit analysis), (2) value rationality (appeal 
to norms or ethics), (3) affect (emotions), and (4) habit (unquestioned view-
points).3 It is this fourth logic—habit—that is the point of concern here.
In his article for this special issue of CTX, Dayspring argues that “the Russian 
Federation is at war with the West. Pretending this is not the case … does not 
make it any less so.” Why would NATO be pretending? The logic of habit, rather, 
would suggest that NATO has, through intellectual inertia, arrived at an ontology 
of deterrence that cannot grapple with the strategies used by Russia. In Hopf ’s 
conceptualization, 
habits both evoke and suppress actions. They imply actions by giving 
us ready-made responses to the world that we execute without 
thinking. … So an infinitude of behaviors are effectively deleted from 
the available repertoire of possible actions. We do not apprehend 
what is out there, and then categorize it. Instead, what is perceived 












Hopf specifically warns that entities such as NATO are susceptible to the force 
of habit: “Institutionalized settings in general, whether international organiza-
tions … or foreign policy bureaucracies, are likely sites for the operation of 
the logic of habit because of their associated routines, standard operating 
procedures, and relative isolation from competing ideological structures.”5 In 
other words, not only is NATO working with outdated physical assets such as 
force structure (see the article by Fábián in this issue), but it is similarly battling 
outdated cognitive awareness regarding the threat environment.   
This logic of habit is driven by the two major phases of NATO’s history. First, the 
Cold War (1945–1990) created the habit of seeing deterrent “bargaining” with 
Russia as having meaning only in reference to a potential nuclear apocalypse. 
Smaller, conventional military actions carried no intrinsic meaning other than 
the communication of intent regarding a larger potential war. Second, in the 
constabulary “Long War” (1990–present), NATO has battled terrorists and 
insurgents, enemies with whom deterrence was precluded by the assumption 
that such entities are not worthy of negotiated settlement—only annihilation. 
In other words, NATO has not encountered or developed effective theories 
regarding middling, militarized interstate disputes for 70 years. Recent Russian 
hybrid warfare activities, therefore, lie outside its habituated worldview.
The Cold War: Bargaining in the Shadow of Armageddon
Because the Cold War emphasis on pre-war “bargaining” dominated thinking 
on how wars occur, the strategic environment of the Cold War shaped and 
entrenched aspects of thinking that remain coded within NATO’s institutional 
DNA. The conceptual effects of this narrow focus are threefold. First, pre-war 
and wartime periods can be crisply delineated. Second, low-level militarized 
activities serve little function without reference to a possible ensuing general war. 
In other words, these bargaining frameworks made it difficult to imagine that 
limited warfare activities could achieve a strategic end state by themselves—such 
activities would have meaning only as a preamble to a larger potential conflict. 
Third, and most obviously, this mindset toward conflict was tailor-made for 
strategic situations of “ex post punishment” deterrence, in which one deters 
potential attackers by communicating the capacity and resolve to retaliate in 
full. In the context of the Cold War, such punishment was ensured by both sides’ 
capacity to deliver a devastating nuclear “second strike” despite any damage 
caused by a sneak attack.
The strategic environment of the Cold War was relatively simple. It was charac-
terized by a standoff between two relatively mirror-image entities: 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Each was an alliance of ideologically 
aligned states behind a leading superpower, each alliance fielded im-
pressive conventional forces, and each alliance established a nuclear 
arsenal with a secure second-strike strategic capability.    
The establishment of the nuclear standoff profoundly changed US 
(and hence NATO) strategic thinking, and therefore, the meaning 
of all lower levels of escalation. In 1946, the first doyen of nuclear 
strategic thinking, Bernard Brodie, established this relationship 
between minor conflict and how it might or might not culminate 
in nuclear exchange: “[I am] not … concerned with who will win Nikita Krushchev and a corn cob
“WHAT IS PERCEIVED 
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the next war in which atomic bombs are used. Thus far the chief purpose of our 
military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose 
must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.”6 In Brodie’s 
view, states of peace and war were neatly delineated, and preventing the latter 
state became the sole focus of strategic thought. 
Throughout the next few decades, this notion of keeping one’s eyes on the “big 
war” while disdaining the meaning of small conflicts continued and was more for-
mally developed.7 It was Brodie’s contemporary, Thomas Schelling, who most fully 
developed the concept of pre-war bargaining as the key to understanding conflict. 
Strategy thus reflected the judgment that ideas of complete victory 
could be anathema even in limited conflicts during the nuclear age, 
and that all parties thus had a common interest in stabilizing crises 
and conflicts before mutual disaster struck. This encouraged notions 
that the superpowers were engaged in processes of bargaining rather 
than battlefield contests for supremacy.8    
The aspect of pre-conflict bargaining that Schelling’s writings most critically 
emphasized was the communication of resolve over disputed issues because, in 
the era of mutually assured destruction, the capabilities of actors were not at 
issue.9 Schelling’s thinking on conflict as the result of a breakdown in bargaining 
was, of course, based on his training as an economist. John Nash had published 
his seminal article, “The Bargaining Problem,” in 1950, unleashing a torrent of 
literature on the topic.10 In these models, actors offer each other divisions of a 
valued good, hoping to gain the largest portion of the good while avoiding the 
costs of conflict. This literature is noteworthy for two attributes. The first is 
the presumption that low levels of conflict are meant to be solely information-
revealing—rather than being meaningful lines of effort in their own right—
within the framework of the ultimate bargaining problem. The second is that 
even in models where infinite counter-offers are allowed, the first (optimal) offer 
is usually proposed and accepted in equilibrium.11 In other words, the models 
emphasize conflict as informational and establish a clear distinction between 
peace (pre-conflict bargaining) and war (the breakdown of bargaining).
Even as the curtain was beginning to drop on the Cold War in 1988, Kenneth 
Waltz—perhaps the single most influential strategic thinker of his time—con-
tinued the pattern of dismissing the utility of lower-order uses of force and 
emphasizing the centrality of ex post punishment deterrence in modern strategy: 
The accumulation of significant power through conquest, even if 
only conventional weapons are used, is no longer possible in the 
world of nuclear powers. … Deterrence is more easily achieved than 
most military strategists would have us believe. In a conventional 
world, a country can sensibly attack if it believes that success is prob-
able. In a nuclear world, a country cannot attack unless it believes 
that success is assured.12
In this framing, the superpowers of the nuclear age embraced a dichotomy 
by which actors could either roll the dice on a total military fait accompli or 
remain at peace. All lesser-included conflict could make sense only within this 
framework.  
“IDEAS OF COMPLETE 
VICTORY COULD 
BE ANATHEMA 





As the Cold War closed, it even became popular to believe 
that war among “normal” states could become obsolete.13 
With the demise of the Soviet Union, the seeming 
triumph of liberal democracy, and the emerging notion 
of “democratic peace,” many hoped war among “civilized” 
states would be a thing of the past.14 This evolution in 
academic thought paralleled the evolving strategic envi-
ronment of the 1990s, a period in which liberal hegemony 
sought to eradicate the legacy of the remaining autocratic 
hold-outs and other “pests” that resisted its totality. 
The Constabulary “Long War”: The Police 
Don’t Bargain with Criminals! 
The end of the Cold War created an entirely novel 
strategic environment for the United States and its NATO 
allies. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
prior to the rise of China, the decade of the 1990s was 
characterized by a “Washington consensus” that pros-
elytized free-market capitalism coupled with democratic 
institutions to all points of the globe.15 The strategic 
environment and academic thinking in this period moved 
from the Cold War’s emphasis on ex post punishment 
deterrent threats with nuclear weapons to preemptive/
preventive policing (constabulary) actions against what 
were deemed illegitimate actors. Whereas Cold War 
thinking neglected low-level coercion in favor of “pre-war 
bargaining” models, the constabulary period focused 
solely on delegitimizing and removing any recalcitrant 
entity from the liberal world order. This shift can be seen 
in the emerging concern with “(il)legitimacy” in inter-
national relations over the last 20 years, the emphasis on 
asymmetric applications of force against such illegitimate 
targets, and the implications of these trends for US-NATO 
strategic thought.
The end of the Cold War, with the concomitant US 
aspiration of establishing a globalized liberal-democratic 
world order, gave rise to a need for homogeneity in 
international relations. Actors that fell outside of this 
model became problematic irritations that needed to 
be eradicated, rather than accommodated or bargained 
with. Nearly a century ago, the German theorist Carl 
Schmitt prophesied the problems that would arise from 
a liberal hegemony, and developed the concept of justus 
hostis—an “equal and just enemy.” “Regarding an enemy 
as both a just and an equal partner meant that peace 
could be made with that enemy—his ultimate destruction 
was not sought, but conflict with him was possible and 
regulated.”16 The enemies of the post-Cold War global 
world order were no longer considered justi hostes, and 
therefore to act against them neither required justification 
for the initiation of conflict nor allowed for negotiated 
settlement to terminate a conflict. The primary targets of 
this type of “eradication” conflict were non-state actors 
(al Qaeda, for example), but included some “rogue” states 
that were categorized as outliers from the liberal order 
(Ba’athist Iraq, for example).17 Thus, labeling terrorist 
NATO HQ
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groups and rogue states as criminal enterprises again deemphasized the low-level 
uses of force among recognized entities. Rather, constabulary enterprises became 
the norm, which allowed for preemptive and preventive uses of force against 
illegitimate foes. 
The analogy of “hegemonic policeman states” and “criminal others” in the 
liberal world order also appeared appropriate due to the vast military asymmetry 
between the United States and its allies and the global “irritants” who opposed 
this orderly vision of the world. Advances in sensors, precision-guided muni-
tions, and computing seemed to embody something close to omnipotence in 
the minds of many planners in Washington. This “revolution in military affairs 
(RMA)” promised to entirely remove the Cold War reliance on deterrence, but 
would replace it with asymmetric hunting excursions: 
If the potential costs of war appear to be extraordinarily low [due 
to these technologies], why not simply remove potential irritants 
before they become major problems? ... Indeed, the ideas embodied 
in the RMA appealed to … [those] who dreamed of “full spectrum 
dominance” … and neoconservative activists clamoring for a new 
Pax Americana built on US military supremacy.18
These strategists then pursued their aspirations across the globe, from the 2003 
invasion of Iraq to ongoing worldwide drone strikes outside of major theaters of 
operations.  
This capability asymmetry, coupled with the perceived illegitimacy of terrorist 
groups and rogue states, codified conflict in the decades after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall as a matter of global policing operations. The concepts it builds on 
do not fall within the Westphalian tradition of international relations among 
legitimized entities, but rather smack of “pest control” within the liberal world 
order.19 Schmitt’s work recognized this problem, which he termed bracketing. 
By declaring actors to be illegitimate (bandits, criminals, terrorists, or rogues) 
from the start, the diplomacy required for beginning and ending a state of war 
was moot.20 Instead, when illegitimate entities caused trouble, the United States 
and its allies (including NATO) would automatically mobilize to eradicate the 
troublemaker. Low-level military operations embedded within “normal” political 
discourse remained neglected. Similar to the Cold War era, the constabulary era 
poorly prepared the NATO countries to deal with lower-order acts of aggression 
among recognized players within the international system.               
Conclusions
The question of why NATO is not effectively handling Russian aggression has 
many possible answers: the defensive nature of the NATO alliance, budget 
constraints, legacy weapons systems, political risk aversion, and many more. 
This essay simply tosses one more argument onto the pile: NATO’s ontological 
worldview and the epistemology of its strategic thought fitted within well-worn, 
but no less inappropriate, habitual grooves.
What can be done? Hopf argues that two mechanisms are often responsible for 
breaking the force of habit: “exogenous events” or “the margins of society.”21 
By the first, he means a shock to the system that will cause purposeful, rational 
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decision making to reemerge. In the contemporary case of Russia, however, a 
thoughtful adversary is deliberately operating below well-established thresholds 
that would deliver such a “wake-up” shock (specifically the invocation of NATO’s 
Article V). By the “margins of society,” Hopf means members of the community 
or organization who are not stultified by conventions: “Those people least 
dominated by the prevailing social structure … or who have lost concern about 
society’s opinion of them … are the most fertile sources of ‘innovation’ and 
challenges to habitualized routines.”22 SOF forces have often played this role 
within broader military organizations. Specific recommendations from some of 
the other authors in this issue prove the point. James’s call for counter-hybrid 
targeting, and Andreassen, Boesgaard, and Svendsen’s argument for US training 
of Norwegian reserve forces are all evidence of such fresh thinking. Further, 
NSHQ itself can provide a hub for accumulating, vetting, synthesizing, and 
promulgating such innovative thinking to break pernicious habits sooner rather 
than later. ²        
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The “little green men” took the world by surprise when they 
appeared at a Crimea airport on 28 February 2014 and sparked renewed con-
cerns about Russian foreign political ambitions. Who would be Russia’s next 
target, and what could small neighboring countries do to deter and counter the 
hybrid threat from the East? Special Operations Forces could play a key part in 
small nations’ counter-hybrid warfare in the future. Elaborating on the work of a 
recent US Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) study, I believe SOF should form the 
core of a new multidisciplinary unit acting as a grand strategy enabler for a small 
nation, guiding and coordinating its counter-hybrid warfare efforts.
In 2014, Professor Nancy Roberts and I directed a team of NPS officer students 
from six countries, which set out to answer the following question: “How might 
we design a special operations force to best serve Norway’s security interests in 
2025?” The team’s findings were presented to the sponsor, the Norwegian Special 
Operations Command, in 2015. The Norwegian Special Operations Forces 
(NORSOF) 2025 study identified hybrid warfare as a key future challenge.1 The 
intent of this paper is to develop the findings of the study, including previously 
unpublished notes from discussions with international subject matter experts, 
into generic recommendations for the potential role of small nations’ SOF in 
counter-hybrid warfare.2 
Several recent studies have examined the future of special operations.3 The 
vast majority, however, take stock only of US SOF. Without denying the great 
importance of the US experience for the development of international SOF, there 
are obvious reasons why not all the findings of these studies are applicable—or 
even useful—for smaller nations. NORSOF, for instance, is dwarfed by the 
69,000-strong US SOF community, which outnumbers the armed forces of most 
countries, has a worldwide presence, maintains specialized units for a wide range 
of purposes, and develops and operates its own equipment in all domains.4 In 
addition to this enormous gap in resources, the organization, roles, missions, and 
tasks of US SOF differ substantially from those of SOF in smaller European nations. 
For instance, while for decades the US SOF have built parallel distinct units within 
the military assistance (MA) and direct action domains, smaller nations have 
opted to include elements of MA in their predominantly commando-style strike 
units. It is, therefore, important to present a small-nation view of the future 
role of SOF in counter-hybrid warfare, which has largely been ignored in the 
academic literature up to now.
The Challenge: Another Kind of Warfare
What will the future of conflict look like? An abundance of over-the-horizon as-
sessments by academic institutions and military intelligence communities paints 
a gloomy picture of governance deficits, complicated political landscapes, and 
intrastate and interstate conflicts: Asia will surpass North America and Europe 
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in global economic power, and the resurgence of Russia’s military capability will 
continue. The proliferation of new technologies will enable non-state actors and 
networks to attack Western interests in more harmful ways.5 The NORSOF 2025 
study predicts that “future warfare will move beyond the military domain into 
the civil domain, challenging traditional organizations and doctrines.”6 Hybrid 
war, a hyped term with no agreed-upon definition (see Steder’s discussion of 
this point in the Introduction to this special issue), describes the increasingly 
blurred distinctions between war and peace, the military and civilian sectors, 
and state and non-state actors. According to Frank Hoffman, hybrid wars can be 
conducted by states or political groups and can “incorporate a range of different 
modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and forma-
tions, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal 
disorder.”7
Initiated by the ousting of Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych in February 
2014 (see Danylyuk’s article for details of this event), Russia’s subsequent aggres-
sion against Ukraine came as a surprise to most of the world. Beyond the fact 
that Russia was willing to utilize military force to annex the Crimean Peninsula 
and support pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine, almost equally disturbing 
was the Russian modus operandi. Unmarked uniformed soldiers with Russian 
military equipment—who came to be called “the little green men” as if they were 
Martian invaders—came to symbolize the hybrid warfare of the twenty-first 
century. In Ukraine, Russia has used the full range of military and non-military 
means to destabilize the country’s new regime and support separatist movements. 
These include military kinetic operations such as artillery bombardments from 
Russian territory and the insertion of regular, unmarked troops in Eastern 
Ukraine; “gray zone” activities including the use of SOF and criminal networks 
against civilian targets; cyber attacks and propaganda campaigns; and political 
activities such as a trade boycott, increased gas prices, and diplomatic efforts. 
Oscar Jonsson and Robert Seely propose the definition “full-spectrum conflict” 
for the Russian way of warfare in Ukraine, where “several military and non-mil-
itary means are under one central command and directed to the same political 
goal.”8 They argue that the “conduct of Full-Spectrum Conflict is premised upon 
a centralized command and control that enables a high degree of coordination” 
and conclude that Russia’s authoritarian regime has “a comparative advantage to 
the EU and NATO’s cumbersome decision making.”9
Not only large international organizations but also individual nations may find 
themselves struggling in the face of hybrid attacks from centrally-controlled 
autocracies. The sectoral structure of Western governments leads to an often-
observed inability to collaborate, or even to coordinate efforts, between govern- 
mental agencies. “We’re not adjusted to the new way of doing things,” complained 
a senior international SOF officer interviewed for the NORSOF 2025 study.10 He 
claimed, “There is no integration between big [governmental] organizations 
facing the same security problem.” A European foreign ministry official concurred 
and argued for the need to share more information between departments and 
agencies.11 Nevertheless, some nations have tackled the problem better than 
others. The United Kingdom stands out as a prominent example, where the 
Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office both coordinates the government’s response to 
crises and develops and implements the national security strategy.12 
According to Hoffman, hybrid warfare’s chief characteristics are convergence 
and combinations. Various methods and actions, spanning all sectors of society, 
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are combined and deployed simultaneously to present the opponent with a 
complex and overwhelming situation.13 They target the weak spots of many small 
Western nations: the gray zones between governmental sectors where limits 
imposed by national law often hamper cross-agency coordination and collabora-
tion. Another challenge is the very limited strategic freedom of action a small 
nation has in a conflict with a large aggressor. A small NATO nation’s rational 
course of action in a bilateral conflict with Russia would arguably be to de-esca-
late the situation unless and until a state of war is inevitable, from which point 
its rational course of action would be to escalate in order to trigger a declaration 
of Article V.14 This dilemma provides the aggressor with substantial leeway in the 
initial, pre–Article V phase of hostilities.
According to B.H. Liddell Hart’s classic definition, “the role of grand strategy 
is to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, 
towards the attainment of the political object of the war.”15 Thus, the ability to 
execute a grand strategy seems closely related to the ability to wage a successful 
hybrid war. Grand strategies are typically developed by large nations and most 
often executed by centrally-controlled autocracies.16 They are rarely observed, 
however, in small Western nations, most of which apparently lack the tradition, 
interest, and ability to develop such strategies. If an aggressor’s hybrid warfare 
strategy is blurring the distinctions between war and peace and targeting the 
gray zones between governmental sectors, this lack of a unifying national 
strategy may seriously impede the small nation’s counter-hybrid efforts. The 
ability to quickly understand and counter the aggressor’s moves through a joint 
interagency effort is critical to success. John Boyd developed the OODA loop 
(Observe→Orient→Decide→Act) to describe the typical decision cycle and 
argued that one side in a conflict will gain an advantage by completing the cycle 
faster than the opponent, generating confusion and disorder on the opponent’s 
side.17 Small Western nations may find themselves on the losing side of the 
hybrid battle unless they tackle this deficit.
The Solution, Part 1: A New Mission for SOF
Make counter-hybrid warfare a primary task for small-nation SOF.
It takes a whole-of-government approach to fight full-spectrum aggression. 
Hoffman suggests that success in hybrid warfare will “require new interagency 
doctrine and new procedures for incorporating military and non-military 
programs and activities into a seamless whole.”18 The NORSOF 2025 study recom-
mends that SOF should play a pivotal part in the interagency coordination of 
counter-hybrid warfare. A senior European SOF commander interviewed for the 
study noted that “hybrid warfare demands more police-like forces, [and] SOF is a 
good tool for solving these problems.”19 Another source claimed, “Putin is using 
political warfare actively in Eastern Europe, [and] SOF is the perfect tool to meet 
that threat.”20 The study makes the case that strengthening a government’s ability 
to coordinate resources and counter hybrid aggression should be a future core 
activity of SOF.  SOF leaders should establish a national interagency network, 
work with the international SOF network, and lead small joint interagency teams 
consisting of representatives from the intelligence services and relevant gov-
ernmental offices.21 SOF could assist the national decision maker’s planning and 
execution of a grand strategy by coordinating all diplomatic, economic, military, 
and informational resources, thereby offsetting the initial advantages of speed 
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and coordination in a centrally-controlled autocracy. Three properties make SOF 
suitable for this role: mission, mindset, and cost-efficiency.
Mission
Although cross-sectoral in nature, counter-hybrid warfare is principally a military 
task and may be viewed as an extension of SOF’s existing roles and missions. 
Unconventional warfare (UW), defined as “activities conducted to enable a resis-
tance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or 
occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and 
guerrilla force in a denied area,”22 is at the core of hybrid warfare.23 Countering 
UW/hybrid warfare may be defined as simply changing posture from the offen-
sive to the defensive, working to reduce the nation’s vulnerabilities, and attacking 
the opponent’s weak spots. In low-intensity conflicts, like hybrid war, relational-
maneuver armies have historically been successful.24 Because they are by nature 
relational, SOF should be the supported organization in these conflicts. 
Mindset
Flexibility, integration, and innovation are key features of the SOF mindset.25 
Counter-hybrid warfare should combine the resources of all governmental 
agencies, and SOF understand the value of integrated efforts better than most. 
Being small organizations, indoctrinated to work by, with, and through others, 
SOF operate jointly as a matter of course. Anna Simons describes SOF as a bridge 
between the military and other governmental agencies, an advantage waiting to 
be nurtured and used on a larger scale.26 Furthermore, the varying and confusing 
composition of the hybrid campaign places a premium on the ability to quickly 
identify the threat and come up with an appropriate response. SOF’s creativity 
and out-of-the-box thinking may prove to be highly valuable in hybrid warfare.
Cost-Efficiency
SOF are cost-efficient as well as cost-effective forces. As noted by Colin Gray, 
“SOF can solve sensitive political problems swiftly, precisely, and cheaply.”27 For 
a small nation, establishing a costly new organization to strengthen interagency 
coordination may not be feasible. Building the desired capability on the basis 
of a well-functioning SOF organization, however, is probably both quicker and 
more cost-efficient. Eirik Kristoffersen points out that SOF already have the 
capabilities required to play a role in a whole-of-government and interagency 
response to unpredictable threats.28
The Solution, Part 2: A New Special Operator
Develop special operators tailored for counter-hybrid warfare.
David Gompert writes that “any force prepared to address hybrid threats would 
have to be built upon a solid professional military foundation, but it would 
also place a premium on cognitive skills to recognize or quickly adapt to the 
unknown.”29 The special operator of today has knowledge, skills, and innate 
abilities useful in counter-hybrid warfare. He or she is a well-educated, mature, 
flexible, resilient, multidisciplinary generalist trained and able to (co-)operate 
with everyone and under any conditions. The special operator is a champion 
of the tactical domain: a 25- to 35-year-old soldier with the exceptional physical 
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qualities and skills required for the execution of high-speed, high-precision, and 
high-risk tactical operations. 
In the future, the nation will also rely on this special operator to conduct com-
mando strikes, special reconnaissance, and counterterrorism operations. How-
ever, “tactical excellence in the conduct of special operations is no guarantee for 
strategic effectiveness.”30 Hoffman claims that 
defeating the hybrid adversary will require alterations in how mili-
tary and national security organizations think about strategy and 
how leaders are educated. It will require commanders throughout 
the military that can work across organizational boundaries, with 
coalition members, international organizations, and non-military 
agencies of government.31 
A NATO staff officer interviewed for the NORSOF 2025 study insisted that the 
future SOF needs “jack-of-all-trades officers who understand the strategic con-
text,”32 and a European defense ministry official suggested, “Military assistance 
skills will be the most sought after in the coming years.”33 The study thus pro-
poses that militaries develop another category of special operator, the “warrior-
diplomat.” In addition to having the highest proficiency in military skills, the 
warrior-diplomat is defined as an operator with “excellent political and cultural 
understanding, highly developed social competencies, empathy, and communi-
cation skills which enable him to lead and work with others in an international 
and interagency environment.” He or she is “a well-educated enabler who thinks 
strategically and is able to creatively develop and integrate SOF capabilities into a 
comprehensive whole-of-government approach.”34 The warrior-diplomat is not 
a completely different breed from today’s special operator. Rather, it is the same 
person with added experience, higher-level education, and training in strategic 
problem-solving. The warrior-diplomat exists within some SOF today, but in 
limited numbers because most operators who reach their forties are forced to 
start a new career elsewhere. Some of these “over-the-top door-kickers” should 
be retained within the SOF organization to become warrior-diplomats. The 
NORSOF 2025 study proposes a dedicated career track for the production of such 
personnel in higher numbers than today.35
Recognizing the complexity of hybrid warfare, the warrior-diplomats should 
be joined by a number of highly competent personnel with complementary 
skills, both military and civilian, to form a truly multidisciplinary team of grand 
strategy enablers within SOF. These would represent a highly capable resource 
in the government’s toolbox, and have the age, basic experience, and cognitive 
skills necessary to work with senior politicians, bureaucrats, and diplomats. They 
would exploit networks and pull strings to coordinate the whole-of-government 
effort in the counter-hybrid warfare campaign. A good training ground could be 
strategic MA missions in international operations. While contributing valuable, 
high-profile strategic effects, these operators would simultaneously develop skills 
that are highly relevant in national scenarios.
The Solution, Part 3: A New Organization
Establish a SOF unit dedicated to interagency coordination and counter-hybrid 
warfare.
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In addition to a new mission and a new special operator, success in hybrid 
warfare also requires a radical reorganization of SOF. The NORSOF 2025 study 
recommends that the SOF organization should have a short line to the ultimate 
decision maker, a mandate and organic ability to plan and execute joint inter-
agency operations, and a flat and networked structure with elements dedicated 
to coordination, counter-hybrid warfare, and research and development.36 
Matching the speed of the decision-making cycle of the opponent’s centralized 
command and control structure is imperative, and minimizing the distance of 
the reporting lines between SOF and the ultimate national decision maker will 
lay the grounds for timely and effective counter measures. As argued by David 
Tucker and Christopher Lamb, “insulating SOF from political authorities or 
filtering SOF control and command through a hierarchy of conventional-force 
commanders does not make sense when SOF are given the strategic lead for op-
erations.”37 A direct and short chain of command enables SOF to quickly launch 
a comprehensive, integrated effort across governmental agencies while retaining 
a high level of secrecy.38 Reducing the number of bureaucratic, hierarchical 
layers between the special operator and decision maker means quicker decisions, 
reduced risk of miscommunication, better control, and increased operational 
security in both the planning and execution phases. SOF should thus have a 
direct link to the national-level decision makers through a special operations 
command (SOCOM) with a mandate and the organic ability to plan and execute 
joint interagency operations. 
Requirements for speed, security, and coordination also imply the need for a flat 
and flexible SOF organizational structure. Traditional hierarchies have slow deci-
sion cycles and ineffective interagency mechanisms, and experience difficulties 
fighting unconventional networks. John Arquilla states that “it takes networks to 
fight networks,”39 while retired General Stanley McChrystal proposes “creating a 
team of teams to foster cross-silo collaboration,” an idea inspired by his experi-
ences as commander of the Joint Special Operations Task Force in Iraq.40 As 
counter-hybrid warfare becomes a primary task of SOF, dedicated, networked 
teams for national interagency coordination and collaboration should be estab-
lished. The NORSOF 2025 study proposes a unit “conducting strategic liaison 
and inter-service, interdepartmental and international coordination” under the 
SOCOM.41 Personnel from this unit would lead small, joint interagency teams of 
grand strategy enablers to coordinate whole-of-government efforts. Additionally, 
SOF should organize small and decentralized units for tactical counter-hybrid 
warfare. NORSOF 2025 proposes SOF reserve units for homeland defense to sup-
port local operations and provide situational awareness and rapid response. They 
would also train Home Guard units in guerilla warfare.42
Innovation is a fundamental feature of special operations forces, and a crucial 
quality for staying ahead of adversaries on the battlefield.43 As Arquilla argues, 
While history provides some useful examples to stimulate strategic 
thought about such problems, coping with networks that can fight 
in so many different ways—sparking myriad, hybrid forms of con-
flict—is going to require some innovative thinking.44 
To keep up with the current pace of doctrinal, organizational, and technological 
developments, close interaction between the armed forces, research establish-
ments, and think tanks is arguably more important than ever. The NORSOF 2025 
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study thus proposes the establishment of a research and development unit within 
SOCOM as a driving force for developing and implementing new technology, 
doctrine, and organizations in SOF.45
Conclusions
Hybrid warfare blurs the distinction between peacetime and war, and challenges 
traditional defense and security doctrines and organizations. Success in hybrid 
war requires the ability to quickly plan and execute coordinated whole-of-gov- 
ernment countermeasures. SOF have the prerequisites to play a key role in the 
counter-hybrid warfare efforts of a small nation, working by, with, and through 
other agencies. 
The SOF of a small nation should be given the mandate and organic ability to 
plan and execute joint interagency operations and have a direct link to the 
national-level decision makers. To accommodate hybrid warfare’s requirements 
for speed, security, and coordination, the future SOF organization should operate 
dedicated, networked teams for interagency coordination and collaboration. 
As the core competency for the counter-hybrid warfare task, SOF should increase 
the number of strategic-thinking operators through retention and academic 
training, and invite personnel with complementary skills into the organization 
to create highly competent and capable multidisciplinary teams. While devel-
oping the new grand strategy enablers, SOF should also maintain their tactical 
champions, providing a one-stop organization for all contingencies.
It is up to the policy makers to decide the future role and mission of SOF. When 
new challenges emerge, however, SOF should be proactive, not a slave of the 
status quo, as a senior international officer interviewed for the NORSOF 2025 
study urged.46 SOF should fill the current gap of the small nation’s capabilities 
by quickly adjusting doctrine, technology, and organization to meet the chal-
lenges in the gray zones. Might these conclusions be relevant even to larger 
nations? ²  
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Do not try to do today’s job with yesterday’s tools and yesterday’s 
concepts.
 — Marshall McLuhan1
After more than a decade of expeditionary operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the NATO alliance and many European nations in particular 
have recently started to refocus their defensive efforts back on their own national 
territories.2 This is partially due to the reemergence of an aggressive Russia, with 
its “new” approach to warfare, and to the rise of ISIS, the violent and multifac-
eted terrorist organization that has conducted a number of spectacular attacks 
on European soil over the last two years.3 Although neither national govern-
ments nor NATO will ever admit it, this refocusing has led to the uncomfortable 
discovery that their Cold War–era, doctrinally rigid, conventionally focused 
defense capabilities have become obsolete and ineffective against the adversaries 
of the twenty-first century.4 In national capitals and at NATO headquarters, the 
last two years have been characterized by a desperate search for solutions, but it 
seems that neither individual countries nor the Alliance has been able to escape 
from the chains of convention and tradition.  
Emily O. Goldman suggests that nations have two fundamental choices when 
designing their defense frameworks. One choice is matching with adversaries, 
which is essentially what the United States and the Soviet Union did during the 
Cold War. The second option is to invest in offsetting capabilities to disrupt and 
undermine the rival’s competitive advantage.5 As recent events have shown, both 
state and non-state opponents have chosen to offset the conventional superiority 
of individual Western nations and the NATO alliance. How should individual 
countries and NATO adapt to this new environment? Should they stick to their 
conventional approaches, reform their military posture to match the opponents’ 
strategies, or offset in some other fashion? Will it be enough to make only minor 
adjustments on the surface, or are fundamental changes necessary? This article 
addresses these questions with the intention to help nations and NATO better 
prepare for future conflicts.
The Fundamental Challenges
As Frank Steder outlined in this special issue’s Introduction, individual nations 
and the NATO alliance face several dilemmas that arise directly from the new 
kinds of warfare that are emerging in the twenty-first century. First, since the 
end of the Cold War, the threat environment has dramatically changed from 
a bipolar peer-on-peer nuclear and conventional military rivalry to a complex 
form of violence and upheaval that threatens not only national security but also 
regional stability and global peace. Even if nations are saying “on paper” that 
they have grasped these changes and adapted to the new reality, their strategic 
approaches, military doctrine, and defense organizations are still primarily based 
on Cold War doctrine.6
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Second, because of shrinking defense budgets, most 
nations are years—if not decades—behind where they 
should be as they struggle to maintain their conventional 
military structures and hardware. Vehicles and weapon 
systems are, for the most part, old and in very bad shape; 
spare parts supplies are dwindling, and storage depots are 
emptying due to ongoing operational needs; and training 
hours have been severely reduced.7 What is more, due to 
this resource shortage, these nations have no chance of 
keeping up with current military technological research 
and development. The price tag of the most modern 
systems is so high that only a few very wealthy countries 
will be able to afford the new gadgets in the future.8 It can 
be argued that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan brought 
some valuable technological improvement—financed 
mainly by the United States—to participating military 
organizations, but these assets are focused narrowly on 
counterinsurgency operations in a very specific opera-
tional environment and hardly seem useful in a modern, 
wide-ranging defense scenario.9
Third, senior military leaders of 
smaller nations lack the knowledge 
and senior-level experience they need 
to be effective leaders during a modern 
crisis. This dilemma arises from three 
mutually reinforcing causes: the number 
of key leadership positions available 
in real, ongoing operations is limited 
(and assigned mostly to officers from 
the major nations such as the United 
States, Canada, the United Kingdom, 
France, and Germany); the national and 
NATO exercise scenarios that the smaller nations’ officers 
usually participate in are still conventionally focused; and 
exercises that involve large units are very expensive to run 
and therefore infrequent. Taken together, these add up to 
inadequate opportunities for these nations’ senior officers 
to gain the experience the new environment requires.
The fourth dilemma facing Western nations is their com-
plete misinterpretation of Russia’s “new” hybrid approach 
to conflict. Most Western strategists define hybrid warfare 
as an approach that simultaneously and adaptively uses 
conventional and non-conventional methods, including 
traditional and irregular forces, supported by political, 
economic, informational, and cyber mechanisms—all 
while sustaining plausible deniability.10 The reality, 
however, is just the opposite. Russian military forces act 
in support of all other elements of national power, which 
are the main lines of effort. Russia does not approach 
conflict from the West’s point of view anymore but rather 
follows the Chinese concept of “unrestricted warfare,” 
which imagines the world on a “total war” footing where 
everything is acceptable.11 The hybrid doctrine proposed 
by Russian Federation General Valery Gerasimov sug-
gests that non-military methods should count for about 
two-thirds of the national offensive effort and military 
methods for only about one-third (see figure 1 in the 
Introduction, page 12).12
General Gerasimov stated that “the very rules of war have 
changed significantly. The use of non-military methods 
to achieve political and strategic objectives has, in most 
cases, proved far more effective than the use of military 
force.”13 Russia’s leaders have learned from history. They 
understand that Russia is not capable of physically occu-
pying European territory, but it does not have to do that. 
By using an alternative approach, Russia can both secure 
long-lasting strategic results and achieve its political goals. 
What the world is witnessing from Russia is an old boxing 
trick: Holding the known and feared right hand (con-
ventional military development, snap 
exercises, airspace violations) in front 
draws the opponent’s attention to it and 
convinces him that the blow will come 
from there. The real danger, however, 
is presented by the ignored and mis-
understood left hand (non-military 
methods, other elements of national 
power). Russia is simply feeding the 
West’s wishful thinking about how 
wars are fought and keeping Western 
leaders in their military comfort zone. 
NATO and many European nations are 
afraid that Russian armies are going to invade certain areas 
of Europe. This is what Russia wants NATO to believe, 
because until the Alliance changes its focus to what Russia 
is actually doing, Moscow can keep its real “forces” hidden 
and effective. 
NATO’S Current Strategy to Counter 
Present and Future Threats
At the 2014 NATO summit in Wales, members held in-depth 
discussions on the topic of hybrid warfare and came 
up with ideas to effectively counter the hybrid threat. 
Individual member nations pledged to spend 2% of their 
GDPs on defense and approved the Readiness Action Plan, 
a policy document outlining measures intended primarily 
to shore up defenses in the member states that lie closest 
to Russia. They also adopted the Very High Readiness 
Joint Task Force (VJTF), as described in the “Statement of 




YESTERDAY IS NOT 
GOING TO WORK 
TODAY OR TOMORROW. 
The Readiness Action Plan agreed by Heads of State and Government 
at the Wales Summit is a response to the changed and broader secu-
rity environment in and near Europe. It responds to the challenges 
posed by Russia and their strategic implications. It also responds to 
the risks and threats emanating from our southern neighborhood, the 
Middle East and North Africa. Its implementation will significantly 
enhance NATO’s readiness and responsiveness and will ... strengthen 
both NATO’s collective defence and crisis management capability.14
The VJTF is envisioned as a “spearhead” force within the existing NATO Response 
Force, “able to deploy at very short notice, particularly at the periphery of 
NATO’s territory. The VJTF should consist of a land component with appropriate 
air, maritime, and Special Operations Forces available.”15 While these initiatives 
and countermeasures demonstrate some level of adaptation, however, they also 
share one common fallacy: they seek to counter Russian hybrid warfare against 
NATO and its members in Europe through existing defense structures, based on 
the traditional Western understanding of warfare. In other words, the Alliance 
is simply buying the Russian boxing bluff. Although many European nations 
increased defense spending and revitalized their defense strategies following the 
Ukrainian-Crimean crisis, they failed to recognize the nature of the beast. These 
countries are still trapped by conventional doctrine and derive their defense 
approaches from fear of a physical occupation. To effectively tackle the Russian 
strategy and prepare for any additional current and future challenges, nations 
must understand that whatever worked yesterday is not going to work today or 
tomorrow. They have to recognize the fact that, as Carl von Clausewitz wrote, 
“war is a chameleon, and it will change its aspects at each occurrence.”16 Nations 
must be ready to change as well. They should abandon their conventional ap-
proaches and reexamine the definition of conflict at the most fundamental level.
An Alternative Approach
Thirty-five years ago, Kenneth Waltz argued that, in the competitive interna-
tional environment of the Cold War, states “socialized” to similar strategies. He 
observed that “the fate of each state depends on its responses to what other states 
do. The possibility that conflict will be conducted by force leads to competition in 
the arts and the instruments of force. Competition produces a tendency toward 
the sameness of the competitors.”17 As Goldman suggested, nations have two 
fundamental choices when designing their defense frameworks: either match 
their strategy with those of possible future adversaries or develop offsetting 
capabilities. By linking the strategies proposed by Waltz and Goldman together, 
national military leaders have a strong realist starting point from which to justify 
abandoning their conventional strategy and matching an opponent’s hybrid 
approach.
If there has ever been a time in history that verified Frank Hoffman’s statement 
that “the incentives for states to exploit non-traditional modes of war are on the 
rise,”18 then today is that time. Like their current state and non-state adversaries, 
nations will have to consider introducing an “unrestricted” or “total war” type of 
national defense strategy and accepting the fact that there is no longer any line 
separating peace and war. Governments will have to go beyond such meaningless 
and heavily theoretical ideas as “smart defense,” “pooling and sharing,”19 and the 
“comprehensive approach,”20 and will have to come up with a sustainable and 
future-based approach. What the world must witness is a fundamental shift from 
72
CTX | Vol. 6, No. 4
“THE INCENTIVES FOR 
STATES TO EXPLOIT 
NON-TRADITIONAL 
MODES OF WAR 
ARE ON THE RISE.”
the current conventionally focused defensive approaches to much more uncon-
ventional national strategies. This should not mean simply polishing the surface 
of WWII-based doctrines and war machines by introducing some specialized 
forces and high-tech equipment, but rather it should entail a total restructuring 
of everything the West understands about national defense. This need is best 
described by retired United States Army Lieutenant General David Barno.
Our military today is in a sense operating without a concept of war 
and is searching desperately for the new “unified field theory” of 
conflict that will serve to organize and drive military doctrine and 
tactics, acquisition and research, training and organization, leader 
development and education, materiel and weaponry, and personnel 
and promotion policies in ways that could replace the legacy impact 
that Cold War structures still exert on all facets of the military.21
Although some developments in several countries begin to address LTG Barno’s 
concerns, all of these efforts up to now have been characterized by cautious 
steps that do nothing to break down historical military traditions that date back 
hundreds of years. This must change, and the revolution in strategic thinking 
must start immediately. To effectively counter the Russian hybrid approach or 
an ISIS-like insurgent organization, nations must start harvesting from the edges 
of strategic thinking instead of blindly following conventionally rooted “main-
stream” ideas. 
Like the phalanx, heavy cavalry, and hussars of past centuries, and the doctrine 
and weapon systems associated with these formations, the current services, 
branches, formations, training structure, and military ranking systems should 
largely disappear as well. As Martin van Creveld suggested in 1991, 
small-scale war will cause regular armed forces themselves to change 
form, shrink in size, and wither away … [and] regular forces to de-
generate into like forces or, in case the struggle lasts for very long, 
mere armed gangs. Over time, uniforms will probably be replaced 
by mere insignia in the shape of sashes, armbands, and the like.22 
The new defense establishments “will not amount to armies as we understand 
the term today.”23 These new formations should be established according to 
the threat they are going to face, but also with consideration for the available 
resources. Different formations should be based on the organizational charac-
teristics of a nation’s military, police, secret services, and intelligence services 
while also incorporating the useful elements of terrorist groups, partisans, and 
insurgent organizations. For instance, these future defensive formations should 
include members with engineering, medical, hacker, communications, media, 
and other such specialized skills. These new elements should also be ready to use 
completely unexpected techniques, tactics, and procedures such as swarming to 
be effective against both a conventional and an unconventional adversary.24 
When the time comes for stakeholders to look for an existing framework on 
which to start building these new kinds of formations, national special opera-
tions forces should come to the fore. Although SOF are as irrelevant in today’s 
operational environment as any other service, their unique characteristics—
including interagency cooperation, flexibility, non-traditional thinking, and 





FROM THE EDGES OF 
STRATEGIC THINKING.
primary vehicle to implement such extensive fundamental 
changes in national security strategy and military organi-
zational structure. The responsibility of national SOF will 
be to recognize the need for change and instead of trying 
to block the revolution, support it as much as possible. 
Of course, because the new approach will probably cause 
all of the other services in their present form to disap-
pear, there will be profound changes in SOF culture and 
traditions as well. What will arise from the destruction, 
however, is a more sustainable and more relevant defen-
sive capability than most countries possess today.
With their new strategy and new formations, nations 
should also move away from reflexively pursuing high-tech 
approaches and adopt a “right-tech” approach instead. 
Today’s most sophisticated and most powerful weapons, 
including fighter planes, tanks, and artillery pieces, are not 
only irrelevant in the current operational environment but 
also come with a prohibitive price tag.25 Nations need to 
forget the idea of fighting the fight that fits their weapons 
and start building the weapons to fit the fight. It is im-
perative to reverse the process by which 
a revolution in weapons technology 
precedes a corresponding revolution in 
military affairs. Governments should 
admit that they cannot afford to buy and 
sustain the most advanced weapons, but 
they should also realize that they do not 
have to. They can finally free themselves 
from their slavery to technology. The 
world is at the point in technological 
development where a nation can choose 
its way of fighting first and then develop or procure the 
proper hardware to support the fight. Instead of trying to 
compete against a tank with a tank or against an airplane 
with an airplane, nations should focus on technologies 
that eliminate the modern systems’ advantages or make 
them irrelevant. Such technologies might include remote-
controlled ground and aerial vehicles, electromagnetic 
pulse technologies, communication disruption tools, and 
“satellite killer” lasers.
Conclusion
If nations decide to go down the road proposed in this 
essay and elsewhere in this special issue, then NATO will 
be in for some serious changes as well. The Alliance has 
to be ready to loosen its standardization principles at 
every level, including in areas such as military formations, 
platform capabilities, and interoperability. Unfortunately, 
there is no one-size-fits-all solution for twenty-first-
century conflicts. Instead of traditional, standardized 
requirements, NATO’s leadership must embrace a variety 
of capabilities and simultaneously develop proper proce-
dures to incorporate them into an effective system. This 
means that both military professionals and civil servants 
will have to accept radical changes outside of their 
comfort zone. As LTG Barno pointed out, while member 
nations undertake their strategic revolutions, NATO will 
also need a new concept of war and a new “unified field 
theory” of conflict. This process will lead to new organiza-
tions, doctrine, acquisition systems, training, and leader 
development, which will replace the legacy principles of 
the Cold War. If NATO is not willing to change alongside 
its individual member nations, then very soon it will be 
unable to win wars or even be a meaningful participant in 
conflicts.     
The world stands at a historic turning point. Nations must 
learn from the past without being trapped in it. “Like a 
man who has been shot in the head but still manages to 
stagger forward a few paces,”26 the traditional approaches 
to national defense are at their last gasp. Nations should 
realize that unconventional approaches 
need not be only for “rogue” states 
and non-state actors to use, but that 
innovation can be taken to another level 
as democratic countries’ grand strategy. 
The change is coming. As van Creveld 
noted, “In the future people will 
probably look back upon the twentieth 
century as a period of mighty empires, 
vast armies, and incredible fighting 
machines that have crumbled into dust. 
… As the old war convention fades away, a new one will no 
doubt take its place.”27 The only question is how prepared 
individual NATO nations and the Alliance will be for this 
new era. ²  
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AIRSPACE OF THE 
BALTIC STATES.
The Russian model of hybrid warfare has been designed to blur 
the lines between war and peace. Recent Russian hybrid campaigns in Georgia, 
Crimea, and eastern Ukraine have demonstrated to the world that Russia is 
highly adept at advancing its objectives through its own unique brand of hybrid 
warfare. To counter and deter the new Russian threat, NATO must reconfigure 
its own hybrid warfare approach toward a more proactive collective defense. 
NATO’s currently reactive collective defense paradigm, characterized by routine 
conventional military exercises and the forward positioning of military equip-
ment and rapid reaction forces throughout Europe, is simply no longer effective 
at deterring Russian aggression. NATO should move to a proactive defense ap-
proach with a robust irregular warfare component to complement conventional 
diplomatic, military, and economic deterrence efforts.
The organizational structure, targeting methodology, and menu of effects that 
NATO SOF have developed and optimized over 15 years of counterterrorism 
operations have great potential for success against Russian hybrid warfare.
The Russian Hybrid Threat 
As Ukrainians struggled to rebuild a democratic government after the flight 
of then-president Viktor Yanukovych in the winter of 2013, Russian military 
personnel without insignia began showing up in eastern Ukraine.1 In March 
2014, Russia annexed Crimea through an illegal and falsified referendum, and 
the international community failed to respond.  
Throughout that spring, Russian soldiers and intelligence operatives used the 
thin veil of a supposed Ukrainian separatist movement to rapidly seize govern-
ment and public infrastructure in parts of eastern Ukraine and established the 
“Donetsk People’s Republic.” The president of this rebel government was a 
Russian political advisor from Moscow, and the defense minister was a known 
Russian Federal Security Service colonel, and yet the international commu-
nity failed to produce an effective response to a de facto Russian invasion of 
Ukraine.2 Russia had seized control of vital parts of the sovereign Ukrainian 
state with only minor repercussions. This outcome made many observers wonder 
whether the NATO collective defense clause (Article V) would hold up if Russia 
attempted similar incursions into NATO’s Eastern European member states. 
Since the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has only escalated its aggression. In 
September 2014, Russia conducted a military operation into Estonian territory 
to abduct an Estonian Internal Security Service officer whom Moscow accused 
of espionage, and Russian military aircraft continually and intentionally violate 
the airspace of the Baltic States.3 Also in September 2014, Russia announced it 
would prosecute Lithuanians who had dodged a Soviet-era military draft in the 
early 1990s, and the Russian prosecutor general’s office has begun to review the 
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legality of the 1991 agreement that granted the Baltic states (Estonia, Lithuania, 
and Latvia) independence from the Soviet Union.4 All of the latent-stage indica-
tors suggest that Russia is scheming to reestablish control of the Baltic states, and 
fear of a Russian invasion is high in these NATO nations.
Fully aware that challenging NATO in a conventional conflict would ultimately 
lead to defeat, Russia is deliberately utilizing hybrid warfare techniques that re-
main below the threshold of NATO’s Article V (see the Introduction to this issue 
for a more detailed explanation of the Article V mutual defense clause). Russian 
proficiency at such activities has been demonstrated in well-executed campaigns 
in both Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. While the specifics of Vladimir 
Putin’s endgame are not entirely clear, the reaffirmation of Russian dominance in 
the former Soviet near abroad and the reemergence of Russia as a global power 
seem to be his preeminent objectives. Hybrid warfare is the way in which Russia 
has chosen to coordinate its means—political, economic, and military—to 
achieve these objectives.5  
In its previously successful hybrid warfare campaigns, Russia used political 
subversion, armed proxy groups, economic manipulation, and varying levels 
of violence for years—in some cases, decades—before ramping up military 
operations when its target appeared to be nearing a point of capitulation.6 These 
slow-burning tactics are already evident in the Baltic States. To coordinate and 
execute these efforts, however, Moscow must first build out its dark networks of 
intelligence and political agents, proxies, resistance movements, and cooperative, 
coerced, or corrupted local citizens. As these networks expand, they begin to 
look like the dark networks of international terrorist organizations that NATO 
has been at war with for the past 15 years. One of NATO’s relative strengths is its 
methodology for effectively mapping and disrupting these dark networks. To 
reorient its posture from reactive to proactive collective defense, however, NATO 
will have to change not only its existing legal framework but also its strategic 
policy. Adapting the US targeting process specifically for NATO represents just 
such a proactive approach to fighting a hybrid war using all means necessary.     
US Network Targeting Doctrine 
In US joint doctrine, targeting, at its most basic, is 
the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and 
matching the appropriate response to them.7 Targets 
can be any entity (person, place, or thing) consid-
ered for engagement or action to alter or neutralize 
the function they perform for the adversary.8 The 
purpose of targeting is, first, to systematically analyze 
and prioritize potential targets, and then, to match 
the appropriate lethal or non-lethal actions to those 
targets to create specific desired effects that achieve 
stated objectives. This procedure must also take into 
account operational requirements, available capabili-
ties, and the results of any previous assessments.9 The 
targeting cycle is conducted in a continuous six-step 
process (see figure 1): First, commanders communi-
cate their objectives to their team. Staff then develop 
and prioritize targets from this guidance, allocate 





























and what assets are available, and either put the plans into action or assign them 
for further development. The final step is to assess the results of the actions 
before beginning the cycle again.10
US Special Operations Network Warfare in the  
War on Terror
Since the beginning of the wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), the tar-
geting doctrine described above has primarily taken the form of kinetic person-
level targeting and group-level targeting.12 US joint and interagency operations 
have attempted—in rapid iterations—to dismantle large terrorist networks by 
finding, fixing, and finishing individuals and small groups of individuals believed 
to be of high value to the enemy network.  
The concept of network warfare, or netwar, first emerged in the early 1990s as a 
number of strategy experts explored emerging forms of low-intensity conflict.13 
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt correctly predicted the rise of fighting 
networks and the doctrinal innovation of remaining relatively amorphous by 
organizing through linked cells that operate semi-autonomously but with a 
common vision.14 With the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the United 
States and NATO were propelled into a world where state actors were at war with 
non-state international terrorist networks.  
The success and resiliency of these flat and networked terrorist organizations 
against conventional military goliaths has been impressive. While ultimately 
there may never be a winner in the internecine fight against terrorist networks, 
15 years of conflict with these networks has forged the US joint and interagency 
community and their network targeting doctrine and methodology into an 
effective enterprise for disrupting dark networks.15
US SOF first encountered an elusive, highly-networked enemy in Afghanistan 
and Iraq following the 9/11 attacks and were forced to rapidly and drastically 
adapt in their efforts to gain an advantage.16 Their success is often measured in 
enemy body counts and amounts of equipment destroyed, because, compared to 
targeting national forces, it is relatively less difficult for US SOF commanders to 
receive the required authority and permission to destroy terrorist targets. As a 
result, most of the concern and controversy in open-source media over these op-
erations revolves around the kinetic methods of destroying targets, such as drone 
strikes and special operations raids. There has, however, been ample success with 
non-kinetic and indirect methods to influence targets, such as the successful US 
special operations campaign against the Abu Sayyaf terrorist organization in 
the Philippines, which had its estimated strength cut by 70 percent as a result of 
non-lethal, indirect targeting.17   
Even during the busiest periods for special operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
when dozens of raids and air strikes were taking place nightly, non-kinetic 
targeting played a significant role in increasing the enemy organization’s costs and 
making its members psychologically uncomfortable. Robust psychological opera-
tions, information operations, and tracking and monitoring were key ingredients 
in the Joint Special Operations Task Force’s ability to disrupt and degrade enemy 
dark networks, and US and allied SOF became highly proficient at methods that 
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With regard to the proxy or loosely-linked networks that 
state actors like Russia operate to destabilize or seize control 
of other sovereign states, the authority to carry out kinetic op-
erations against them would obviously be much more difficult 
to obtain due to the elevated political sensitivity and danger 
of escalation.18 The non-lethal and indirect methods skillset 
and menu of options are therefore most useful when targeting 
Russian networks and their irregular operations outside of 
Russia. The implementation of a succinct and aggressive 
targeting effort against Russian agents and proxies should be 
led by NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) and 
all its allied SOF entities. With appropriate resourcing, this 
kind of targeting can illuminate the adversary’s network for 
exploitation and can ultimately be an effective deterrent to 
Russian irregular warfare by increasing the inherent political 
risk, reducing deniability, and imposing associated costs for 
Russia.
Creating an Operational Command 
Structure to Target Russian Networks
NSHQ has already established a Special Operations Compo-
nent Command (SOCC) as a worldwide deployable opera-
tional headquarters. This SOCC serves as the initial command 
and control element for NATO special operations forces that 
are deployed in a NATO Crisis Response Operation.19 If its 
command makes the psychological shift to acting as a war-
time headquarters, NSHQ could task the SOCC as the initial 
operational headquarters for targeting Russian hybrid opera-
tions. Folding the Special Operations Intelligence Branch of 
the NATO Intelligence Fusion Center into the headquarters 
would provide NSHQ with robust intelligence collection and 
coordination capabilities. The staff and manning billets could 
be filled as needed by the NSHQ G2 and G3, similar to the 
Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) model used in 
forward-deployed US SOF headquarters.20 This headquarters 
could operate a 24-hour Allied Joint Operations Center to 
coordinate situational awareness and effects and ensure a 
continuous effort. 
Subordinate to the NSHQ SOCC, regional or country JSOTFs 
operated by NATO members’ SOF would be able to feed 
information and intelligence to and coordinate operations 
up, down, and laterally across all NATO SOF partners. The 
NSHQ commander or designated SOCC commander would 
direct targeting and prioritization. The command staff and 
the subordinate task forces would develop and analyze targets 
and execute operations, or provide the appropriate national 
law enforcement authorities with intelligence that would 
enable them to conduct operations against Russian networks 
within their territory.  
The aftermath of an explosion at a night market  
in Davao City, Philippines, that killed over a  
dozen people, 2 September 2016.
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Given how difficult it is to share information among NATO allies, this proposed 
organizational structure could help break down some of those barriers. To 
effectively target Russian networks through a unified effort, a large number of 
military, intelligence, and other governmental organizations across the Alliance 
should be willing to provide input and coordinate their activities. If the effort 
proves effective for deterring or blunting the adversary’s irregular warfare, then 
the momentum of success would build upon itself and NSHQ would have a 
critical ongoing role to play.
Once an operational headquarters is established and its intelligence section is 
capable of analyzing threat networks operating within NATO states, it will be 
time to develop an initial list of targets for non-kinetic operations. Person-level 
candidates for targeting could include agents of the Russian Foreign Intelligence 
Service, members of the Spetsnaz (Russia’s SOF, aka “little green men”—see 
Atay’s article in this issue on the Spetsnaz in Crimea), or individual citizens who 
are cooperating with or being coerced by Russian agents.21 Group-level targets 
for these kinds of operations might include Russian criminal syndicates and 
political elements seeking to exert influence in NATO states, larger formations 
of Russian special operators who have infiltrated to conduct military operations 
or stoke resistance, and vulnerable populations within NATO states such as 
ethnic Russian enclaves and extremist groups. NSHQ could also target network 
infrastructure such as safe houses, weapons caches, and communications and 
electronic warfare equipment. In the cyber domain, NSHQ could seek to counter 
Russian information operations and cyber attacks by drawing on existing assets, 
such as the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence in Estonia, 
to help develop situational awareness and capabilities within this sphere.
How Might Proactive Collective Defense Targeting against 
State Actors Take Form?
At the tactical and operational levels, NSHQ and subordinate headquarters have 
a wealth of options they could use to influence the network targets identified by 
the targeting process. Kinetic options would be available for other than human 
nodes within the network, such as weapons, equipment, finances, and cyber enti-
ties. To deal with the humans in the network, there are three plausible options, 
depending on the type of target and the desired effect: institution building, 
psychological operations, and tracking and monitoring.
Institution Building 
This indirect approach can be used on friendly or “blue” targets when the net-
work targeting process identifies adversaries that are working to de-legitimize or 
reduce the effectiveness of an Allied host nation. As the name suggests, institu-
tion building focuses on developing healthy host government institutions for 
governance, rule of law, and economic development.22 NATO already recognizes 
capacity building as a central part of its Strategic Concepts in Core Task C: 
cooperative security.23 Refined intelligence through comprehensive targeting and 
a holistic view of the adversary’s network would allow NSHQ to provide recom-
mendations to NATO on where to emphasize institution building across the 
whole of government. On the military side, NSHQ could assist partner nations 
with the focused development of their military institutions and capacities (see 
Fábián’s article in this issue on transforming NATO forces).
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Institution building is most often thought of as an effort over time, but it can 
also be done in an acute, proactive, and targeted manner to blunt an adversary’s 
actions or prop up a vulnerable partner institution. For a hypothetical example, 
assume that NSHQ’s network targeting indicated that Russia’s foreign intelligence 
units or their military counterparts were organizing protests within a country’s 
Russian ethnic enclaves against a new government policy that required people 
born in Russia to pass a host-language test to receive citizenship.24 With this 
foreknowledge, NSHQ might recommend that NATO’s diplomatic arm and 
member states should rapidly deploy teams to assist the target government with 
crafting or adjusting its policy and thus defuse any legitimate grievance among its 
ethnic Russian population.  
Simultaneously, and with the approval of national authorities, NSHQ could 
rapidly deploy SOF to provide riot control training to the target country’s 
national law enforcement and military units, and advise or enable psychological 
and information operations aimed at quelling unrest. Unlike a generalized 
calendar of allied training exercises or scheduled capacity-building exchanges, 
this deployment could be tailored to a specific instance or vulnerability, and 
would therefore provide economy of effort and resources while simultaneously 
disrupting the adversary’s network activities.  
Psychological Operations 
Psychological operations strategies use information and messaging to influence 
the emotions, perceptions, attitudes, and ultimately, the behavior of adversarial 
individuals, groups, organizations, and governments.25 This tool for targeting ter-
rorist networks has been highly successful over the last 15 years, and many of the 
methods developed in those fights could be useful for disrupting and degrading 
Russian state-backed entities operating in NATO countries. If Moscow has no 
reason to fear repercussion, its hybrid warfare activities will grow unabated, but 
if psychological operations could be leveraged, particularly at the individual 
level, the costs and risks for the aggressor would rise dramatically.  
NSHQ could use its forces and knowledge of enemy networks to cause extreme 
discomfort for Russian elements operating in a foreign country. Its operators 
might use targeted messaging, threats, and other subtler techniques against 
members of Russian smuggling cartels, against Russian political agents who are 
attempting to spread influence or corrupt and coerce the target government’s 
officials, or in the case of an actual incursion, against the “little green men.”
For all the advantages of operating in decentralized networks, the lack of guid-
ance from a higher commander or supervisor can be a vulnerability when an in-
dividual in the network is squeezed into psychological discomfort. Once under 
pressure, these individuals or small groups tend to make exploitable mistakes. 
By targeting individuals and groups, even with non-kinetic psychological opera-
tions, NATO would communicate the larger message to Russia’s leaders that their 
hybrid warfare strategy will not be ignored or tolerated. If Russia knew ahead of 
time that NATO is ready and able to deploy effective countermeasures, it would 
likely be deterred from taking such bold action.
ONCE UNDER 
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The targeting cycle depicted in figure 1 will usually identify and select only a 
handful of targets for action; the vast majority of targets require continued 
development and refinement, or simply tracking and monitoring. Arquilla 
discussed this process in his 2009 study, Aspects of Netwar and the Conflict 
with al Qaeda.26 By tracking and monitoring nodes within the adversary’s dark 
network, for example, the extended linkages of the larger network can gradually 
be developed to the point that the entire network is illuminated. Proactively 
tracking and monitoring these dark networks, even without executing special 
operations against them, would allow the Alliance to avoid or at least mitigate 
strategic surprises, and would provide it with a menu of effects to use against 
them as needed.  
Conclusion
NATO should consider conducting proactive targeting of the Russian networks 
that are conducting varying levels of hybrid warfare against NATO states. Indi-
vidual, group, and organizational nodes should at least be made psychologically 
uncomfortable and should be exploited when doing so benefits NATO. NSHQ 
and the collective NATO SOF have a myriad of tools and methods to conduct 
such operations, but if they are not used as part of a comprehensive effort, Rus-
sian aggression will continue unabated and at a low cost to Moscow. Failing to 
take action that imposes costs on Russia will only bolster its leaders’ confidence 
and increase their audacity.   
NSHQ should consider organizing and adequately resourcing an operational 
headquarters that is dedicated to executing proactive targeting against state and 
non-state networks. The Alliance should also consider establishing subordinate 
regional or country headquarters to oversee the execution of daily operations 
and intelligence efforts.
If the potential costs of attempts to violate NATO members’ sovereignty could 
be made clear to state and non-state actors, they would be forced to think much 
more carefully about where and how to invest their instruments of power, for 
fear of international political embarrassment or military defeat. Across the large 
NATO alliance, members exhibit varying levels of political appetite for such 
activities, but there is a wide array of indirect and non-kinetic options for proac-
tive network targeting that can be useful to deter aggression. The days of openly 
declared war appear to be gone, and NSHQ should lead NATO’s efforts to adapt 
to the emerging model of aggression by developing its own new paradigm.  ² 
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The days of major counterinsurgency interventions such as 
those that took place in Iraq and Afghanistan seem to be over.1 The enormous 
military resources dedicated to these conflicts have produced only limited 
results, and the military strategy for future counterinsurgency or other stabiliza-
tion efforts will likely be focused on leaving a light military footprint and finding 
local solutions to local problems.2 These types of non-conventional counterin-
surgency missions have traditionally been executed by special operations forces. 
With their flexible mindset, cultural awareness, and small unit size, SOF can 
operate independently in remote areas to help build up the capacity of indig-
enous forces, as well as facilitate the preconditions to establish or strengthen 
government institutions. 
Such missions require a long-term commitment to be successful, however, and 
SOF are a scarce resource. Declining defense budgets, experienced by most NATO 
countries over the past decade, erode coherence between the ways, means, and 
ends of any strategy. Even with more resources, SOF cannot be mass produced 
because personnel require special selection and training.3 Therefore, NATO 
members must explore different solutions to this resource scarcity if they are to 
find sustainable responses to counterinsurgency in the future.  
One solution could be to analyze existing mission sets and determine whether 
SOF are needed in all cases, or whether conventional forces could undertake or 
give greater support to some types of special operations missions. In the recent 
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, there have already been changes in the mission 
sets conducted by conventional forces, but these changes do not appear to be 
the result of a structured collaboration between SOF and conventional forces. In 
an attempt to alleviate the problem of resource scarcity, this article argues that 
coordination between the forces can be accomplished better and more effec-
tively in future conflicts. This proposal pertains not only to individual countries, 
but also to NATO as a whole. By integrating and synchronizing the efforts of SOF 
and conventional forces early in the response to a conflict, NATO will increase its 
capacity by using the same resources more efficiently. 
Geographically, the main threats to NATO emanate from the Alliance’s Eastern 
and Southern Flanks. The threat to NATO’s Eastern Flank—the Baltic states 
and Poland—comes from Russia and must be met with both a strong and 
credible deterrence and a strategy to counter Russia’s hybrid warfare methods. 
The threats to NATO’s Southern Flank—the eastern Mediterranean and North 
Africa—come from fragile states and latent ethnic and religious conflicts that are 
breeding grounds for criminal activities and terrorist organizations. The solution 
to these threats includes stabilization and reconstruction activities, in which “the 
primary military contribution usually focuses on establishing a safe and secure 
environment for the host nation (HN) authorities, population, and other actors 
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to facilitate stabilization and reconstruction and lay the foundation for long-
term stability.”4 
Western nations are increasingly focused on the hybrid warfare that Russia 
has conducted against states in its near abroad. The Southern Flank, where 
conflicts are dominated by non-state actors, however, cannot be neglected. The 
economic and political environment in parts of Africa is characterized by high 
unemployment rates and weak, fragmented, and decentralized administrations. 
The erosion of government institutions in many African states, along with 
some governments’ inadequate control over their own territory, makes these 
states easy targets for violent non-state actors. Abundant cheap weapons make 
wars an option for a number of non-state actors such as warlords, private firms, 
terrorists, and mercenaries. The mechanisms of globalization and social media 
enhance non-state actors’ maneuverability and make them difficult to target in 
a conventional manner.5 African countries that are at risk of collapsing pose a 
complex and indirect threat to European stability by increasing refugee streams 
and creating potential safe havens for terrorist organizations.6 Thus for these 
countries, it is especially important that military assistance (MA)—a traditional 
SOF task—is offered to support local entities that are trying to create a safe and 
secure environment. Because this kind of task calls for a widespread and long-
term commitment of SOF personnel, force scarcity becomes a problem. 
SOF’s Role in Stabilization and Reconstruction
Small-scale, small-footprint operations that can enhance the capacity of local 
forces to provide security appear to be the future of international military 
activities. Having local forces create a safe and secure environment establishes the 
foundation for those non-military government and non-government actors, who 
are essential for long-term stability, to participate in state-building.7
SOF are well suited to conduct these types of missions; the principal task is 
MA, which can include training, advising, mentoring, and partnering with 
local forces.8 While it can be argued that conventional forces can carry out the 
same types of missions, some important characteristics distinguish SOF from 
conventional forces, such as the types of units each is fit to partner with and 
the operational environment in which each kind of force can conduct capacity-
building missions, as shown in table 1.
Special Operations  
Forces (SOF) Conventional Forces (CF)
Can partner with local SOF or CF Can partner with local CF
Require limited logistical support Require considerable logistical support
Suitable for politically high-risk 
missions
Suitable for politically low-risk missions
Deploy in small units Deploy in larger units




Are a limited resource Are available in larger numbers
 Table 1: Characteristics of SOF and Conventional Forces for  
Local Force Capacity-Building Missions
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SOF are more flexible and are a better fit for low-cost, 
small-footprint missions due to their smaller size and 
lesser dependence on outside logistical support. Capacity 
building in future conflicts will require a long-term com-
mitment of personnel and resources to be successful—a 
commitment that is likely to overstretch scarce SOF units. 
In many potential conflict areas, a SOF presence could help 
local forces prevent latent hostilities from breaking out 
or contain them before they escalate beyond the point at 
which a small SOF unit could provide adequate assistance. 
This disconnect between the increasing need for SOF and 
nations’ inability to produce high-quality forces in suf-
ficient numbers presents an obstacle for the resolution of 
future conflicts. On the one hand, if a long-term commit-
ment to a given conflict zone is the priority, then fewer SOF 
units will be available for other engagements, leaving some 
potential conflict areas without assistance. This raises the 
risk that intervention will come too late to prevent warfare. 
On the other hand, if the available SOF units are dis-
persed across too many areas, it would 
be difficult to sustain these missions 
over a longer period of time. Some of 
the missions would be forced to end 
prematurely, before the local govern-
ments and their security forces were 
able to handle the conflicts on their own 
without outside support. Either case 
would affect the ability of non-military 
organizations to carry out their work of 
stabilizing the areas through institution 
building, economic growth initiatives, and so on. These 
organizations need a safe and secure environment for their 
projects to succeed and prosper. Without that safety and 
security, development projects might close down, further 
eroding the general stability of the area and adding fuel 
to potential conflicts. In other words, SOF must be used 
appropriately, and only when other assets are unsuitable 
for the mission.9
For a variety of reasons, SOF are sometimes deployed in 
other roles, such as elite infantry to support conventional 
forces’ missions and objectives. One reason is that the 
military and political leadership may lack an adequate 
understanding of the SOF role. Another reason is that 
inter-service rivalry and fighting for resources can lead 
each branch of the armed services to try to optimize its 
own role instead of thinking in terms of a joint and 
holistic framework. But the special operations community 
is not without blame. When not occupied elsewhere, SOF 
leaders sometimes accept missions that put their forces 
into a conventional role instead of reserving them for 
more appropriate missions. To free up more SOF capacity, 
SOF higher command must avoid these kinds of deploy-
ments in the future.
Since 9/11, the primary focus of the SOF community has 
been on conducting kinetic and unilateral actions against 
terrorists. Not to disparage the importance of these mis-
sions, but this is not a winning counterterrorism strategy. 
For every high-level terrorist leader who is eliminated, 
a new one moves up in the organization to replace him, 
and new fighters are recruited to fill the ranks of the 
organization. This direct approach to counterterrorism 
treats only the symptoms and leaves the root causes of the 
problem unaddressed. As long as this is the case, terrorist 
organizations and other criminal elements will have no 
problem attracting recruits. Therefore, strategy must give 
greater priority to the indirect approach of using SOF 
as a force multiplier and working by, with, and through 
indigenous forces to enhance local capabilities and find local 
solutions. By creating the preconditions for non-military 
organizations to stabilize a region 
through institutional and economic 
development, it is possible to address 
the underlying causes that give rise to 
insurgents, criminals, and terrorists. 
This approach requires a shift in goals: 
from measuring success by the number 
of dead terrorists toward a more 
complicated and ambiguous method of 
measuring success in terms of political 
and economic stability. It is extremely 
difficult to isolate the effect of the military component, 
and therefore hard to prove whether military forces are 
doing things right or even doing the right things.
SOF and Conventional Forces Integration 
in Military Assistance
Even when SOF are used only for appropriate missions 
in which MA takes priority over direct action and special 
reconnaissance, there is still an imbalance between the 
quantity of tasks and the SOF units available to resolve 
them. Conventional forces, which already provide the 
human capital for recruitment into the SOF, can help fill 
this gap. If just a fraction of the large number of personnel 
within the conventional forces assisted in parts of the MA 
missions conducted by SOF, the problem of sustaining 
numerous missions over the long term would be, if not 
resolved, then at least diminished. Three basic factors 
determine whether substituting regular forces for SOF 
is a feasible option for a particular mission: the mission 
task, the skill set of the conventional forces, and the 
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environment in which the forces are to operate. If all three factors are conducive 
to conventional force activities, then there is no reason for SOF to be involved 
in the mission. Although this is rarely the case and SOF therefore remain a vital 
component of most MA missions, there is still a place for conventional forces to 
support them. 
Many individuals and conventional forces units from the NATO countries in-
volved in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have picked up invaluable experience 
training, advising, and partnering with local forces. Although no two conflicts 
are alike, this experience can be useful for MA missions in other conflicts. 
Conventional forces will also benefit because the organizational lessons learned 
from military assistance will endure within the organization—valuable experi-
ence that could easily be lost due to the frequent personnel turnover within 
conventional forces. Furthermore, experience in MA missions will help keep the 
conventional forces relevant at a time when conventional state-on-state conflicts 
are less likely. But experience alone is not enough. If conventional forces are to 
deploy as part of a SOF-led task force, they must also receive adequate mission-
specific training prior to deploying. The hostility of the environment, the degree 
of self-sufficiency required, and the nature of the task dictate the amount of 
training needed. Consequently, detailed and updated situational awareness is 
necessary to evaluate whether deploying conventional forces is a feasible option 
and to determine the kinds of pre-deployment training these forces will need. 
This information will also dictate the balance of SOF and conventional forces in 
the task force. 
The following is an example of the balance of forces within a small-scale MA 
mission focused on capacity building: A SOF unit deploys to a potential con-
flict area to establish situational awareness and to partner with and train local 
forces. As the unit’s situational awareness and the stability in the area improve, 
conventional forces gradually replace the SOF unit in certain functions and tasks. 
This frees up SOF to deploy elsewhere or to recover and rebuild strength before 
deploying again. If the situation later deteriorates and the area becomes unstable, 
however, it may be necessary to bring more SOF back in to replace the conven-
tional forces. 
The conventional forces’ support to SOF can be 
organized in different ways. One method would be 
to use conventional forces to develop specific units 
that specialize in building capacity in indigenous 
forces (see figure 1).
These conventional units should be able to 
work closely with SOF and also be able to deploy 
independently when the environment and the task 
are suitable. By conducting joint training with 
SOF when not deployed, conventional units would 
be able to quickly integrate with their special 
operations counterparts if they needed to deploy 
rapidly. One important advantage of such an arrangement is the ability to tailor 
the military force that is conducting capacity building before it is needed, and 
to deploy with a mixed configuration of conventional forces and SOF instead of 
deploying solely with SOF. Thus the scarce resource of SOF could be spared for 
other priority missions. 




The personnel for these conventional force capacity-building units should be 
mature and experienced soldiers. The selection process should focus on the 
character traits needed for successful capacity building, such as cultural under-
standing, a flexible mindset, and good “people skills.” The units either could 
be organized within the conventional forces structure or could be integrated 
directly into the SOF organization. While the latter option would be preferable 
in terms of command and control and training opportunities, it seems highly 
unlikely that the conventional forces would be willing to give up some of their 
most experienced people to the SOF community. During a time of shrinking 
military budgets, creating new units would require existing units to give up 
both economic and personnel resources, an option that is equally likely to meet 
organizational resistance. 
A more realistic solution would be for these con-
ventional units or individuals to support SOF on a 
mission-by-mission basis. Higher command would 
identify qualified individuals and units within the 
conventional forces and assign them to the SOF 
unit they are to deploy with. This would require a 
much longer period of pre-deployment training, 
however, before these conventional forces could be 
integrated into the SOF unit that would conduct 
the MA mission. Such a requirement makes it 
functionally impossible to start with a mixed 
configuration of SOF and conventional forces; the 
first unit to deploy on a capacity-building mission 
would have to be a SOF unit (see figure 2).   
Although the conventional units would have to give up some individuals for a 
period of time, after pre-deployment training and deployment, these individuals 
would return to their original units with valuable experience and input.
The Role of NATO in the Allocation of SOF
Unifying the political and military goals and policies of 28 different member 
states, often with competing interests, is a huge challenge for NATO. A state’s 
view on the different threats to NATO is affected in large part by the state’s 
geographical location. Naturally, the Baltic States focus on Russia as their biggest 
threat, while countries around the Mediterranean may be more concerned with 
the spread of terrorist organizations in North Africa and the increasing number 
of refugees coming into southern Europe from Syria and North Africa. NATO 
does not have its own military forces but depends on voluntary military contri-
butions from the member states. Because the NATO alliance is based on common 
accord and unanimity, every member state’s interests must be taken into account 
whenever action is being contemplated—obviously, it is easier to gain support 
from those countries that are directly affected by a specific threat. Countries on 
the Eastern Flank will be inclined to dedicate their troop contributions towards 
the Russian threat, while countries on the Southern Flank will want to direct 
their forces toward the Mediterranean region. From NATO’s perspective, this 
bifurcation of interests is not necessarily the best solution, however. A more 
holistic approach would make the best use of the Alliance’s military resources 
and better align with NATO’s concept of Smart Defence, which was introduced at 
the Chicago Summit in 2012.10 Because the threats to the Eastern and Southern 
Figure 2: Changes in Military Assistance Deployment Levels  
with Ad Hoc Unit
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Flanks are of different natures, they require different 
solutions. 
To utilize the members’ various military capacities most 
efficiently against relevant threats, NATO’s Allied Com-
mand Operations must have a free hand to deploy the 
troop contributions of member states where it makes 
the most sense for NATO as a whole. This would require 
national policy goals and caveats to be secondary to the 
overall goals of the Alliance. The only way this would 
work is if countries were able to enter into a quid pro quo 
agreement: a state that commits military resources to a 
mission that is not a national security priority for that par-
ticular state would need to get something else in return. 
For example, a state situated on the Eastern Flank could 
send SOF to participate in military capacity building in 
North Africa, despite the fact that the country’s national 
security priorities are focused on the Russian threat. In 
return, another NATO state situated on the Southern 
Flank might post an armored unit—which would not be 
of much use for building up fragile states 
in North Africa—on the Eastern Flank 
to help deter Russia. NATO’s role would 
be to assess and evaluate the overall 
threat to NATO and to coordinate and 
synchronize the deployment of military 
contingents where they would be most 
useful. 
On a tactical level, NATO Special 
Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) can 
play a role in disseminating the member 
countries’ experiences with SOF and 
conventional force cooperation and integration. By 
sharing the lessons of failures as well as successes, NSHQ 
can identify best practices and help ensure that mistakes 
are not repeated.
Conclusion
The future battlefield will be characterized by a large 
number of non-state actors fighting an increasing number 
of intra-state wars. These wars will be fought in an 
environment of increasing complexity where globaliza-
tion increases the mobility, outreach, and mobilization of 
non-state actors across borders. This scenario demands a 
more holistic approach from states, in which long-term 
military assistance is a key element for providing a secure 
environment and regional stability. Intra-state wars are 
particularly prevalent at NATO’s Southern Flank, while 
NATO’s Eastern Flank is dominated by Russian hybrid 
warfare. Despite large differences in the characteristics of 
these conflicts, they cannot be treated as separate issues: 
NATO must address both simultaneously. If the chronic 
conflicts on the Southern Flank are ignored, the sum of 
threats and pressure from Africa, the Middle East, and 
Russia will endanger NATO’s ability to safeguard many 
of its members. NATO’s two flanks also differ in the types 
of forces they need. The Eastern Flank calls primarily for 
conventional deterrence against further Russian aggres-
sion, while the Southern Flank calls for SOF to carry out 
MA and stabilization missions.    
If NATO is to conduct long-term stabilization operations 
in the future, its SOF resources will be in ever higher 
demand. But SOF remain a scarce resource, even for the 
largest NATO member states, which means the Alliance 
must explore new ways of conducting stabilization mis-
sions. First, NATO members must use scarce SOF appro-
priately: if another asset can complete the mission, SOF 
should not be deployed. Even in idle times, SOF leaders 
should not encourage decision makers to waste precious 
SOF resources by using SOF for missions 
that are unsuitable for them. Second, 
countries must adopt a more holistic 
view of their armed services and think 
in terms of a joint framework. With 
declining defense budgets, the services 
and branches should move closer to one 
another in search of force-multiplying 
effects. Unfortunately, the opposite 
appears to be taking place. 
Third, and most important, the special 
operations community should look to 
the conventional forces to help fill the gap between SOF 
resources and the large number of long-term MA commit-
ments worldwide. Conventional forces have great poten-
tial to be effective in these missions and can be integrated 
with SOF in numerous ways. One thing is certain: SOF will 
continue to be a scarce resource, and NATO must explore 
new options to resolve the conflicts of the future. ²
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NATO SOF Military Assistance to Support 
Deterrence and Reassure Russia
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THREATS ARISE 
FROM A COMBI-
NATION OF  
CAPABILITY AND 
INTENTION.
NATO Special Operations Headquarters has described a  
requirement for more cost-effective military assistance (MA) operations directed 
at key strategic objectives.1 SOF leadership can both contribute to NATO’s secu-
rity objectives and educate and encourage decision makers on the smart use 
of SOF. One way to do this is to “recommend operations in support of policy, 
and influence policy by identifying opportunities in sync with vital security in-
terests,” also called “policy by concept of operations.”2 The aim of this article is to 
develop MA concepts of operations in support of security policy objectives and 
propose feasible new concepts for future NATO SOF MA operations. This article 
explores several of these ideas through the lens of Norwegian security concerns 
on NATO’s Northern Flank (Sweden, Finland, and Norway).3 
Norway and Russia share a common border along the Kola Peninsula, which may 
be the Russian Federation’s most strategically vulnerable region. From the Russian 
perspective, this vulnerability requires Moscow to maintain a strategic defensive 
depth beyond the peninsula’s immediate border areas. Norwegian defense and 
security policy throughout the post-WWII period has been characterized by 
deterrence through membership in NATO and reassurance through cooperation 
with Russia whenever possible. Norway also observes a number of self-imposed 
restrictions, including basing and nuclear policies that limit Alliance operations 
on Norwegian territory close to the Kola Peninsula. This article explores four 
areas in which SOF can help Norway and other smaller NATO members develop 
and implement deterrence and reassurance strategies toward Russia:  
 ¡ Use the global SOF network to enhance the capabilities of NATO SOF.
 ¡ Develop cost-effective countermeasures for hybrid warfare that have a 
small SOF MA footprint.
 ¡ Support the primary Norwegian security policy objective: a credible 
deterrence of Russia.
 ¡ Strengthen Norway’s role as a partner in future policies aimed at reas-
suring Russia, a role that could become a strategic niche for Norway 
within NATO. 
Part 1: Military Assistance in Support of Deterrence
Stephen Dayspring sets the scene in his article for this special issue: “Russia has 
established strategic objectives that violate the sovereignty of its neighbors and 
threaten the stability of the international system. It has selectively deployed tools 
from the full range of state power, including the overt and covert use of force, 
to achieve those objectives.” Russia has begun to reopen bases in the high north 
and to re-establish Arctic brigades and command structures. Threats arise from 
a combination of capability and intention, however, and although Russia is in-
creasing its capability in the north, it is difficult to envision any rational basis for 
Russian military action against Norway in the short to medium term. Intentions, 
nevertheless, can change over time.4
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For Norway, credible deterrence in the event of a severe crisis must build on 
Alliance engagement from the very outset. Escalation must be as seamless as pos-
sible, ensuring that the build-up of Norwegian forces and allied reinforcements 
takes place simultaneously and in an integrated manner.5 The Norwegian defense 
strategy may be described as a threshold defense, which serves to close the gap 
between crises that are, so to speak, too large for Norway, but too small for NATO. 
The 40,000-strong Norwegian Home Guard has important roles to play in the 
defense of Norway and may prove effective against elements of Russian hybrid 
warfare. These roles include making use of civilians in local networks to detect 
and report on abnormal activity, securing key infrastructure and working with al-
lied reinforcements, and serving as a well-organized and well-equipped resistance 
movement if strategic areas of Norway become occupied by Russian forces.
A Proposed Course of Action
To deter future Russian aggression against Norwegian strategic interests, the 
credibility of the Norwegian threshold defense should be strengthened. To 
achieve this, Norway’s SOF would use their current position and contacts in the 
global SOF network to facilitate US Army Special Forces’ MA to the Norwegian 
Home Guard. This assistance would be directed toward Home Guard capabili-
ties and districts that are determined to have priority. 
Deterrence is about signaling. The development of Norwegian Home Guard 
capabilities by US Army SF sends a signal about the importance and credibility 
of the Home Guard. This signaling effect would not be as powerful if any force 
other than US Army SF conducted such training. The desired end state would 
be achieved when the ability of the Norwegian Home Guard to counter par-
ticular elements of Russian hybrid warfare is more credible and when Russia has 
weighed the costs and benefits of aggression toward Norway and been influ-
enced in accordance with Norwegian interests. 
Through their contacts in the global SOF network, which includes the Norwe-
gian SOF liaison to the US Special Operations Command and NATO Special 
Operations Forces Headquarters (NSHQ), Norwegian SOF should investigate 
whether it is possible to train the Norwegian Home Guard to counter certain 
aspects of Russian full-spectrum warfare under the Green Beret Volckmann 
Program, or whether the training could be justified as a contingency plan in 
other US/NATO operations.6 The Home Guard Training Center might be one 
possible organizational hub for facilitating this training program. The Norwegian 
Ministry of Defence’s Strategic Communication Unit would coordinate an in-
formation operations plan with the US embassy in Norway. The scope of such an 
MA operation like this should be “small footprint, long duration” for all involved 
parties: US Army SOF, the Norwegian Home Guard, and Norwegian SOF.
A number of beneficial secondary effects might emerge from this cooperative 
training program. First, US Army SOF would have the opportunity not only 
to train in unconventional warfare by conducting foreign internal defense 
exercises with civilian indigenous units in a permissive environment, but also 
to support a strategic purpose in a NATO flank country. US Army SOF regard 
“bridging the Unconventional Warfare gap” as an integral part of their capability 
development.7 Second, US Army SOF would be able to familiarize themselves 
with the geography of the NATO country with the longest border (sea and land) 
with Russia, while also building important networks with and through their 
TO DETER FUTURE 
RUSSIAN AGGRESSION, 
THE CREDIBILITY OF 
THE NORWEGIAN 
THRESHOLD 
DEFENSE SHOULD BE 
STRENGTHENED.
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History of US-Norwegian SOF Cooperation and Value to NATO
Norwegian SOF carry on the traditions of the original 
Independent Company 1, also called the “Linge Com-
pany” after its first leader, Martin Linge. This was a British 
Special Operations Executive group formed in March 
1941, which incorporated Norwegian special soldiers. The 
group performed raids, conducted sabotage, and trained 
indigenous units in Norway, and its members were crucial 
in the development of the Norwegian Home Guard after 
WWII. 
William E. Colby, the former director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, met the predecessors of the cur-
rent Home Guard when he and his Office of Strategic 
Services Jedburgh team members jumped out of an 
airplane, together with soldiers of Norwegian descent, 
over Trondheim, Norway, in 1944 as part of Operation 
Rype (Grouse).8 He later praised the Norwegian Home 
Guard organization and emphasized its importance to 
Norway’s defense; one of the Norwegian Home Guard 
units in Trondheim carries the name Rype to honor this 
operation.9
Since 1960, the Norwegian Home Guard and early Nor-
wegian SOF units have trained in guerrilla warfare with US 
Army SF, first in the United States and later in Germany. 
From 1963 to the mid-1980s, US Army SF and the Norwe-
gian Home Guard conducted joint training and exercises 
at the Home Guard Training Center as part of the US 
Military Assistance Program.10 Beginning in September 
1970, US soldiers of the 10th Special Forces Group, who 
had recent experience fighting in Vietnam, contributed 
significantly to the courses taught at the Norwegian 
Home Guard Training Center at Dombaas. This activity 
was part of Exercise Flintlock, which continues with 
NATO SOF participation in a number of countries.11  
Cooperation between US and Norwegian SOF fits 
well with Commander, Allied Joint Force Command 
Brunssum General Hans-Lothar Domröse’s 2015 initiative 
for NATO SOF to develop innovative, low-cost, and small-
footprint hybrid defense approaches to counter “gray 
zone/phase 0” threats in Europe.12 Domröse particularly 
emphasized the importance of MA operations, led by SOF 
officers who were adept at working within both civilian 
and military structures.13 
At NATO NSHQ’s hybrid warfare seminar in June 2015, 
Lieutenant General Brad Webb, the commander of NSHQ, 
described what he saw as the three primary objectives for 
NATO SOF:
 ¡ Understand: “Get out there and figure out what is 
happening.”
 ¡ Enhance: “Show that you are out there and use 
your network.”
 ¡ (En)counter: “Use force if necessary, but it should 
not be necessary.”  
According to Webb, MA is a priority task for NATO SOF. 
He suggested that NATO SOF should embrace operational- 
and strategic-level MA activities through the conduct 
of long-term MA operations with a wide spectrum of 
partners. He further argued that such activities are most 
relevant and less difficult to approve within NATO before 
Martin Linge, the first commander of Norwegian 
Independent Company 1
Norwegian counterparts. Third, by participating in the training of the Home Guard, Norwegian SOF would have a venue 
for developing their MA capabilities in Norway; the experience would also provide them with options for future basic MA 
training. Fourth, US Army SF, Norwegian SOF, and the Norwegian Home Guard would have the opportunity to develop 








a conflict erupts, and that SOF are well-positioned to fill this role by taking 
advantage of opportunities within the global SOF network.14 
Visualization 2025
The following is a visualization of the ripple effects this deterrent course of 
action may create a decade from now. Fasten your seatbelts, and project yourself 
into 2025:
In 2025, the US Army SF and Norwegian SOF programs for training 
and advising the Norwegian Home Guard have helped increase the 
strategic relevance of a networked Home Guard, which presents 
considerable deterrent obstacles for potential aggressors. Further-
more, Norway’s defense strategists have finally abandoned their 
ambition to mirror the US AirLand Battle doctrine, which called 
for winning tactical victories against an initially superior aggressor 
by using small armored forces in mountainous terrain over vast dis-
tances, without any strategic movement capability. Like the Home 
Guard, the Norwegian Army and parts of the Navy have started to 
evolve into swarm-like networked structures. Norwegian strategy 
has shifted its focus away from tactical victories to one in which 
the defense forces avoid decisive battles while protracting the fight, 
as a means to achieve cumulative strategic effects over time (with 
NATO’s support). US Army SF and Norwegian SOF lead the way in 
this doctrinal change through MA training with the Norwegian 
Home Guard and the Army, including small-unit guerilla tactics 
augmented by superior firepower—another SOF specialty. The es-
sential purpose is to influence Russia’s perception of the credibility 
of Norway/NATO’s defense of Norway, and Russia calculates that 
this new strategy makes military aggression less likely to achieve 
Moscow’s strategic goals. Thus, the deterrent effect has increased.
Part 2: Military Assistance in Support of Reassurance
We must think differently, seek greater understanding of local, 
regional, and global contexts, and strengthen trust through 
interagency and partner cooperation. [emphasis added] 
 — Admiral William H. McRaven15
SOF represent diplomacy conducted by other means, and as 
such are usually subject to strict political or military control at the 
highest levels. [emphasis added]
 — Maurice Tugwell and David Charters16 
The previous section examined a proposal to enhance Norwegian and NATO 
deterrence through a NATO/US military assistance program in Norway. This 
section explores what might seem to be a diametrically opposed approach: reas-
suring Russia and mitigating incentives for aggression through MA programs. 
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Historical Background
Norwegian policy has been to engage Russia through 
cooperation whenever possible. The strategic objective 
is to ensure stability and predictability, especially in the 
High North region. Since the early 1990s, Norway and 
Russia have cooperated on the “safety side” of the security 
spectrum: managing non-military crises, conducting 
search and rescue in the North, responding to oil spills, 
and cooperating on border control.17 In 1998, the Norwe-
gian Coast Guard and Russian border units developed a 
partnership through the annual bilateral exercise, Barents. 
Military cooperation between the two countries increased 
from 2000 on, and a major Nordic-Russian exercise, Bar-
ents Rescue, was initiated in 2001.18 There were also stu-
dent exchanges between 
the Norwegian and 
Russian military acad-
emies.19 Norway began to 
participate in what was 
originally a US-Russian 
exercise, Northern Eagle, 
in 2008 and established a 
separate bilateral exercise 
with Russia in 2010. This 
exercise, called Pomor, 
included preparations for 
joint anti-terrorism and 
anti-piracy operations.20 
Significantly, despite all 
of these exercises and 
exchanges, Norwegian 
and Russian SOF have 
never participated. The 
only known joint exercise 
between Norwegian SOF and the Russian military oc-
curred in 2008 in the Russian city of Pskov, when Norwe-
gian SOF personnel parachuted together with the Russian 
76th Air Assault Division as part of a program led by the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to the 
Norwegian officers who participated, this visit seemed 
like a one-time event—a symbolic activity without any 
long-term strategic purpose.21 
From the Norwegian perspective, military cooperation 
was a key factor in the normalization of relations between 
NATO and Russia after the Cold War. This period was not 
without bilateral challenges and incidents, yet progress 
was real. Perhaps the most important result of Norway’s 
cooperative policy was the settlement in 2010 of the 
40-year-long border dispute between Russia and Norway 
in the Barents Sea, signed on the Russian side by Prime 
Minister Dmitri Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov and for the Norwegians by Prime Minister Jens 
Stoltenberg (now secretary general of NATO) and Foreign 
Minister Jonas Gahr Støre (see figure 1). 
As described earlier, Russia has recently established 
strategic objectives that violate the sovereignty of its 
neighbors and threaten the stability of the international 
system. Moscow has selectively used tools from the full 
range of state power—including the overt and covert use 
of force—to consolidate its objectives (see Dayspring’s 
article in this issue). Following the annexation of Crimea 
in 2014, Norway, together with other NATO countries, 
placed most of its bilateral cooperation efforts with Russia 
on hold. Norway has nevertheless maintained some con-
tact in the northern areas 
between the Norwegian 
and Russian coast and 
border guards, and the 
Norwegian Joint Head-
quarters still maintains 
open channels with the 
Russian Northern Fleet 
to de-conflict military 
activity in the High 
North. In short, Russia 
is a geographic and 
geo-political fact and will 
remain the dominating 
factor in Norway’s 
security strategy for the 
foreseeable future. It is, 
therefore, worthwhile 
to consider a course of 
action that could help 
improve the currently tense political atmosphere between 
Norway/NATO and Russia, based on common security 
interests in the High North.
The Goal of the Proposed Course of Action
Like deterrence, reassurance is all about signaling. Few, 
if any, bilateral military activities signal trust or the 
credibility of intent more effectively than cooperation 
between countries’ special forces. To signal Norway’s 
desire to improve bilateral relations, Norwegian SOF could 
use their experience with maritime counterterrorism 
operations to conduct joint counterterrorism training and 
exercises with Russian SOF during future bilateral exercises 
like Pomor. Based on existing bilateral energy agreements, 
it is still possible that the two countries will exploit future 
transnational oil and gas fields in the Barents Sea as one 
large unit, perhaps with both Russian and Norwegian 









personnel at the same installation.23 Furthermore, Russia’s proposed Northern 
Sea Route from the Kara Sea to the Bering Strait will likely become a vital route 
for global shipping and Arctic tourism in the future. There will probably be oc-
casional hostage rescue operations at sea in which both Norwegian and Russian 
lives are at stake. 
Norwegian cooperation with Russia could (and arguably should) be developed 
through a memorandum of understanding that enables joint actions against 
terrorism and sabotage on the Snøhvit (Snow White) and future Shtokman 
oilfields, and to protect petroleum transport and shipping in the Barents Sea.24 
Norwegian SOF have the experience, knowledge, and procedures to implement 
integrated operations with other countries’ military forces, including countries 
with which Norway does not normally share all available intelligence and 
information.25 
The desired end state will be achieved when Norway’s and Russia’s mutual 
security concerns regarding future infrastructure can be jointly met without 
misunderstandings, when mutual trust is reestablished, and when Russia has 
weighed the costs and benefits of aggression towards Norway and has come to a 
conclusion that is positive for Norway and NATO. 
While the strategic purpose of this cooperative course of action is to use Norwe-
gian SOF as a strategic asset to help reestablish trust between Norway/NATO and 
Russia in the future, there are also some secondary effects that could arise from 
such a policy. First, countering terrorism is a policy objective shared by Norway/
NATO and Russia. It is, therefore, possible that joint counterterrorism training 
would be viewed as less politically sensitive than other kinds of military activity. 
Both Norwegian and Russian SOF units have repeatedly fought Islamist terror-
ists who were willing to die for their cause, but each country’s SOF uses different 
equipment, rules of engagement, and tactics. Russian SOF also have valuable 
experience from conducting counterinsurgency and MA operations.26 Sharing 
such experiences might be tactically beneficial for both parties. 
Second, Russia’s apparent ambition is to assert itself as a regional actor, and 
possibly to reestablish itself as a global actor. Russian SOF are currently active in 
conflicts where NATO SOF are also present, although they operate from different 
strategic perspectives. We are seeing a growing level of complexity in the cur-
rent conflict environment, and this condition is likely to continue. NATO SOF 
have recently had substantial difficulties trying to de-conflict activities with the 
Russians in a “shared” battlespace, most notably in Syria. Norway has operational 
experience with such de-confliction, primarily through routine communications 
between the Norwegian Joint Headquarters and the Russian Northern Fleet, a 
policy that has included personal visits between commanders. Over time, this 
course of action could help build similar person-based trust and knowledge 
between Norwegian and Russian SOF commanders. In future scenarios like Syria, 
Norwegian SOF personnel may contribute to de-confliction, and perhaps even to 
cooperation, between Russian and NATO SOF by expanding on such knowledge 
and trust. Building such levels of trust requires persistent engagement, however; 
it cannot be surged.27
Third, former Russian Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdiukov was inspired by 
Western special operations command models to establish the new small and lean 
Russian Special Operations Command.28 Although it sounds far-fetched today, 
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Norway should not exclude the eventual possibility of exchanging perspectives 
on the use of SOF at the doctrinal level with Russia. Russia has a well-deserved 
reputation for encouraging innovative military thinkers who develop efficient 
doctrines. It is likely that Western nations can learn from this model if the 
current geo-political environment changes. If it does, a readiness to discuss 
cooperation on doctrine might position Norway as a potential NATO partner for 
this kind of mutual exchange.
In short, future cooperation between Norwegian and Russian SOF is an invest-
ment in “diplomacy by other means,” which could help bridge the mistrust that 
currently exists between Russia and Norway/NATO. 
NATO Justification
Of all of NATO’s partner relations, none holds greater potential 
than that between NATO and Russia. But today that potential is 
not being fully met.
 — Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO Secretary General 
(2009–2014)29
“The basic problem, I think, is very simple. It is the lack of trust. It 
is the lack of trust on both sides.”
 — Marek Menkiszak, Head, Russian Department, Centre for 
Eastern Studies30
SOF-related training and operations issues similar to those described earlier 
have been discussed between NATO and Russia for years. The NATO-Russia 
Council provides a mechanism for consultation, consensus building, cooperation, 
joint decision making, and joint action. Russia should have a direct interest in 
maintaining such ties because it shares borders with several countries where ter-
rorists are being mobilized and trained. According to former Norwegian Foreign 
Minister Støre, the NATO-Russia Council has benefited from Russia’s knowledge 
of Afghanistan in connection with the fight against illegal drugs, issues relating Merlin Mk3 helicopter  
in heavy snow in Norway
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to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and terrorist activity, all of 
which are SOF-related concerns.31
Russia scholar James Sherr notes that Russia is a multinational state that is 
threatened by extremism and the growing sophistication of globally organized 
terrorist movements, and he emphasizes the importance of the work that NATO 
and Russia can do together.32 The radicalization of Muslims is another problem 
shared by NATO member countries and Russia. Terrorism expert Julie Wilhelmsen 
also notes that the radicalization of Russian Muslims, both in Chechnya and 
other areas, is the biggest internal security threat facing Russia. Russian researchers 
estimate that Russians fighting for ISIS number nearly 8,000, which is a substan-
tial number by global standards.33
One initiative NATO and Russia have unveiled is the STANDEX project, which 
aims to prevent terrorists from using explosives against commuters in mass 
transit systems.34 Both the STANDEX project and the Cooperative Airspace 
Initiative are examples of successful NATO-Russian cooperation.35 Both work 
well because of two important elements, which are also present in the reassur-
ance actions proposed here: the two sides benefit equally, and neither project 
involves politically highly sensitive issues. Both of these projects are technical in 
character and address real concerns.36 The course of action described here also 
addresses concrete, technical problems related to common security interests in 
the High North and should therefore be welcomed by both Russia and Norway/
NATO.
General Robert Mood, Norway’s senior military representative at NATO Head-
quarters, recently urged that the military dialogue with Russia be strengthened: 
“There is no reason why there should not be closer links both between Russia 
and NATO, and Russia and Norway. It is a dialogue that is required, not least in 
crisis.”37 Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Philip Breedlove 
explained why Norway’s relationship with Russia occupies a vital strategic 
niche: “In NATO, we see Norway’s leadership in the way it handles relations with 
Russia. Norway has a long history of working with Russia in the border areas. 
You [Norwegians] have experiences that we can learn from in NATO.”38
Visualization 2025
The following is a visualization of the ripple effects that such a course of action, 
based on reassurance and cooperation, might create a decade ahead. Buckle up 
once again, and project yourself into 2025:
Norway has made some progress in its efforts to reassure an eco-
nomically weak and increasingly desperate Russia that both Russian 
elites and the Russian population will have their interests best served 
through increased cooperation with Norway and NATO. Norwegian 
SOF at the Norwegian Joint headquarters and Russian SOF represen-
tatives from the Western Military District have established personal 
contacts with one another. Based on common security interests in 
the High North, the first small unit exchange between Norwegian 
and Russian SOF is now being discussed at the highest political 
levels. Maritime counterterrorism provides a basis for possible future 
cooperation in the Barents Sea area. NATO headquarters is informed 
 “IN NATO, WE SEE 
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about the progress of these plans, and the issue gains support in 
the North Atlantic Council. Norway strengthens its niche role as a 
dialogue partner with Russia, and Russia’s leaders are reassured that 
their country’s security and economic interests in the High North 
are best taken care of through cooperation, not aggression.
Using the global SOF network for military assistance operations will enhance 
NATO capabilities, help develop cost-effective countermeasures for hybrid war-
fare, and support national security policy objectives. New and innovative uses 
for MA concepts could enhance both deterrence and reassurance measures aimed 
toward Russia. NATO SOF leadership have noted that these kinds of operations 
are much more likely to be approved before a conflict erupts, and they win ap-
proval more easily than other types of operations.39 This is an aspect of MA that 
should be exploited, because there are likely to be several other national security 
objectives—or even international strategic security objectives—that MA opera-
tions can fulfill within the broad category of NATO special operations. It is to be 
hoped that NATO SOF leadership make it possible to exploit the full potential of 
Alliance MA capabilities before the level of conflict rises too far and the political 
landscape makes military assistance operations impossible. ²
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HELP BUILD  
RELATIONSHIPS 
OF TRUST AND 
CONFIDENCE.
This special issue of the Combating Terrorism Exchange offers 
a number of proposals for the best uses of NATO special operations forces in 
countering hybrid opponents and unconventional tactics. These are threats that 
remain in the “gray zone” of conflict, below the threshold at which an Alliance 
member state might resort to war and invoke the collective defense measures 
provided under Article V. Recent evidence of Russian government–directed 
interference in the 2016 US presidential election through cyber operations 
underscores the need for NATO nations to refine their means for identifying, 
characterizing, attributing, and defeating such unconventional threats to their 
national and collective stability. The articles collected here suggest that NATO 
should use a whole-of-government or comprehensive approach as the framework 
for countering the hybrid threats that abide in the gray zone. International law 
enforcement organizations such as INTERPOL and domestic law enforcement 
agencies, intelligence services, emergency response organizations, customs and 
immigration agencies, academic scholars, and civil organizations, in addition 
to national military forces, must develop routine proactive methods to share 
information. Working together, they must develop an accurate threat assessment 
mechanism to sustain situational awareness across the Alliance. As an important 
component of such a comprehensive approach, NATO SOF bring unique capabili-
ties to bear.
Current NSHQ commander Vice Admiral Colin Kilrain sees NATO SOF operating 
throughout the spectrum of hybrid conflict, particularly in the gray zone—a con-
cept advocated by former NSHQ commander Lieutenant General Brad Webb and 
explored by the contributors throughout this special issue. According to VADM 
Kilrain, preparing NATO to embrace this enabling role for SOF will require a 
stair-step approach, beginning with education and training programs that build a 
common base of knowledge, a shared lexicon, and a set of procedures throughout 
the Alliance. In addition to developing a shared understanding of these hybrid 
threats, the education and training programs can help build relationships of trust 
and confidence between NATO SOF and the government agencies that lead efforts 
to counter hybrid warfare. Education and training, coupled with strong relation-
ships, will enable the development of civilian-led inter-agency, multi-national 
structures in NATO that will be responsible for identifying, characterizing, 
attributing, and directing the mitigation of hybrid threats. 
NATO can build on the research presented in this special issue to develop a 
mechanism to implement a whole-of-government comprehensive approach, or if 
I may boldly suggest, a whole-of-alliance comprehensive approach. Creating a truly 
comprehensive approach to countering hybrid threats—whether civilian-led or 
military-led—is complicated, and additional research and analysis are needed. 
One proposal is to engage the academic research community in creating a NATO-
based research branch dedicated to the study and analysis of hybrid warfare 
and the development of a comprehensive approach to mitigate those threats to 
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Alliance member and partner nations. This agency could 
be modeled after the Special Operations Research Office 
(SORO) established by the US Army to study revolutionary 
warfare in the 1950s and 1960s.  
One unique characteristic of SORO was the dedicated 
relationship it established between the military branches, 
charged with countering revolutionary 
warfare threats to liberal democracies, 
and the interdisciplinary academic 
community that studied the complex 
security environment of the period. This 
precedent for military-academic coop-
eration may prove particularly valuable 
for developing nuanced threat assess-
ments and new measures for countering 
the threats that now appear character-
istic of conflict in the gray zone. Such a 
collaborative relationship may be vital to 
achieving the NSHQ commander’s vision 
for a civilian-led, whole-of-Alliance 
approach to security. Only by bringing 
such diverse capabilities and assets to 
bear will NATO successfully counter the current dangers 
posed by Russian hybrid warfare, instability in the Middle 
East and North Africa, and other sources.
The priority line of research should be to assist NSHQ 
in developing an education and training program along 
the lines of the stair-step approach proposed by VADM 
Kilrain. The next most pressing line of research is to 
construct an Alliance-wide legal framework that facili-
tates the identification, characterization, attribution, and 
mitigation of both hybrid and conventional threats to the 
individual and collective member states. Further lines of 
research should define innovative indirect countermea-
sures that NATO can apply under this legally empowered 
whole-of-Alliance framework, according to the Alliance’s 
principle of collective security, and should also explore the 
use of military assistance operations to build partner na-
tions’ law enforcement and military capabilities, because 
stable neighbors can create a buffer for the states that 
border the Alliance. Another vital avenue of research is 
the use of SOF in roles that deter Russia and other adver-
saries from engaging in hybrid warfare. 
As LTG Webb indicated in his Foreword, this special issue 
of CTX came out of a partnership between NSHQ, the US 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), and the Norwegian 
Defence Research Establishment (FFI). 
As former NSHQ chief of staff and now 
as the sitting NPS chair for Special 
Operations, I, too, believe in the value 
of collaboration between the opera-
tional forces and academia. I intend 
to promote this partnership as an 
enduring asset that will directly link to 
a future NATO research office. Both the 
military organization and the academic 
institution bring unique characteristics 
to the collective effort to effectively and 
efficiently identify and resolve emerging 
challenges to the security of NATO and 
its member states. 
Finally, I would like to thank those men and women 
responsible for the completion of this special issue of CTX, 
including the former and current officers who produced 
the bulk of the research, the faculty who advised the 
research, the former and current NSHQ command teams 
who inspired the research, and the CTX staff. Special 
thanks go to FFI and its director of research, Frank 
Brundtland Steder, who took a leading role in this project 
from beginning to end.  ²
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JSOU PUBLICATIONS
Military Innovation in War: It Takes a Learning Organization; A 
Case Study of Task Force 714 in Iraq 
by Richard Shultz
In this monograph, Dr. Shultz provides key findings on how organizational 
change and innovation by Task Force 714 dismantled al Qaeda in Iraq’s net-
worked secret organization. Dr. Shultz utilizes sound methodology to show 
how TF 714 was able to achieve this incredible transformation. Drawing from 
memoirs and in-depth interviews with several TF 714 leaders, Dr. Shultz further 
analyzes these sources through the use of analytic tools drawn from leading 
business and management studies focused on organizational learning and in-
novation. This monograph provides critical insights and lessons learned for US 
Special Operations Forces and interagency partners who will establish, deploy, 
or support a special operations command and control organization. It is also a 
good historical case study and provides a foundation on how to adapt, innovate, 
and grow military structures into learning organizations to meet the future 
challenges of complex environments and our enemies.
These recent JSOU Press publications are available electronically in the JSOU Library Management System: 
https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications
Special Operations Research Topics 2017
Special Operations Research Topics 2017 presents a list of recommended SOF-
related research topics for those who desire to provide insight and recommenda-
tions on issues and challenges facing the SOF enterprise. As with the past several 
years’ topics publications, this list is tailored to address priority areas identified 
by USSOCOM. There are five SOF priorities: Ensure SOF Readiness, Help Our 
Nation Win, Continue to Build Relationships, Prepare for the Future, and Pres-
ervation of the Force and Family. This publication also includes the Key Strategic 
Issues List, which is another key document that identifies critical research topics. 
It is developed and maintained by the USSOCOM J5 Strategy, Plans, and Policy 
Directorate. Reflecting the consensus of the SOF experts who participated in the 
Research Topics Workshop, these topics are particularly worthwhile for ad-
dressing immediate SOF needs and for building future capacity to meet emerging 
challenges.
CTX | Vol. 6, No. 4
November 2016
103
The Asia Pivot: Implications for US Special Operations Forces  
by Russell D. Howard and John P. Duvall, Jr.
In this compelling new monograph by retired US Army Brigadier General Russ 
Howard and U.S. Marine Corps Major John Duvall, Jr., the authors leverage 
their vast experiences and knowledge of the region to explore the Obama Ad-
ministration’s Asia Pivot strategy, announced in 2011, and its impact on special 
operations. The authors begin by defining this vast region. They then look at US 
strategic goals, evaluate the threats, and provide an analysis of the progress from 
2011 to where America is today, along with the importance to and impact on 
special operations. This monograph is the culmination of two years of analysis of 
the “pivot to Asia” by the authors. It provides a starting point for all SOF to gain 
a better understanding of this vast region and the future role SOF could play to 
counter the threats to our national interests.
Assessing Special Operations Forces Language, Region, and Culture 
Needs: Leveraging Digital and LRC Learning to Reroute the 
“Roadmap” from Human Terrain to Human Domain  
by Robert R. Greene Sands
For this essay, Dr. Greene Sands uses his vast experience and knowledge of 
this subject and draws from the existing Department of Defense’s Language 
Transformation Roadmap, recent lessons learned, and historical beginnings to 
outline the importance to the US military, especially the SOF community. The 
past decade of counterinsurgency operations has challenged the ability of US 
military personnel to carry out a variety of missions involving culturally complex 
situations and interactions. Success in such operations often depends on difficult 
linguistic and interpersonal skill-based competencies and abilities. Dr. Sands 
emphasizes the utility of language skills, along with regional and cultural knowl-
edge and cross-cultural competence, in engaging populations across sometimes 
uncompromising cultural divides. This monograph provides key lessons learned 
as US Special Operations Command determines the way ahead for LRC educa-
tion and training to better prepare the future SOF operator to meet the chal-
lenges of operating in complex environments and meet the command’s priority 
to continue to build relationships.
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